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A GENTLE AND EASY DEATH: FROM ANCIENT GREECE
TO BEYOND CRUZAN TOWARD A REASONED LEGAL
RESPONSE TO THE SOCIETAL DILEMMA OF
EUTHANASIA
THANE JOSEF MESSINGER*
To be, or not to be, that is the question:
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles
And by opposing end them. To die, to sleep.
No more; and by a sleep to say we end
The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to; 'tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wish'd. To die,
to sleep.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of euthanasia has presented societies throughout history
with a deeply troubling dilemma of defining the meaning of death-and
the value of life. 2 Advocates on both sides are pointed in their criticisms,
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1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAmLET PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 1.
Hamlet's soliloquy speaks timelessly well to both sides of the euthanasia debate; "the slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune" captures the essence of what is normally considered by
proponents necessary for euthanasia to be legitimate, while the "thousand natural shocks"
are destined for all, and are thus not sufficient to warrant taking arms against one's own sea
of troubles. Id. The operative words are "outrageous" on the one hand and "natural" on the
other.
2. See, e.g., DON V. BAnE, TH CHALLENGE OF EUTHANASA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRA-
PHY ON EUTHASI AND RELATED SUBJECTS (1990); DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETT, THE
RIGHT TO DIE: UNDERSTANDING EUHANASIA 1-130 (1986) (the authors are co-founders of The
Hemlock Society, which advocates euthanasia); 0. RUTH RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO Din: MORAL
AND LEGAL AsPEars OF EUTHANASIA 53-214 (rev. ed. 1977); BETH SPRING & ED LARSON, EUTHA-
NASIA SPIRITUAL, MEDICAL & LEGAL ISSUES IN TERMINAL HEALTH CARE 105-34 (1988) (histori-
cal Christian perspective); SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA: HISTORICAL AND COTEMPORARYTHEMES
9-216 (Barouch A. Brody ed., 1989) [hereinafter SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA]; DAVID C. THOM-
ASMA & GLENN C. GRABER, EUTHAsA TowARD AN ETHICAL SOCIAL POLCY 85-86 (1990);
ROBERT N. WENNBERG, TERMINAL CHOICES: EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE, AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 1-107
(1989);JEERv B. WILSON, DEATH BY DECISION: THE MEDICAL, MoRAL, AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
EUrHANASIA 17-45 (1975).
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with little common ground for compromise.3 The law often skirts the is-
sues involved, primarily because society is unable deal with the explosive
problems associated with euthanasia. Euthanasia, however, should not be
viewed through the narrow lens of our own society or time. It is important
to understand the historical and philosophical developments surrounding
euthanasia if we are to strive to devise an acceptable legal structure to
resolve these difficult problems.
Those opposed reject euthanasia on the ground that it places injeop-
ardy a fundamental inviolability of human life.4 From Biblical proscrip-
tions to "natural" law, human life is considered sacrosanct, and efforts to
destroy even a fraction of our time on earth are a direct violation of God's
will.- Suffering is itself seen as a positive influence. 6 The objection has
two levels: first, rejecting the possibility that life can have negative value,
7
and second, rejecting the power of man to choose for himself to end his
own life.8 Further, opponents point to a parade of horribles, which they
3. Compare Nat Hentoff, The Indivisible light For Life STUmS IN L., MED. & Soc'y 1-9
(1987) (pamphlet describing a "pro-life" position, published by Americans United for Life,
which opposes euthanasia) (copy on file with DENY. U. L. REv.) and PAUL MARX, Excns'rS
FROM: THE MERCv KILLERS 1-7 (date unknown) (pamphlet distributed by Human Life Inter-
national, which opposes euthanasia) (copy on file with Draw. U. L. Ray.) and CALIFORNIA
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, VOLUNTARY ACTIV EuT AN~s THE "HuMANE AND DIGNIFIED DEATH
Act 2 (1988) (report concluding that the risks of active voluntary euthanasia outweigh the
benefits) with GLANv.LE WnLAAms, THE SANCrrrT OF LIFE AND THE CmMNAL LAw 311-50
(1957) (an early modem advocation of euthanasia by a leading legal scholar) and THE NA-
TIONAL HEMLOCK SOCIETV, SUPPORTING THE OnIoN OF ACrrVE VOLUNTARY ETHNASIA FOR
THE TERMINALLY ILL 1 (1990) (pamphlet describing the Hemlock Society's General Principles
and Objectives) (copy on file with DENv. U. L. REv.) and AMERICAN CvIL LmERTIs UNION,
Poucir #271 (1976) (supporting the legitimacy of Living Wills, while recognizing society's
right to prevent suicide (Policy #213)) (reprinted in informational sheets distributed by the
ACLU) (copy on file with DENv. U. L. REv.).
4. Cf Basil Mitchell, The Value of Human Life in MEDICINE, MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE
VALUE OF LIF 34-46 (1990). Western civilization has been indelibly marked by Christian
influences, which have imbued an assumption that, to be civilized, a society must value
human life absolutely. See id. at 38-39; see also infra note 78 and part II.B. See generallyJoseph
Boyle, Sanctity of Life and Suicide: Tensions and Developments Within Common Morality, in SUICIDE
AND EUTANASIA, supra note 2, at 221-47 (explaining that the sanctity, sacredness, or dignity
of human life provides sufficient reason why one should not kill an innocent person).
5. See infra notes 112, 361-62, 365-67 and accompanying text. It is possible to object on
non-religious grounds to euthanasia as immoral. See infra notes 367, 370 and accompanying
text. Non-religious moral arguments often concentrate on the effects of condoned euthana-
sia, particularly concerning the element of "voluntariness" and its difficult definition. See
infra parts IV.A.4-6; see also infra note 48 (noting an argument that "voluntary" euthanasia is
oxymoronic, and necessarily involves varying degrees of coercion). These arguments are
powerful because they do not rely for support on the self-referential nature of theological
arguments, but instead look to the moral foundations of society. Objections on moral
grounds, as distinguished from purely theological ones, are probably best enunciated
through the slippery slope objection, infra part IV.A.2, and the effect on the euthanasia-
candidate and his family, infra part IV.A.6.
6. See infra notes 217, 368, and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 101 and accompanying text; cf. infra notes 428-432 and accompanying
text (arguing that life may indeed have a negative "value"). But cf. Mitchell, supra note 4, at
43-44 (noting that the authors of the Linacre Centre's report Euthanasia and Clinical Practice
carefully avoided framing the issue in terms of the overall quality of the patient's life to avoid
the moral morass there).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08, 112.
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fear will inexorably follow any loosening of proscriptions against killing.9
One example often cited is the Nazi German debacle, during which mil-
lions died-hundreds of thousands under the auspices of "euthanasia"
programs. 10 Opponents further argue that any legitimization of euthana-
sia will erode medical" and societal' 2 values and will deprive the individ-
ual of the will to live.'
3
Against these contentions, proponents of euthanasia cite examples of
human suffering that have become increasingly frequent as medical tech-
nologies improve.' 4 Medicine can now save many who, arguably, should
not be saved; some, in essence, outlive their own deaths.' 5 The noble goal
of medicine has proved a double-edged sword: in the race to preserve life,
suffering is sometimes prolonged instead.16 Those in favor of euthanasia
must necessarily reject-or ignore-the theological arguments regarding
the sanctity of life. Sanctity itself is, by definition, absolute.' 7 This is an
uncomfortable position for many, but an unavoidable one when faced
with the very real problems of miserable deaths.
As with other issues that are inextricably linked to disparate moral,
medical, philosophical, theological, and legal considerations, euthanasia
provides little room for agreement.' 8 Each side in the debate enters the
arena with incompatible presuppositions; either one accepts theological
precepts-and all that that implies-or one does not.'9 Progress in the
9. Generally, proponents are also concerned about the possibilities for abuse, but stress
instead the need for legal safeguards. Se; e.g., RussEu., supra note 2, at 272-80; Paul A. Drey
&James J. Giszczak, May I Author My Final Chapter? Assisted Suicide and Guidelines to Prevent
Abuse, 18J. LEGIs. 331, 338-45 (1992) (noting several policy considerations that need to be
addressed before legislation is passed). Further, abuses may be exacerbated by the secrecy
caused by a lack of legal options. RussEl., supra note 2, at 226-27; cf. Robert A. Pletcher,
Assisted Suicide for the Terminally ll: The Inadequacy of Legal Models to Rationally Analyze Voluntary
Active Euthanasia, 13 CiuM. JusT. J. 303, 304-15 (1992). Also objected to is the use of the
slippery slope argument as an offensive shield; it can be raised against virtually any action.
Wnjums, supra note 3, at 315; see also infra text accompanying note 141.
10. See infra notes 176-89, 371, and accompanying text.
11. See infra part IV.A4.
12. See infra part IVA5.
13. See infra part IV.A.6.
14. See Htmn mv & WicKE-rr, supra note 2, at 131-44.
15. See WENNB.RG, supra note 2, at 77-78.
16. Robert N. Wennberg recounted a horror story based on a letter published in the
British Medical Journal of February 17, 1968, in which a 68-year-old physician is diagnosed as
having advanced stomach cancer, which spread quickly to the liver. He suffered constant
pain despite increasing dosages of drugs. He developed a lung arterial clot, which was re-
moved. After this, he specifically requested that no other actions be taken to prolong his life.
Two weeks later he had a heart attack and was resuscitated. He had four heart stoppages that
night, and was resuscitated each time. He lingered for another three weeks, while vomiting
and suffering convulsions. Preparations were made for artificial respiration, but his heart
beat them to it. Id. at 112.
17. See Boyle, supra note 4, at 221-47 (discussing the theological arguments behind sac-
rosanct life).
18. The fact that five U.S. Supreme Court opinions were written in the recent watershed
case concerning Nancy Crnzan indicates the divisive nature of the debate. See infra notes 438-
40 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 361-68 and accompanying text. For a discussion of non-religious ob-
jections to euthanasia see Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Kill-
ing" Legislation, 42 MwN. L. REv. 969 (1958).
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form of reasoned, balanced public debate and policies are unlikely. In
this version of the zero sum game, one side will be the loser. Unfortu-
nately, in this debate the loser won't be able to easily live-or die-with
the loss.
Part II of this article focuses on the various meanings of "euthanasia"
and related issues.20 Part III traces the patterns of euthanasia practices
and societal mores from ancient Greece and Rome 2 to early Christian
attitudes, 22 and finally to contemporary history.23 Part IV examines argu-
ments on either side of the euthanasia controversy.2 4 Parts V and VI ex-
amine the legal issues25  and moral, medical, and economic
considerations2 6 surrounding the various facets of the euthanasia debate.
Part VII briefly illustrates contemporary euthanasia policy in the Nether-
lands.2 7 Finally, Part VIII recommends a redefinition of the right of pri-
vacy to include a property interest in one's own physical person, arguing
that government mustjustify intervention in cases where euthanasia is con-
sidered.28 Further, the criminal law should consider the humanitarian
motives of the person who kills, the circumstances of the death, and the
circumstances of the person who dies. These distinguish permissible eu-
thanasia, under very limited circumstances, from homicide.
2 9
II. DEFINING EuIrHANASIA AND RELATED TERMs
The term "euthanasia" often connotes disguised murder, barbarism,
uncaring elimination of "problem" people, or worse, planned genocide.
30
Many who advocate euthanasia define it as "death with dignity," "mercy
killing," or "the right to die,"3 ' while opposing groups, such as the Inter-
national Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, see active3 2 euthanasia as "death on
20. See infra part II.
21. See infra part ll.A
22. See infra part II.B.
23. See infra part III.C.
24. See infra part IV.
25. See infra part V.
26. See infra part VI.
27. See infra part VII.
28. See infta part VIII.
29. See infra part VIII.
30. See infra notes 177, 189 and accompanying text.
31. See CHRimAAN BARNARD, GOOD Lir GoOD DETxi: A DocroR's CASE FOR EurTHANA-
SIA AND SUICIDE 63 (1980); Arthur Dyck, Beneficent Euthanasia and Benemortasia: Alternative
Views of Mercy, in BENEmCENT Eur N5ia 117, 118 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1975);James Rachels,
Passive and Active Euthanasia Are Equally Acceptable, in EuT As OPPOsING VIEWPoINTS 42,
43 (Neal Bernards ed., 1989). See Generally ROBERT L. RISLEY, DeATH wrm DCNrIr. A NEw
LAw PEPJ&rNG PSYsicLAN Am-rNDvmr, (1989); Peggy L. Collins, Note, The Foundations of the
Right to Die, 90 W. VA. L. Rev. 235 (1987). "Agathanasia" refers to a "better death." Kenneth
L. Vaux, Debbies Dying. Mercy Killing and the Good Death, in EurHA AsIA: THE MoRAL ISSUES 30
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1989). Arthur Dyck believes the word
"benemortasia," from the Latin bene (good) and mor (death), better describes how we ought
to behave toward those who are dying or whose death would appear to be a merciful event
See Dyck, supra, at 124.
32. See infra text accompanying note 45.
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demand," the moral equivalent of murder.8 , Importantly, euthanasia is
not suicide; rather, it can be a limited subset of a general category of sui-
cide.8 4 Defining euthanasia precisely has become particularly problematic
because it can encompass disparate actions, or omissions, as well as gen-
eral philosophies of life and death. The emotions involved in this debate
invariably affect, and are affected by, broader feelings, fears, and societal
taboos.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines euthanasia simply as "[a] gentle
and easy death."8 5 Black's Law Dictionary defines euthanasia as "the act or
practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable
and distressing disease as an act of mercy."8 6 Of these definitions, Oxford's
is the most eloquent,3 7 while Black's is more precise in addressing the cur-
rent uses and connotations of the word, and in focusing the legal and
ethical issues on the circumstances where euthanasia may or may not be
appropriate.38 For these reasons, Black's definition is intended through-
out this Article.
3 9
Euthanasia can be further subdivided according to the nature of the
action ending life.40 Passive 41 euthanasia ordinarily entails a refusal to
33. See HUMAN LIE CENTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-EuTHANASIA TASK FORCE: AN IN-
TRODUCTION, (undated) (discussion of the organization's reasons for being); see also FR. PAuL
MARx, AND Now EUTHANAsIA 14 (1985) (distributed by Human Life International, an organi-
zation that opposes euthanasia).
34. Suicide is "the act or an instance of taking one's own life voluntarily and intention-
ally." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1156 (1981). The motive for taking one's own
life, central to the issue of euthanasia, is missing in the definition of suicide. See infra text
accompanying notes 501-03 (discussing motive in the definition of homicide). Itis also possi-
ble for euthanasia to not be suicide, as in involuntary euthanasia. See infra notes 49-52 and
accompanying text.
35. VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 444 (2d ed. 1989). The definition includes "the
means of bringing about a gentle and easy death," as well as the more recent use, "the action
of inducing a gentle and easy death." Id.
36. BLACKS'S LAw DICTIONARY 554 (6th ed. 1990); see also Arm iucAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDcICN 424 (1989) (rejecting passive euthanasia as a subset of
euthanasia).
37. It has the advantage also of being (relatively) apolitical. Etymologically derived from
the Greek eu (good) and thanatos (death), it does not bear the burden of current sociological
debate. See OxFoRD ENGLISH DicrnoNARY, supra note 35. But cf. C. Everett Koop, The Chal-
lenge of Definition, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2 (1989) (U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop
arguing that "euthanasia" is misleading when interpreted as a "good death," because such an
interpretation rejects theJudeo-Christian axiom of absolute sanctity of life, and that the med-
ical arena is no place to reverse societal values).
38. See also Philippa Foot, Euthanasia, in DEATH AND DECISION 85, 86 (Ernan McMullin
ed., 1978) (underscoring the importance of understanding the meaning beyond that given
by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, which is essentially the same as that of the Oxford
English Dictionary); THOMASMA & GRtAER, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing the role of "value"
in the euthanasia debate).
39. Poetic license is requested for the title; BLACK's definition is hardly the stuff of an
inspiring banner.
40. Many, particularly those opposed to euthanasia, refuse to recognize the following
distinctions; they are seen as purposefully confusing distractions from the central issues. See,
e.g., MARX, supra note 33, at 14.
41. Also referred to as "negative" or "indirect" euthanasia, or "dysthanasia." See Hum-
Pint & WIcKETr, supra note 2, at 289; RUssELL, supra note 2, at 19-20; WILSON, supra note 2, at
81 (citing Joseph Fletcher, who later replaced "dysthanasia" with "antidysthanasia").
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make extraordinary efforts to keep a person alive.42 Many do not consider
this euthanasia. Rather, it is seen as merely leaving to nature the ordinary
course of events that follow if extraordinary means are not used to main-
tain life.4 3 Active 44 euthanasia, conversely, involves some deliberate action
to cause death.4 5 Distinguishing between passive and active euthanasia is
often crucial because many who strongly oppose active measures support
passive ones.46 Others, however, see a false dichotomy between the ethics
of passive and active euthanasia.
47
Euthanasia can be either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary eutha-
nasia is the least complicated ethically, as the dying person can make a
rational request, and be examined to ensure the validity of the request.
48
42. But cf Rachels, supra note 31, at 43 (defining passive euthanasia as refraining from
doing anything to keep the patient alive) (emphasis added). To avoid semantic difficulties,
medical ethicists now often refer to "forgoing life-sustaining treatment" rather than the more
controversial "passive euthanasia." See THOMAS SCULLY & CELIA SCULLY, PLAYING GOD: THE
N w WORLD OF MEDICAL CHOICES 112 (1987). See generally By No ExTR owRNDr, ME.ANs:
THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-susTATNINc FOOD AND WATER (Joanne Lynn ed., 1986) (discuss-
ing the implications of a decision to forgo food and water).
43. See, e.g., MARx, supra note 33, at 14; see alsoJ. Gay-Williams, The Wrongfulness ofEutha-
nasia, in EU ANAsI THE MORAL ISSUES 97, 98 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum
eds., 1989) (stating that a failure to continue treatment after it is recognized that the patient
will not recover is not euthanasia).
44. Also referred to as "positive" euthanasia. See RussE.L, supra note 2, at 19.
45. See, e.g., BARNAR.D, supra note 31, at 27; Rachels, supra note 31, at 43.
46. This is particularly true in a religious context. For an excellent synthesis of various
religious beliefs, see Htmsv & Wicxrmr, supra note 2, at 295 (containing a chart from
GR.LD LARuF, EUTHANASIA AND RELIGION (1985)). Nearly all religions cited accept passive
euthanasia (albeit not necessarily with that label), while opposing active euthanasia. See id.
Notably, this is not universally true; some religions consider active euthanasia to be a personal
choice. See id.
47. See BARNARD, supra note 31, at 69, 80; Rachels, supra note 31, at 44; see also DennisJ.
Doherty, Physician-Assisted Suicide: What Constitutes Assistance?, 65 Wis. LAw. 20, 20 (1992). Dr.
Joseph Fletcher outlined a progression in degrees of euthanasia:
1. An absolute refusal to elicit any human initiative in the death or the dying. Life
must always be considered as the ultimate human value.
2. A qualified refusal, in that the doctor can refrain from employing extraordinary
means of preserving life but would nonetheless do whatever possible by ordinary
means to keep life going.
3. Declining to start treatment in a patient who has an incurable disease and is
suffering from a curable inter-current illness (for example, the terminally ill
cancer patient with pneumonia). The doctor refuses to initiate treatment for
the lung infection that can be cured and in this way may actually hasten death.
4. Stoppage of treatment, with consent, where it is the patient's wish not to be
treated any further.
5. Stoppage of treatment, without consent, when the attending physician feels that
further treatment can only prolong suffering.
6. Leaving the patient with an overdose of narcotic or sedatives, thus assisting the
dying person to take his own life.
7. Prior permission is given by the patient to the doctor to administer an injection,
under certain circumstances, from which the patient will not recover.
8. Without consent, and on his own authority, the doctor ends the patient's life
with an overdose of drugs.
Paper given by Dr.Joseph Fletcher to the 1974 Euthanasia Conference in New York, reprinted
in BA NARD, supra note 31, at 63-64. Barnard sees social attitudes regarding the various forms
of euthanasia as hypocritical and illogical; man has long sanctioned and encourages massive
deaths via war. Id. at 67; see alsoJustice Scalia's discussion in Cruzan, infra note 440.
48. But cf. Richard Fenigsen, A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia, 19 HAsTNcs CENTER REP.
22, 24 (1989) (arguing that "voluntary" euthanasia is oxymoronic and necessarily involves
varying degrees of coercion). This constitutes one of the strongest arguments of those op-
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Involuntary49 euthanasia has not been, but should be, further categorized
into beneficent and malevolent involuntary euthanasia.50 The distinction
is a function of the motives behind, and the methods used, in the actions
taken. On the one end is a decision made by the family and the courts
with the best of intentions, and with full legal safeguards.5 1 On the other
is the purposeful disregard of human concerns, either in violation of legal
processes, or with co-option of the legal system itself.
52
As medical technologies extend life, the question of what constitutes
death is itself becoming increasingly difficult to define.53 This is particu-
larly relevant to the issues of beneficent involuntary euthanasia where pa-
tients can be kept alive when arguably they should die.
5 4
III. HIsToRIcAL CONTEXT
A. Early Attitudes Toward Euthanasia
5
By necessity, ancient views of death often differed dramatically from
posed to euthanasia on moral, but not necessarily religious, grounds in that the voluntariness
of the euthanasia decision can never be truly ascertained, and decisions made because of
subtle or not-so-subtle external pressures may poison the possibility for genuinely beneficent
euthanasia. See generally VOLUNTARY EuTHANAsIAz EXPERTS DEBAT THE a rrorO Dm (A.B.
Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986). One of the requirements for active euthanasia in
the Netherlands is "voluntariness," defined as a persistent, conscious, and free request by the
patient. See M.A.M. Wachter, Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316, 3316
(1989); infra part VII.
49. "Involuntary" is a somewhat unfortunate term, as it can have two connotations as the
antonym of "voluntary": it can mean either a decision made in the absence of free will, or a
decision made against one's free will. The difference is critical, and here, the meaning is that
of a decision made in the absence of free will. Euthanasia performed involuntarily in the
Nazi German sense is neither intended nor the subject of current legal debate.
50. See infra notes 181, 191, 372.
51. If and when such safeguards apply remains a problematic issue in this debate. See
infra part V.A
52. See infra notes 176-89, 371 and accompanying text; cf Donald R.A. Uges & Ben
Greijdanus, Euthanasia: A Challenge for the Forensic Toxicologis 35J. FORENSIC Scs. 1424, 1425-
30 (1990).
53. See ANN E. Wmss, Bimo'cs: DaxtAs IN MODERN MEDicrNE 79 (1985); BARNARD,
supra note 31, at 31. See generally B.D. CoLE, HARD CHOIcES: MIXED BLEssINGs OF MODERN
MEDiCAL TECHNOLOGIES 243-64 (1986); H. Tristram EngelhardtJr., Definitions ofDeath: Where
to Draw the Lines and Why, in DEATH AND DECISION 15 (Eman McMullin ed., 1978); Collins,
supra note 31, at 236. BLAcK's LAW DICrONARY defines death simply as "the cessation of life,"
which is hardly helpful in medical situations. BLACK's LAW DarIoNARY 400 (6th ed. 1990).
Even the second part, "permanent cessations of all vital functions and signs," is too vague for
questions of when death occurs; medical sophistication in monitoring stages of death has
grown far beyond the general diagnoses that have previously sufficed. Id. According to
BAc's, characteristics of brain death (the "Harvard" definition) include: "(1) unreceptivity
and unresponsiveness to externally applied stimuli and internal needs; (2) no spontaneous
movements or breathing; (3) no reflex activity; and (4) a flat electroencephalograph read-
ing after 24 hour period of observation." Id. at 188. A precise definition might not be possi-
ble, or even desirable. Death is a gradual process at the cellular level, with different tissues
varying in their abilities to withstand deprivation of oxygen. See BARNARD, supra note 31, at
34. Brain cells are among the least able to withstand anoxia. Id.
54. See, eg., infra notes 296-307, 309-38 and accompanying text.
55. Historical illustrations are neither considered nor intended as justifications for
modern practices or proposals. Rather, they are useful empirically as a reference for
contemporary ideologies and as examples to be either criticized or espoused.
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those of modem societies. 56 Whether as a result of injury, disease, or old
age, death was treated as a natural part of life. Aiding death was often
done out of respect, not contempt, for the impaired individual. 57 In an-
cient Greece, euthanasia appears to have been an accepted and prevalent
practice. Indeed, many Hellenic philosophers advocated euthanasia.58 As
the Hellenics prospered, the Platonic principle of kalokagathid, the ideal of
a perfect balance of physical and mental well-being, gradually replaced the
Homeric values of glory and victory.59 Also involved was the underlying
belief, prevalent as well in Roman thought, that man is the master of his
own body, with the right to decide his own fate.60 These values competed
with the traditional disapproval of suicide that was based primarily on the
individual's loyalty to the state, and the Greek taboo against killing one's
kin.61 Despite the Greek taboo, suicide was sometimes not only possible,
but officially endorsed.
According to some historians, a custom existed on the island of
Ceos62 whereby very old citizens who had outlived their usefulness to soci-
ety would gather annually, as if for a banquet, and drink together a lethal
potion. 63 In one of Greece's oldest colonies,64 as well as in Athens and
Ceos, it was the custom for public magistrates to maintain a depository of
poison65 available for anyone who could justify his desire for death before
56. We must be careful to avoid interpreting the actions and beliefs of ancient cultures
according to present-day circumstances and ethical values. To comprehend fairly the poli-
cies then in existence, one must view the practices in relation to the then-current religious,
social, and technological conditions.
57. See, e.g., THoMAsMA & GRAB -R, supra note 2, at 85-86.
58. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 55. See generallyJohn Cooper, Greek Philosaphers on Eutha-
nasia and Suicd in SUCmE AND EtrrHANAsiA, supra note 2, at 9-32. John Cooper points out,
however, that our English understanding of the words "euthanasia" and "suicide" are mis-
leading in interpreting the opinions of Hellenic philosophers; suicide was more narrowly
construed, and euthanasia in its contemporary meaning was never discussed. Id. at 9-11. The
relevant issue was the person's ability to live a full, active life in furtherance of socially useful
activities that he was previously suited for, not his medical conditions or suffering; their medi-
cal knowledge was insufficient to decide these matters with certainty. Id. at 11; cf. infra text
accompanying notes 69-75. Indeed, to Plato, the question was an objective one; the patient's
wishes were not controlling, or even elicited. See Cooper, supra, at 12-14. The result of a
person who wishes to prolong his life is uncertain. Id. at 13; cf. infra note 182 and accompa-
nying text. Interestingly, the aged are not included in Socrates' discussions; their efforts for
the community are no longer expected. Cooper, supra, at 13. In Plato's Republic, they are
due honor and respect, and do not fall under his restrictions against prolonging life. Id.
59. Hum'HRY & WIcTr, supra note 2, at 3; WILSON, supra note 2, at 20.
60. RussELm, supra note 2, at 53 (referring to historian Morris H. Safron of Rutgers Medi-
cal School).
61. See ALFRED ALVAREZ, THE SAVACE GOD: A STuDY OF SUICIDE 56 (Bantam Books 1973)
(1971). Taboos against the taking of one's own life also existed. Illegitimate suicide was an
offense against the state, with penalties imposed. V THE ETHics OF ARISTOTLE xi (J.A.Y.
Thomson trans., 1980); see also Cooper, supra note 58, at 19-23. Usually, the corpse's right
hand was cut off, he was buried separately, his descendants were disenfranchised, and his
family was dishonored. See HUMPHRY & WIcKETr, supra note 2, at 3.
62. The birthplace of Hippocrates. RussEuL, supra note 2, at 53.
63. Id.
64. What is now Marseilles.
65. Extracted from the infamous hemlock, which provides a painful and uncertain
death. See Introductoy Letterfiom the National Hemlock Society 2 (rec'd Aug. 10, 1990) (copy on
file with DENY. U. L. REv.).
[Vol. 71:1
A GENTLE AND EASY DEATH
the Senate. 66 Libanius 6 7 is quoted as stating the rules for requesting
permission:
Whoever no longer wishes to live shall state his reasons to the
Senate, and after having received permission shall abandon life.
If your existence is hateful to you, die; if you are overwhelmed by
fate, drink the hemlock. If you are bowed with grief, abandon
life. Let the unhappy man recount his misfortune, let the magis-
trate supply him with the remedy, and his wretchedness will
come to an end.68
According to Plato, Socrates saw painful disease and suffering as good
reasons not to cling to life. 69 In the Republic,70 Socrates praised Asclepius,
the god of healing and medicine, for his more humane and practical poli-
cies. Bodies that disease had penetrated "through and through" Asclepius
would not have attempted to cure: "[H]e did not want to lengthen out
good-for-nothing lives.... Those who are diseased in their bodies, [physi-
cians] will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an
end to themselves."
7 1
A far more extreme view of appropriate social policy was sometimes
advocated. Asclepius is said to have scorned weak fathers for begetting
weaker sons.72 Similarly, Socrates recommended infanticide: "[T]he off-
spring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed,
will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be."
73
Socrates even condemned the physician Herodicus, the teacher of Hip-
pocrates, for "the invention of lingering death."74 Aristotle also endorsed
infanticide to ensure the state of the worthiest citizens.75 On Ceos, evi-
dence indicates an ancient custom76 requiring people over sixty to com-
mit suicide-a "utilitarian practice."
77
Perhaps the best evidence of euthanasia in Greece is the condemna-
tion of the practice by others, such as the Pythagoreans,
78 Aristotelians,7 9
66. See HUMPHY & WIczMT-, supra note 2, at 4.
67. Greek Sophist and rhetorician, who serves as a major source of historical informa-
tion for the period. SeeVIR THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BArrNNIcA 327 (15th ed. 1986).
68. EMIE DuRm-ma, SuicmE: A Sru-Y IN SOCIOLOGY 330 (John A. Spaulding & George
Simpson trans., 1951).
69. Humsmwv & WicKarr, supra note 2, at 4.
70. PLATO, THE PORTABLE PLATO 398 (Scott.Buchanan ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Viking Press 1966). Many physicians may have followed this policy, but for less noble rea-
sons. Doctors of the time were itinerant and had the status of craftsmen. Their livelihoods
demanded accurate diagnoses and effective cures-if at all. HutnHRv & WICKETr, supra note
2, at 4; Wn.soN, supra note 2, at 19.
71. PLATO, supra note 70, at 398, 401.
72. Id. at 398.
73. Id. at 471.
74. PLATO, supra note 70, at 396. Socrates stated that Herodicus, "being a trainer, and
himself of sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found out a way of
torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world." Id.
75. See HUmPHRY & WicKtrr, supra note 2, at 3.
76. Possibly a legal requirement. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 20.
77. Id.
78. The Pythagoreans rigorously opposed suicide based on their religious belief that
each man is assigned to his post in life by the gods, and cannot desert it regardless of the
circumstances. Id. at 21; Cooper, supra note 58, at 32. The Pythagorean philosophy influ-
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and Epicureans.8 0 Perhaps most importantly, the Greeks elevated the sub-
ject to one susceptible to rational discourse.8 '
To the Romans, living nobly meant dying nobly. The appropriateness
of suicide depended on the dominant will and a rational choice.8 2 Conse-
quently, aristocrats were often allowed suicide as an alternative to execu-
tion or enslavement.8 3 Killing oneself was also acceptable as an escape
from disgrace at the hands of an enemy.
8 4
In Rome, suicide was punishable only if irrational. Killing oneself
without cause was contemptible because "whoever does not spare himself
would much less spare another."8 5 Terminal illness, however, was consid-
ered good cause. The idea of dying well was a summum bonum, or extreme
good.8 6 Indeed, Marcus Aurelius defended the right of the individual to
free himself from even the danger of "intellectual decrepitude."
8 7
The Stoics favored suicide when life was no longer in accordance with
nature, because of pain, grave illness, or physical abnormalities.8s Seneca
wrote:
It makes a great deal of difference whether a man is lengthening
his life or his death. But if the body is useless for service, why
should one not free the struggling soul? Perhaps one ought to
do this a little before the debt is due, lest, when it falls due, he
may be unable to perform the act.8 9
Although less debated, in other areas of the world similar practices
occurred. In some Eskimo tribes, an old or sick member would request of
his family to die. If the family was a good one, it would comply by aban-
enced later beliefs, and indeed, is reflected in the basic medical ethics of the Hippocratic
Oath. WILsoN, supra note 2, at 21.
79. Aristotle opposed suicide as contrary to the right rule of life, as an injustice against
the state, and cowardly if done to escape suffering. WILSON, supra note 2, at 21; Cooper,
supra note 58, at 19-23.
80. While the Epicureans believed that the soul ceased to exist at death, they did not
value life absolutely. Epicurus urged men "to weigh carefully whether they would prefer
death to come to them, or would themselves go to death." WILSON, supra note 2, at 21-22.
Cicero attributes to Epicurus the thought that we may "serenely quit life's theatre, when the
play has ceased to please us." Cooper, supra note 58, at 29. Still, Epicurus was insistent on
the unreasonableness of suicide. Id.
81. HUMPHRY & WIcKETr, supra note 2, at 5. John Cooper admires the Hellenic debates
and believes that these philosophers have already said everything of value regarding the kill-
ing of one's self. Cooper, supra note 58, at 32.
82. ALVAREZ, supra note 61, at 62.
83. HuMPHR & Wiciarr, supra note 2, at 5.
84. Id. For interesting accounts of a classic example of 960 men, women, and children
who consciously chose death rather than disgrace and certain execution or enslavement, see
generally GEORGE C. BRAu.vR, JR., JUDAEA WEEPING: THE JEWISH STRuocLE AGAINST Rohm
FROM POMPEY TO MASADA, 63 B.C. TO A.D. 73 (1970); MOSHE PEARLmsAN, THE ZEALOTS OF
MASADA: STORY OF A DIG (1967); AiYRlE H. TAMAmN, REVOLT INJuDEA: THE ROAD TO MASADA
(1968).
85. HUMPHRY & WicTrr, supra note 2, at 5.
86. Id.
87. RussELL, supra note 2, at 54.
88. Cooper, supra note 58, at 24-25.
89. WILSON, supra note 2, at 22.
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doning the Eskimo to nature or by killing him.9 ° When an elderly Aymara
Indian's9 1 time came, relatives and friends were summoned for a death
vigil. If death was slow, the elder could ask for assistance, whereupon his
family would withhold food and drink until he slipped into unconscious-
ness and died.9 2 Aboriginal Australians may have practiced their own
form of euthanasia.93 The Khoikhoin9 4 of southern Africa would prepare
a lavish feast before ceremonial abandonment in the wilderness. 95 Less
sympathetically, -the Ethiopian elderly were tied to wild bulls, the Amboyna
ate their failing relatives out of a sense of charity, and the Congolese
jumped on the tired and old until life was gone. 96 Formosans97 would
complete the process somewhat more humanely with strong drink-most
likely a potent rice alcohol.
98
B. Early Christian Influences
Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear
no evil: for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff they comfort me.99
In the second and third centuries, the growing influence of Christian-
ity weakened Stoicism.100 For Christians, the value of life, which for the
Greeks and Romans was determined by the quality of life, was reinter-
preted to mean that life per se was valuable regardless of the circum-
stances. 10 1 Church law followed the denunciation of suicide' 0 2 by
denying anyone who had taken his own life a Christian burial, a considera-
ble punishment for the time.10 3 Civil legislation was similarly influ-
90. HumPr-Rta & WicxE-r, supra note 2, at 2. Abandonment is not as cruel as it may at
first seem. Hypothermia (exposure to extreme cold) normally causes an anesthetized state as
the body slowly shuts down its non-critical (exterior) systems in favor of heating the body
core, resulting in spreading numbness. Pain results usually only during reheating. Cf. ENLc-
acoPEDtA OF MwDrcrNE, supranote 36, at 562-63; THE MERcK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THER-
An 2361-63 (15th ed. 1987). Religious beliefs are also relevant here, as many Eskimos believe
that anyone who has courageously faced death spends eternity in the highest heaven. Hum-
PHRY & WicKETT, supra, at 2.
91. Of Bolivia. HumpHRY & WcKErr, supra note 2, at 2.
92. Id. Interestingly, medical examinations of these deaths indicates that death was
caused not by starvation or thirst, but rather, by the simple will to die. Id.
93. See Derrick J. Pounder, A Probable Case of Euthanasia Amongst Prehistoric Aborigines at
Roonka, South Australia, 23 FORENSIC Sca. INT'L- 99, 101-08 (1983).
94. Pejoratively known as the Hottentots. VII OxFoRD ENGLISH DICnONARY, supra note
35, at 430.
95. See HumPHrY & WxcE-rr, supra note 2, at 2.
96. Id.
97. In what is now Taiwan, remnants of the aboriginal culture remain in the mountain-
ous central and eastern regions. See ROBERT SToREY, TArwAN 10 (1987).
98. See HumPHRY & WicKcEr, supra note 2, at 2.
99. Psalms 23:4 (KingJames).
100. HumPHRY & Wic:--rr, supra note 2, at 5.
101. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 23. See general!y Darrel W. Amundsen, Suicide and Early
Christian Values, in SuXCD E AND EUTANAsLA, supra note 2, at 77.
102. Suicide was considered diabolically inspired. WILSON, supra note 2, at 23; see also
SPRNmG & LARSON, supra note 2, at 105;Joseph Sullivan, The Immorality ofEuthanasia, in BENEF -
cEs-r EuTHAN~siA 12, 19 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1975). Scripture, however, is silent on suicide. See
Amundsen, supra note 101, at 77.
103. -WtsoN, supra note 2, at 23.
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enced.10 4 The deceased's property was confiscated, and the body was
ignominiously buried on the highway, impaled by a stake. 10 5 There were
no exceptions; every suicide was branded a frlo de se, regardless of the ex-
tent or duration of suffering.1 0 6 Christian leaders' interpretations of
Christianity demanded that suicide was an abomination. 10 7 Killing oneself
essentially took from God that which belongs to God; to decide one's own
death thus violated God's will.' 0 8 Still, suicides were not uncommon. 10 9
In the fifth century, however, Saint Augustine 1 0 proclaimed that "sui-
cide is a detestable and damnable wickedness.""' He proposed several
reasons to support his condemnation. First, taking one's own life was a
violation of God's Sixth Commandment: "Thou shall not kill." 112 Second,
suicide was a usurpation of the function of church and state. 113 Third,
suicide deprived man of the opportunity'of repentance. 1 4 Finally, life
and its sufferings are divinely ordained by God and must be borne accord-
ingly. 1 5 It should be noted that Saint Augustine was referring to suicide,
104. Id.
105. HUMPHRY & WITrrr, supra note 2, at 6.
106. Id. But cf. Amundsen, supra note 101, at 78 (noting that early Christian condemna-
tions of suicide were rare, and equivocal).
107. See HUMPH & WIctr, supra note 2, at 6.
108. Id.
109. The general practice of suicide was perhaps fueled by Christian martyrdom. Id.; see
also Amundsen, supra note ibi, at 79-80; WILSON, supra note 2, at 25 (noting indications of
ceremonial euthanasia in Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and England).
110. Leader of the early Christian Church and author of City of God. RussELL, supra note
2, at 54.
111. SAnrr AuGusTIm, THE Crry OF GOD 30 (Marcus Dods trans., 1950). Augustine saw
two classes of exceptions: suicide would not be murder if it were justified either by a general
law or by a special commission granted to some individual. Id. at 27; RussELL, supra note 2, at
54. In addition, deaths resulting from wars fought in obedience to divine commands, or in
conformity with God's laws, were by no means violations of the Commandment that "Thou
shall not kill." AUGUSTINE, supra, at 27 (making no mention of the method of communica-
tion from God necessary to divinely command a war). Under the second exception, Abra-
ham's actions were to be applauded, because he was ready to slay his son in obedience to
God, rather than to his own passion. Id. Similarly, Jephthah's killing of his daughter was
merely in compliance with a command from God to kill the first to meet him as he returned
from battle. Id.
112. Saint Augustine took pains to point out his interpretation of the Commandment
"Thou shalt not kill" did not prohibit the killing of plant and animal life, but did prohibit the
killing of other men and one's self. AUGUSTME, supra note 111, at 26.
113. HUMPHEY & WicIxr, supra note 2, at 6. This could logically imply that both the
church and state have the power to enforce suicide and homicide. It does, however, seem to
suggest that the church and state have the sole, or ultimate, authority over a person's life and
death.
114. SeeAuGuSTNE, supra note 111, at 30 ("Is it not better to commit a wickedness which
penitence may heal, than a crime which leaves no place for healing contrition?").
115. See id. at 29-30. An argument used by Augustine in support of this proposition is
arrived at by negative implication:
For suicide we cannot cite the example of patriarchs, prophets, or apostles; though
our Lord Jesus Christ, when He admonished them to flee from city to city if they
were persecuted, might very well have taken that occasion to advise them to lay
violent hands upon themselves, and so escape their persecutors. But seeing He did
not do this, nor proposed this mode of departing this life, though He were address-
ing His own friends for whom He had promised to prepare everlasting mansions, it
is obvious that such examples as are produced from the "nations that forget God,"
give no warrant of imitation to the worshippers of the one true God.
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which encompasses a broader range of actions than euthanasia. 116 Saint
Augustine may also have had practical considerations in mind: high birth
and survival rates of Christians were crucial to the growth of Christian-
ity. 117 Both church and criminal laws followed, intensifying the official
disapproval of euthanasia.
Theological opposition to suicide culminated in the thirteenth cen-
tury with Saint Thomas Aquinas. 118 In the Summa Theologica, he synthe-
sized the medieval philosophical and theological arguments against
suicide. Suicide was sinful, not merely because it violated the Sixth Com-
mandment, but because it left no time for repentance." 9 Further, suicide
was against the law of nature and contrary to charity. 120 Each man be-
longs to his community;, it was thus unlawful to deprive society of his pres-
ence and activity. Finally, it was a sin against God, as life was a gift and
subject only to God's powers.' 2 ' While the Reformation altered the near-
total authority of the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages, the
Reformers continued in their opposition to suicide, citing theological ar-
guments.122 Similarly, euthanasia was not an arguable moral issue. Some
accounts, however, indicate a different treatment of the insane and de-
formed. According to three slightly variant accounts, a twelve-year-old
congenitally abnormal boy was considered merely a monster or lump of
flesh-a massa carnis without a soul-and should thus be drowned. 123
In the Chrisian world, the noted sixteenth century British scholar and
statesman Sir Thomas More 124 differed dramatically in his views. In Uto-
pia, his vision of an ideal society, voluntary euthanasia was officially
sanctioned:'
25
The sick they see to with great affection, and let nothing at all
pass concerning either physic or good diet whereby they may be
restored again to their health. Them that be sick of incurable
diseases they comfort with sitting by them, with talking with
them, and to be short, with all manner of helps that may be. But
if the disease be. not only incurable, but also full of continual
Id. at 28. For example, it is not for women to follow the example of earlier martyrs who
avoided rape by suicide, or even to question the design of God in allowing such rapes by
enemy heathens. See id. at 31, 33. Saint Augustine alluded to "some lurking infirmity" in the
women which might have caused God to bring such outrages upon them. Id. at 33-34.
116. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
117. See RussEa., supra note 2, at 54.
118. HtrMprYw & Wicrrr, supra note 2, at 7; Russu.L, supra note 2, at 55.
119. See Hurmwv & WicKErr, supra note 2, at 7.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 24. Two unusual forms of euthanasia were evidently
practiced in the Jewish community during the period. Removal of a pillow from beneath a
dying person was believed to hasten the process of dying. Alternatively, the synagogue keys
were placed under the pillow of the dying as a means of easing death. Both practices were
officially discouraged, either by law or condemnation. Id. at 25. The former practice was not
peculiar to the Jewish community, and continued into the seventeenth century. Id.
123. Id. at 24. It was further believed that the devil resided in such persons in place of
their soul. See id. at 25.
124. The Roman Catholic Church canonized Sir Thomas More in 1935, four centuries
after his death. Russu.L, supra note 2, at 55.
125. See Humw & Wicrr, supa note 2, at 7.
1993]
DENVER UN!VERS!TY LAW REV!EW
pain and anguish; then the priests and the magistrates exhort the
man, seeing he is not able to do any duty of life, and by outliving
his own death is noisome and irksome to others and grievous to
himself, that he will determine with himself no longer to cherish
that pestilent and painful disease. And seeing his life is to him
but a torment, that he will not be unwilling to die, but rather take
a good hope to him, and either dispatch himself out of that pain-
ful life, as out of a prison, or a rack of torment, or else suffer
himself willingly to be rid of it by others. And in so doing they
tell him he shall do wisely, seeing by his death he shall lose no
commodity, but end his pain.... But they cause none such to
die against his will, nor they use no less diligence and attendance
about him, believing this to be an honourable death.
126
Sir Thomas More thus outlined a forerunner of contemporary proposals
for the practice of euthanasia with legal safeguards. 12 7 His views met with
strong opposition, but in succeeding centuries, others, including Francis
Bacon,128 John Donne,129 and David Hume, 30 joined his criticism of the
doctrine that taking one's own life was necessarily wicked.' 3 '
Medical knowledge grew throughout the Renaissance to such an ex-
tent that professionals began to recognize the paradox their knowledge
brought them; abilities to maintain life sometimes brought suffering,
which threatened to diminish the value of life.' 3 2 In 1790, due primarily
to the influence of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Diderot, France enacted a
statute legalizing suicide.' 33 The common law of England, however, con-
tinued to regard suicide' 3 4 as a crime, with the penalties of forfeiture and
ignominious burial.'
3 5
126. ST. THOMAS MoRE, UTOPIA (Edward Surtz ed., 1964), reprinted in RussELL, supra note
2, at 55-56. Lawyers, interestingly enough, would play no part in the debate; truth would
most easily come from the mouths of each citizen, "uncoached in deception" by lawyers, who
would be banned from the mythical Utopia. See MoRE, supra, at 114.
127. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 56.
128. Who insisted that doctors should help dying patients "make a fair and easy passage
from life." HUMPHRY & WICKE31r, supra note 2, at 8.
129. Dean of St. Paul's, who, in Biathanatos, argued in favor of voluntary euthanasia. See
id.; RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 56.
130. In his 1777 Essay on Suicide, Hume argued that a man who retires from life does no
harm to society, he only ceases to do good. DAVID HtmE, DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL
RELIGION AND THE PosTuMoUs ESSAYS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF =H SOUL AND OF SUICIDE 103-
04 (Richard H. Popkin ed., 1980). Further, ifa person cannot promote the interests of soci-
ety but rather is a burden, his resignation from life is not only innocent but laudable. Id. See
generally Tom L Beauchamp, Suicide in the Age of Reason, in Stncm AND EuTHA~ssA, supra
note 2, at 183 (discussing of the views of Donne, Hume, and Kant).
131. See SUICIDE AND EtrmsANsrA, supra note 2, at 183. See generally Gary B. Ferngren, The
Ethics of Suicide in the Renaissance and Reformation, in SUICDE AND EuTrnNAiA, supra note 2, at
155 (discussing the evolution of opinion regarding suicide after Augustine).
132. See WiLsoN, supra note 2, at 26.
133. RussELu, supra note 2, at 56. From 1700 to 1789, only eighteen successful actions
were taken against suicides in France. HUmfa & Wc, rr, supra note 2, at 9.
134. Defined as one who "deliberately puts an end to his own existence, or commits any
unlawful malicious act, the consequence of which is his own death." 4 WnjjtAM BiACysrONE,
CoMMENrAIus ON a LAw OF ENGLANm 189 (The University of Chicago Press 1979). There
was no exception for suffering- suicide was prohibited even when accomplished "to avoid
those ills which [persons] had not the fortitude to endure." Id.
135. See id. at 189-90.
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C. Contemporary Historical Background
1. The 1800s
The term "euthanasia" first appeared, in the contemporary sense of
induced death, during the latter part of the nineteenth century.' 3 6 Essays
by S.D. Williams, and later by the Honorable Lionel A. Tollemache, re-
futed critical arguments and laid the groundwork for the formation of
pro-euthanasia groups in England and elsewhere.13 7 Williams insisted
that it was the duty of the physician in cases of hopeless and painful illness
"to destroy consciousness at once and put the sufferer to a quick and pain-
less death."' 38 He warned, however, that every effort should be made to
prevent any possible abuse of this duty.13 9 Tollemache incorporated his
and Williams' arguments into his book Stones of Stumbling, in which he at-
tributed much of the fear of death to the preachings of Christians regard-
ing hell and suffering as a punishment for sins.1 40 He criticized the
slippery slope argument by commenting that "if we rejected all reforms
which might lead to contingent and remote evils, no reform whatever
would be passed and we should be in a state of... stagnation."14 1 He
further believed adequate safeguards were possible to prevent an abuse of
power.142 In the late 1800s, a society was formed in England to secure
such a change in the laws, but was declared illegal and disbanded. 143 Ad-
ditionally, Dr. William Munk'4 proposed, with little result, that the medi-
cal profession incorporate the study of euthanasia in medical training.
45
2. The Early 1900s
In 1901, Dr. Charles Goddard 146 suggested that, beginning with the
medical profession, a new attitude was needed regarding this "somewhat
gruesome subject." 14 7 The first bill to legalize voluntary euthanasia for
adults of sound mind who are fatally hurt, terminally ill, or suffering ex-
treme pain was introduced in the Ohio legislature in 1906, but died in
committee.
148
136. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 57.
137. See id.
138. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 27.
139. Id.
140. See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 57.
141. Id. at 58.
142. Id.
143. WILSON, supra note 2, at 27.
144. Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons, who used the term "euthanasia" in its origi-
nal meaning of a gentle or easy death. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 58.
145. See id.
146. In an article entitled: Suggestions in Favor of Terminatinatng Absolutely Hopeless Cases of
Injuiy and Disease. Id.
147. Id. at 60.
148. Id. The bill was described in a January 24, 1906 New York Times article as being
requested by a Miss Anna Hall following her mother's miserable death. That a woman would
draw up such a "cruel" bill dismayed the editor of the Independen who, along with editors
from the New York Times, condemned the bill. The January 25 New York Times editorial saw
the Ohio proposal as "something considerably worse than ignorant folly-something that
verges close upon, if not into, the criminal." RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 60-61.
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In 1912, a woman suffering constant pain from an incurable disease
petitioned the New York state legislature for permission for her physician
to put her to death painlessly.149 Her petition caused a sensation, eliciting
a mostly hostile public reaction, and was unsuccessful. 150
In 1917, Dr. HarryJ. Haiselden of Chicago allowed a baby girl born
with microcephaly to die when he could have saved her life. 151 Forty
other physicians had examined the girl and agreed with Dr. Haiselden's
decision.1 52 Supported by fifteen doctors at trial, he was acquitted.
153
In 1920, in People v. Roberts,'54 a Michigan man was convicted of willful
murder in the preparation of a poisonous mixture for his wife, who was
suffering from multiple sclerosis and had previously attempted suicide.155
He was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor and solitary confine-
ment.15 6 His conviction was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Michigan.'
57
In 1925, however, a Colorado physician who had killed his incurable
invalid daughter whom he had nursed for thirty-two years was released
after a jury was unable to reach a decision; the case was dismissed.
15 8
3. The 1930s
The 1930s were an important decade for the debate on euthanasia.
Books by two of Britain's most distinguished clergymen' 5 9 challenged
traditional beliefs and religious dogma. In 1931, Dr. C. Killick Millard, a
health officer for the city of Leicester, England, intensified the debate in
an address to the Society of Medical Officers of Health in London, and by
a companion article in support of legalization of euthanasia.16° In his ad-
dress, Dr. Millard described euthanasia as a basic human right, and pro-
posed a Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation Bill with the following
provisions:
1. An application for a euthanasia permit may be filed by a dy-
ing person stating that he has been informed by two medical
practitioners that he is suffering from a fatal and incurable
disease and that the process of death is likely to be pro-
tracted and painful.
2. The application must be attested by a magistrate and accom-
panied by two medical certificates.
3. The application and certificates must be examined and the
patient and relative interviewed by a "euthanasia referee."
149. Id. at 63.
150. Id.
151. RUSSEL, supra note 2, at 63.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 178 N.W. 690 (Mich. 1920).
155. WILSoN, supra note 2, at 29.
156. Roberts, 178 N.W. at 692.
157. Id. at 694.
158. WILsoN, supra note 2, at 29.
159. Dr. Willima Inge and Canon Peter Green. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 64.
160. Id. at 65; see also HumPHRY & Wicirr, supra note 2, at 13.
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4. A court will then review the application, certificates, the testi-
mony of the referee and any other representatives of the pa-
tient. It will then issue a permit to receive euthanasia to the
applicant and a permit to administer euthanasia to a medical
practitioner (or euthanisor).
5. The permit would be valid for a specified period within
which the patient would determine if and when he wished to
use it.
1 6 1
From this point on, euthanasia became a subject of much debate.' 62
In 1935, the British Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation Society was founded
to promote a change in the law. Its supporters and critics were both repre-
sented by medical, educational, religious, and social leaders of Britain.
The opponents succeeded in defeating the bill in the House of Lords by a
vote of thirty-five to fourteen.
163
In 1937, a similar bill was introduced in the Nebraska legislature. 164
It differed, however, in two respects. First, in addition to a person suffer-
ing from an incurable and fatal disease, it would have included those who
were helpless and suffering from the infirmities of old age. Second, the
next of kin would have been able to make an application on behalf of a
mentally incompetent adult, and a parent or guardian could similarly ap-
ply on behalf of a minor whose condition was incurable or fatal.1 65 The
161. C. Killick Millard, The Case for Euthanasia, 120 FORT. Rv. 708 (1930), re'rinted in
WusoN, supra note 2, at 31-32.
162. Dr. Harry Roberts, a highly regarded British physician and advocate of euthanasia,
was critical of Dr. Millard's bill for two reasons. First, its safeguards were too cumbersome,
and second, its scope was too limited. Regarding the former, Dr. Roberts wrote that "when
our sympathy outweighs our fear of the law, let us act on it." He further felt it was important
to permit euthanasia for hopelessly incapacitated or defective ihdividuals, who may not be
capable of making a request. RussELL, supra note 2, at 76. Dr. George W.Jacoby, in his 1936
book P, sicta.N, PASTOR, AND PAT=NT, criticized the influence of superstition and religion on
medicine and the resulting effect on public policy. Id.
The suicide in 1935 of Charlotte Gilman, great-granddiughter of Lyman Beecher,
sparked a public controversy. Named one of the greatest women in the world by Carrie Catt,
she left both a note in which she called "justifiable suicide" the simplest of human rights, and
an article for publication in which she wrote:
Our mental attics are full of old ideas and emotions, which we preserve sentimen-
tally but never examine. The advance of the world's thought is promoted by those
whose vigorous minds seize upon inert doctrines and passive convictions and shake
them into life or into tatters. This theory that suicide is a sin is being so shaken
today.
Id. at 77. Ms. Gilman's suicide had a parallel in the suicide three years earlier of George
Eastman, the manufacturer of cameras and patron of music and education. Id.
In response to her suicide, the editor of the Forum published a debate entitled The Right
to Die- Dr. Abraham Wolbarst, a distinguished New York physician, advocated euthanasia,
including cases of insanity which remained uncured for a period of time, such as ten years.
He further urged consideration of the suffering of relatives and friends, particularly where
hopelessness continues indefinitely. Dr. James Walsh argued the opposite position. He
wrote: "Suffering is one of the great mysteries of life and we do not know the meaning of
it.... Man who has suffered is more human." Id. at 78. He added that patients "recognize
that they deserve some punishment for.., slips from grace in past moments of weakness, and
become persuaded that their pain may represent punishment." Id. at 78; see also infra note
368 and accompanying text.
163. WILSON, supra note 2, at 32.
164. Russ=aL, supra note 2, at 71.
165. WILSON, supra note 2, at 32.
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bill was referred to a committee and indefinitely postponed.
16 6
In 1938, the Euthanasia Society of America was formed in New
York.16 7 The Reverend Dr. Charles F. Potter,168 its founder and first presi-
dent, commented that euthanasia was a problem that, sooner or later, con-
fronts every practicing physician.16 9 Potter, responding to the religious
argument that euthanasia violated the Sixth Commandment, stated:
It seems that if the killing is done wholesale and in anger and
bitter hate, the Ten Commandments can be set aside; but when
you come to an individual case, and the killing is done in mercy,
to release a sufferer from intolerable agony, then the Ten Com-
mandments are suddenly in force again.
170
Potter emphasized the safeguards that would prevent possible abuse by
unscrupulous and impatient heirs who might wish to hasten their benefac-
tor's demise. 171 Potter further advocated euthanasia for defective new-
born babies and the chronically insane, but on advice from other
members, limited the scope of proposed legislation to voluntary euthana-
sia only.
172
In 1939, a bill to legalize euthanasia, similar to the British bill,' 73 was
proposed by the treasurer of the Euthanasia Society for the State of New
York. It was, however, never introduced into the legislature, and the Sec-
ond World War temporarily suspended efforts on its behalf.' 74
4. Nazi Germany and the 1940s-1950s
The practice of euthanasia took a radically tragic turn in Nazi Ger-
many. The concept of lebensunwerten Leben17 5 provided the underlying ra-
tionale for the Nazi practice of "euthanasia."176 In stark contrast to most
166. RussELL, supra note 2, at 72. Apparently, no action on this bill has been taken since.
167. Id. Its original name was: "The National Society for the Legalization of Euthanasia."
Id.
168. Potter had left the Baptist Church to become a Unitarian minister and later a New
Humanist and was regarded by some as an apostle of liberal religion. Id.
169. Id. at 73.
170. Id.; cf. supra note 111 (St. Augustine's exceptions to suicide as murder).
171. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 73.
172. Id. at 74. Others in the Society were more radical in their views. Dr. Foster Ken-
nedy, the second president, recommended "the release from living of those who should
never have lived at all." Foster Kennedy, Euthanasia: To Be or Not to Be, CoLUEPas, May 20,
1939, at 15. Regarding "nature's mistakes," Kennedy argued that "it would be for the general
good that euthanasia be legalized for creatures born defective, whose present condition is
miserable and whose future ... hopeless." Id. at 16. Dr. Kennedy would, however, later
modify his position, to limit the scope of acceptable euthanasia, because of the danger of
errors. WILsoN, supra note 2, at 33. Dr. Alexis Carrel, another advocate, was even more
radical. "Sentimental prejudice," he had declared several years earlier, "should not obstruct
the quiet and painless disposition of incurables, criminals, and hopeless lunatics." The Right
to Kil TIME, Nov. 18, 1935, at 54; cf. infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying note 161.
174. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 74.
175. "Lives not worthy of life." HUmPHRY & Wrcxcrr, supra note 2, at 22. The term,
coined by Karl Binding and elaborated by Binding and Hoche, referred to a patient's objec-
tive uselessness to the community. WILSON, supra note 2, at 34. Also used during the war was
the phrase, unnutze Esser, or "useless eater." HUMPHRY & Wicxrrr, supra note 2, at 22.
176. WILSON, supra note 2, at 34.
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previous efforts to promote edthanasia based on a humanitarian compas-
sion for individual suffering, the argument behind lebensunwerten Leben fo-
cused on the right of society to rid itself of those who were
burdensome. 177 Although opposed by some religious leaders, the concept
had popular support in Germany. 17 8 Germany, like most cultures, has a
long history of obsession with racial purity.179 This, coupled with Ger-
many's humiliating defeat in World War I and the emphasis on a philoso-
phy that subordinated the individual to the community, led to "eugenic
euthanasia."' 80 Interestingly, efforts for legal reform to sanction euthana-
sia for the benefit of the patient were rejected because they were based on
individual rights, rather than for societal benefit.' 8 ' Indeed, throughout
177. SeeHelen Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law 103 U. PA. L Rzv.
350, 356 n.21 (1954). In an attempt to explain the depraved atrocities committed by some of
the most educated of the world's medical practitioners in exterminations and medical experi-
mentation, George Ables of the Nazi Health Office reportedly commented: "We're not think-
ing of individuals but of the race. The race is bigger than the individual." RUSSELL, supra
note 2, at 92. Medical experimentation was rationalized by the defense at the Nuremberg
trials as justified "worthy medical questions." Id.
178. WILSON, supra note 2, at 34. According to a 1920 poll, seventy-three percent of the
parents and guardians of mentally deficient children favored euthanizing the children. Id.
179. And thus, by illogical conclusion, racial superiority. The German concept of the
Volk or pure "Aryan" Germans who were destined to rule the world, had existed for centu-
ries. Humt-RY & Wcxr-r, supra note 2, at 21; see also CLARIssA HENRY & MARc HiF.LE, OF
Pu BLOOD 22 (Eric Mossbacher trans., 1976).
180. See HutrfPHw & WIccr, supra note 2, at 21; WILSON, supra note 2, at 34. The use of
both "eugenic" and "euthanasia" in this context is troublesome. "Eugenics," coined in 1883
by the English scientist Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, refers to the science that
deals with the improvement of hereditary qualities of a species or breed. WE3srER'S NEw
COLLEGIATE DIcrioNARY 390 (1981). What is highly objectionable are the operant qualities
defined by the Nazis, and their methods.
No reasonable conclusion regarding a positive correlation between a person's non-"Ar-
yan" background and decreased intelligence or physical capabilities can be drawn from em-
pirical (or any other) evidence. This assumes, parenthetically, that intelligence and physical
characteristics are the crucial variables for the "improvement" of the human species. Fur-
ther, eugenics has never required or intended extermination; selective breeding, or even
selective non-breeding, is normally meant. For an excellent discussion of the relevant issues
surrounding eugenics, see generally DANELJ. KEvLEs, IN THE NAmE OF EuGENics: GENMrcs
AND THE UsEs OF HuthaL HF F rr (1985).
"Euthanasia" is similarly strained in meaning because the contemporary reference is
from the perspective of the suffering individual; for the Nazis it was more a euphemism for a
program of murder than anything remotely similar to the context normally argued either for
or against. HUMPHRY & WICxKrr, supra note 2, at 28 (argument by Professor Lucy Davidowicz
that studying the Nazi experience does not enlighten us regarding the contemporary
problems surrounding euthanasia). Similarly, philosopherJoseph Fletcher considers it mer-
ciless, not mercy, killing. Id. Philosopher Marvin Kohl agrees, adding-
The motivation behind and the nature and consequences of acts of beneficent eu-
thanasia are radically different. In the Nazi example, the motivation, aside perhaps
from sadism, was solely that of maximizing "benefit" for the state. In cases ofbenefi-
cent euthanasia the motivation is essentially and predominantly that of maximizing
benefit for the recipient, of helping most where and when the individual needs it
most The Nazi form was involuntary- the form advocated here is voluntary.
Marvin Kohl, Voluntary Ben fient Euthanasia, in BENEFICENT EutHANAstA 130, 137 (Marvin
Kohl ed., 1975).
181. Silving, supra note 178, at 356 n.23. Further, there is no indication that later Nazi
atrocities included putting to death those suffering intolerably from a fatal illness; the entire
thrust of the government program was involuntary extermination of those the government
considered undesirable. HUMPHRY & WicKxrr, supra note 2, at 23.
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the war, no law legalizing euthanasia 82 existed.' 8 3
Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf in 1924: "All who are not of good race in
this world are chaff. And all occurrences in world history are only the
expression of the races' instinct of self-preservation, in the good or bad
sense."18 4 In 1939, Hitler signed a directive initiating a Nazi euthanasia
program, with the result of secret institutions that carried out Hitler's di-
rective with usual German efficiency.185 In contrast to a national program
of sterilization, 18 6 the "euthanasia" program operated secretly.18 7 By the
end of the war, the Germans had "euthanized" at least 275,000 people, in
182. In the sense of death given to relieve suffering.
183. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 116.
184. ADoLF HrrTLR, MaIN KAmPF 296 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1943).
185. WSON, supra note 2, at 35. Initial gassings occurred at Brandenburg an der Havel, the
first of many such sites. Covert organizations in Berlin arranged transportation of the vic-
tims, dealt with financial and legal affairs, and sent false letters to next of kin. The letters
often read:
We regret to inform you that your _ who was recently transferred to our
institution by ministerial order, unexpectedly died on _ of _ All our
medical efforts were unfortunately without avail.
In view of the nature of his serious, incurable ailment, his death, which saved
him from a lifelong institutional sojourn, is to be regarded as a release.
Because of the danger of contagion existing here, we were forced to have the
deceased cremated at once.
HUMPHRY & WICKLr, supra note 2, at 22. Alternately, the letter might conclude: "For pur-
poses of avoiding the outbreak or the communication of an infectious disease, the local po-
lice authorities, as per § 22 of the ordinance concerning the combating of communicable
diseases, have ordered the immediate cremation of the corpse and the disinfection of any
remaining effects." Id. at 23. An urn containing the supposed ashes of the deceased was
forwarded to the family. Expenses were often paid by unwilling relatives, who were warned
against demanding further explanations or spreading "false rumors." Id.; WilsoN, supra note
2, at 35. Administrative errors did occur, but little was allowed to come from them. Hum-
PHy & WicKEr, supra, at 23. The program was slowed, however, probably in response to
growing awareness of the government's actions and concern that the elderly would be next.
Public morale deteriorated to the extent that in late 1940, Heinrich Himmler, head of the
SS, wrote to a Reich official:
I hear that there is great unrest in the Wurttemberg mountains on account of the
Grafeneck Institution. The people know the grey SS bus and they think they know
what happens in the crematory with its ever-smoking chimney. What does happen
there is a secret, and yet it is a secret no longer. The public temper is ugly and in
my opinion there is nothing to do but to stop using this particular institution. Possi-
bly one might initiate a skillful and reasonable program of enlightenment by run-
ning films on hereditary and mental disease in this particular region. May I ask you
to let me know how this difficult problem was solved.
Id. at 24.
186. Shortly after assuming office in 1933, the Nazis enacted a compulsory sterilization
program for all persons with hereditary illnesses. HUMPHRY & WIcKaETr, supra note 2, at 21.
187. Id. at 22. Hider insisted on distancing himself officially from the project. In late
October 1939, he signed a secret decree, backdated to September 1, 1938, which read:
"Reich leader Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the responsibility for expanding the
authority of physicians, to be designated by name, to the end that patients considered incur-
able in the best available human judgment, after critical evaluation of their state of health,
may be granted a merciful death." Id. (quoting ALExANDER MrrscHERLICH, DocTORs OF IN.
FAMy. THE STORY OF THE NAZi MEDICAL CRIMES 92 (1949)). "Granted" was hardly the appro-
priate word; the exterminations were involuntary. See Htmi-mtv & WicxL=T, supra note 2, at
22. Some dispute exists over whether Hitler's secret order was backdated. SeeYale Kamisar,
Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mergy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MiNN. L REV. 969, 1034
n.219 (1958).
Reports of Nazi practices did make their way to the rest of the world, however. In 1941,
William Shirer's Berlin Diary was published, which contained accounts of the Gestapo's mur-
A GENTLE AND EASY DEATH
addition to the millions of other "undesirables."' 8 8
The German medical profession, seeking readmission to the World
Medical Association, admitted its guilt and pledged to "exact from our
members a standard of conduct that recognizes the sanctity, moral liberty,
and personal dignity of every human being." 89 After heated discussion at
the same meeting of the General Assembly, approval was given to a resolu-
tion to "condemn the practice of euthanasia under any circumstances."1 90
Interestingly, the German debacle appeared to have little effect on
American public opinion regarding voluntary euthanasia. 191 In 1945, the
Euthanasia Society of America started a new campaign in New York to
legalize -voluntary euthanasia.192 In 1946, a committee of 1776 physicians
and 54 Protestant ministers publicly supported, the movement.1 93 The
clergymen announced that, in their view, voluntary euthanasia was not
contrary to the principles of Christianity.' 9 4 In 1949, additional Protestant
and Jewish spokesmen supported the bill, but it was never introduced into
the New York legislature.' 95
derous practices. Other accounts surfaced intermittently throughout the war. HuMPHRY &
Wzicrr, supra note 2, at 37.
188. Dr. Leo Alexander, an investigator for the War Grimes Tribunal, attributed much of
Germany's moral decline to the attitudes of the physicians. In what is often incorporated as a
major argument for anti-euthanasia and "pro-life" forces, Dr. Alexander described a "wedge,"
or slippery slope effect of the German programs:
The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shifting in emphasis, in the basic atti-
tude of the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the
euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. This
attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the severely and chronically
sick. Gradually the sphere of those to be included in this category was enlarged to
encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially un-
wanted and finally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize that the infinitely
small wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind received its impetus was
the attitude toward the nonrehabilitable sick.
HUMPHRY & WICar, supra note 2, at 27. But cf infra note 374 (explaining why the wedge or
slippery slope argument may be ruled out).
189. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 93-94. The German request for readmission was thus palat-
able to the General Assembly, which admitted German doctors by a vote of 33 to 3, with
Israel, Great Britain, and Czechoslovakia strongly protesting. Id. at 94.
190. Id. The United States was among those supporting the resolution. This is likely a
result of the influence of a U.S. representative and former American Medical Association
president, Dr. Morris Fishbein, who held strong anti-euthanasia beliefs. Id.
Assuming the use of the term "euthanasia" is illegitimate when describing the actions of
the Nazi Germans, the confusion of the term after the war to prevent "real" euthanasia is
logically improper. See supra note 183. The effect is the bar of rational considerations of
euthanasia policy because of Nazi co-optation of the term and strong, if incorrect, association
with the atrocities of Nazi Germany. Perhaps for this reason alone a new term is preferable.
191. WILSON, supra note 2, at 35. But see SPRINO & LARSON, supra note 2, at 89.
192. WILSON, supra note 2, at 36. The proposed bill, presented to the New York legisla-
ture in 1947, was similar to previous voluntary euthanasia model bills. Id.; see supra text ac-
companying note 162.
193. See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 95.
194. Id. This brought forth strong religious opposition. Monsignor R.E. McCormick, the
presiding judge of the ecclesiastical tribunal in New York's Catholic Archdiocese, denounced
both the statement by the ministers, and the ministers themselves. He further announced
that the proposed bill was "Anti-God, un-American, and a menace." Id.
195. See WiLsoN, supra note 2, at 37. Further efforts were suspended until 1952, when a
final attempt was made. Htu.mw & WicKrr, supra note 2, at 38. In a dramatic attempt to
capture attention, representatives from the Euthanasia Society in New York presented to the
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Cases of euthanasia continued, but rarely publicly. In one well-publi-
cized 1943 case, John Noxon, a forty-six-year-old Harvard-educated attor-
ney crippled for twenty years by polio, was charged with first-degree
murder in the death of his six-month-old mongoloid child.19 6 The evi-
dence was substantial but not conclusive.' 9 7 After five hours of delibera-
tions, the jury found Noxon guilty; death via electric chair was
mandatory.' 9 8 Eight days before his scheduled execution, the Massachu-
setts governor cited "extenuating circumstances" and commuted his sen-
tence to life. 19 9 The governor carefully explained that mercy killing, so-
called, could not be considered extenuating circumstances and was not a
factor in his decision; he never specified the basis for his decision.
2 0 0
In another case, New Hampshire physician Hermann Sander was
charged with first-degree murder after ordering the injection of forty cu-
bic centimeters of air into an incurably ill patient.20 ' The patient's hus-
band pled with the doctor to end her suffering; she was within a week of
death and could neither eat nor sleep.20 2 Dr. Sander was acquitted due to
problems with proof of causation, thereby avoiding the broader question
of mercy-killing.20 3 The case polarized the local community.20 4 While
supporters gathered money to defray his legal expenses, the Reverend Na-
poleon Gilbert declared that "suffering on earth is useful in the sight of
God,"20 5 and the Reverend Dr. Franklin Frye condemned all mercy kill-
ing, although he hoped that Dr. Sander could be restored to practice with-
out condoning euthanasia.
20 6
In 1958, an Illinois defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter for suf-
focating his wife, a rheumatoid arthritis sufferer, who begged to be
killed.2 0 7 Following testimony concerning her pain and his devotion to
president of the Senate a nine-foot petition signed by two thousand voters. Id. at 47. The bill
was not introduced into the legislature. Id.
196. HUMPHRY & WICKETr, supra note 2, at 40.
197. Id. The child was found on a metal tray in wet diapers with a radio wire around his
arm. He died by electrocution, suffering acute heart failure caused by electric current pass-
ing through the chest from forearm to forearm. Id. Noxon maintained his innocence
throughout the trial and appeals. See id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 40-41.
201. Id. at 42-43. This is a rather painful way to go. Scuba divers (good ones, anyway) are
obsessed with avoiding overly rapid decompression as they ascend. If the diver ascends too
rapidly, the result can be fatal. The medical results, in increasing order of severity, include
decompression sickness (the "bends") and air embolisms. The latter arefatal, while the
bends are the excruciatingly painful result of nitrogen gas bubbles formed within the blood
vessels and body cells. See OwEN LEE, THE SKiN DIVER'S BaLE 162 (3d ed. 1986).
202. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 2, at 43.
203. Id. at 43.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 44.
206. Id. Evangelist Billy Graham told a Boston audience of six thousand that Dr. Sander
should be punished as "an example.... Anyone who voluntarily, knowingly or premedita-
tively takes the life of another, even one minute prior to death, is a killer. I don't say that Dr.
Sander deserves death, but if we let this pass, who is to say who is to die and who is to live."
RussELU, supra note 2, at 108.
207. WILSON, supra note 2, at 39-40.
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her, he was allowed to change his plea to not guilty and was acquitted. 208
Similarly tragic cases arose over the years but with inconsistent legal re-
sults; much depended on the circumstances and the characters surround-
ing the "crime."20 9 The difficult moral and legal questions regarding
euthanasia were never addressed in these cases.
2 10
In 1950, the Euthanasia Society in England submitted a petition to
the United Nations that called for universal human enjoyment of "free-
dom from fear." The petition was signed by 356 prominent Britons and
more than two thousand Americans, 211 but was not submitted to Eleanor
Roosevelt, the chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, for two
years.2 12 She sympathized but was concerned about possible conflicts with
the Genocide Convention and felt it inappropriate to submit the proposal
at that time.
213
In 1956, Pope Pius XII declared:214 "Medical jurisprudence is
subordinate to medical ethics which expresses the moral order willed by
God. Medical jurisprudence cannot, therefore, in any circumstances per-
mit doctor or patient to carry out euthanasia directly, nor may a doctor
ever perform it either upon himself or upon anyone else."215 In 1957, at a
convention of Catholic physicians, the Pope softened his stance when he
responded to three questions presented for edification of euthanasia-re-
208. Id. at 40. Otto Werner, the defendant, was resuscitated after taking an overdose of
drugs following the euthanizing of his wife. HUMPHtY & Wlctrhr, supra note 2, at 61. Her
physician had described the severity of her illness in a letter to the Court. Id. The trial
court's comments are worth noting:
Well, folks, how would the family and neighbors feel if I permitted the defend-
ant to withdraw his plea of guilty and I found him not guilty?
Here is a man sixty-nine years old, in the twilight of his life, and he has been so
devoted and attentive to his wife....
I would rather send him home to his daughter and son without the stigma of a
finding of guilty, and I am not reluctant to do it if the family feels they wouldn't
have any objection.
I won't ask the state's attorney for his consent to [the change of plea). I know
him well enough to know he would be inclined to do the same thing ....
Mr. Werner, this is a time in one's life where good reputation and decency over
a span of years pay off. I can't find it in my heart to find you guilty. I am going to
permit you to go home with your daughter and live out the rest of your life in as
much peace as you can find it in your heart to have.
Id. at 62 (alterations in original).
209. See, e.g., HUMPHRY & WIcarr, supra note 2, at 60-62; RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 135-36;
WILsoN, supra note 2, at 38-40. The fact that uncertainty is the rule of law in this area is itself
cause for concern. Individuals who disclose their actions or consult with medical or legal
professionals are at risk of prosecution, providing a strong incentive for clandestine euthana-
sia. This results in even less societal control over the safeguards which even devout propo-
nents generally agree are necessary to protect those who either do not wish to, or should not,
end their lives.
210. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 40.
211. RussELL, supra note 2, at 110.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. The Pope's declaration was given in an allocution to the Seventh International Con-
gress of Catholic Doctors in the Hague. RussELL, supra note 2, at 128.
215. Id.
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
lated issues.2 16 While addressing a later international audience of physi-
cians, the Pope gave instructions to Catholic doctors on the use of
extraordinary means for prolonging life. Although he admired the in-
stances of resurrecting a seemingly dead person, he made it clear that
when life was ebbing irrevocably, physicians might abandon further efforts
to prolong life.2 1 7 Indeed, relatives may ask doctors to desist "in order to
permit the patient already virtually dead, to pass on in peace."
2 18
216. See LiE E mcs CENTRE, EuTHAwsta Racmr DECLARATIONS OF POPES AND BISHOPS
(1983). The questions were:
1. Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesia and to accept physical
pain in a spirit of faith?
2. Is it in accord with the spirit of the Gospel to bring about by means of narcotics
the loss of consciousness and the use of a man's higher faculties?
3. Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to make use of
narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? Can narcotics be used
even if the lessening of pain will probably be accomplished by a shortening of
life?
RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 128-29.
Before answering specifically, the Pope spoke to the spiritual value of suffering and the
justification for seeking relief from it if one so desired, because: "[I]n the long run, pain
prevents the achievement of higher goals and interests." Id. at 129. In answer to the first
question, the Pope responded: "The patient desiring to avoid or relieve pain can in good
conscience use those means discovered by science which, in themselves, are not immoral."
Id.
Regarding the suppression of consciousness, the Pope had no moral objection to the use
of narcotics, providing "they do not prevent the patient from fulfilling his duties." Id. The
Pope warned, in response to question three, that:
every form of direct euthanasia, that is to say, the administration of a narcotic, in
order to procure or to hasten death, is unlawful because it is a claim to dispose
directly of life. It is one of the fundamental principles of natural and Christian
morality that man is not the master and possessor, but has only the usufruct of his
body and of his existence. One lays claim to a right of direct disposition, whenever
one wills the shortening of a life, whether as an end or as a means. In the hypothe-
sis you envisage, it is merely a question of saving the patient from insupportable
sufferings, as for example, in the case of inoperable cancers or of incurable diseases.
If between the narcosis and the abridgment of life there exists no direct chain
of causality due to the will of the interested parties, or from the nature of the cir-
cumstances, (this would be the case if the suppression of pain was obtainable only
by a shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the administration of narcotics,
itself lead to two distinct effects, one the relief of pain and the other the shortening
of life, it is lawful; one is still bound to ascertain that between these two effects there
exists a reasonable proportion and that the advantages of the one compensate the
disadvantages of the other. It is also important, in the first place, to determine
whether, in the actual state of science, the same result might be obtained by employ-
ing other means, and then in the administration of the narcotic not to exceed the
limits of what is practically necessary.
LrE Emics CENTrr, supra, at 8-9.
217. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 131; cf infra note 245 (advancing medical technology as
a possible threat to human dignity due to prolonging life for too long). See also Kevin
O'Rourke, Catholic Teaching in Regard to Two Prominent "Right to Life Issues". A Historical Theolog-
ical Study, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L REv. 425 (1992).
218. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 131 (emphasis added). Curiously, this is in opposition to
the Hippocratic Oath requiring of doctors "to strive at all costs to keep a patient alive as long
as possible." Id.; infra part IV.A.4.
The use of the word "virtually" belies the crux of the issue. In effect, the Pope is begging
the question by leaving open the possibility of some Twilight Zone of human existence. "Vir-
tually" is susceptible of shades of meaning-particularly in the context of modern medicine
and death. Even if by "virtually" the Pope meant merely "just a matter of a very short time,"
he is sanctioning behavior which contradicts the ethos of sacrosanct life. Cf. infra note 216
(comments about the sanctity of life).
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The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, written in 1957 by Glanville
Williams, 21 9 sparked debate among both supporters and opponents of eu-
thanasia. Williams, in response to what he saw as the counterproductive
effect of legal safeguards in euthanasia legislation,220 recommended that
future euthanasia legislation provide only that physicians would not be
criminally liable for helping a patient to die-providing the physician
"acted in good faith, with the consent of the patient, and to save [the pa-
tient from] severe pain in an illness both incurable and fatal."22 1 Williams'
recommendation did not recognize a patient's right to choose euthanasia,
leaving the issue to the discretion of the physician. 222 Consequently,
many euthanasia supporters while appreciating Williams' efforts, were




Efforts to enact legislation in England continued with the attempted
passage of a new Voluntary Euthanasia Bill.22 4 Controversy in this area was
already high due to a controversial Neasden Hospital policy on the
resucitation of patients brought to public attention in 1967.225 The policy
had been posted in the hospital for over a year before being reported to
authorities by a patient. The policy provided: "The following patients are
not to be resuscitated: very elderly, over sixty-five; malignant disease.
Chronic chest disease. Chronic renal disease. Top of yellow treatment
card to be marked NTBR [not to be resuscitated]." 226 The Bill, passed
219. A Fellow ofJesus College, Rouse Bali Professor of Laws at Cambridge University, and
member of the Standing Committee on Criminal Law Revision. HuMPiM & Wicx , supra
note 2, at 57. He also wrote the treatise Cwenq. LAw: THE GENERAL PART (1953).
220. HtThPHRY & WiCKmrr, supra note 2, at 58-59. He noted that, rather than drawing
support, they provided additional areas for attack by anti-euthanasia groups: "Did the oppo-
sition like these elaborate safeguards? On the contrary, they made them a matter of com-
plaint. The safeguards would, it was said, bring too much formality into the sickroom, and
destroy the relationship between doctor and patient." Id.
221. Id. Similar to the Pope's pronouncements, Williams' proposals focused on decisions
and actions instigated by the physician. Id.
222. RussELL, supra note 2, at 127. He likely continued to believe that legislation recog-
nizing a right to choose euthanasia, with legal safeguards, was the best alternative; in 1969, he
assisted in the drafting of a new British Voluntary Euthanasia bill. Id. at 127-28.
223. See Humpmar & Wicimir, supra note 2, at 59.
224. Humrmunv & Wicirr, supra note 2, at 89. The 1969 version of the Bill contained
fewer safeguards than the 1936 version. -See supra text accompanying note 162.
225. Id. at 88.
226. Id. Do-not-resuscitate orders, previously non-existent, are now commonplace. Syd-
ney H. Wanzer et a., The Physician's Responsibiliy Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look, in
EuTANhswr THE MoRAL Issuas 163, 163-64 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds.,
1989); see also Lieutenant Colonel William A. Woodruff, Letting Life Run its Course: Do-Not-
Resucitate Orders and Withdrawal ofLfe-Sustaining Treatment, ARssv Law., April 1989, at 6, 6-18
(discussing the history, substance, and potential problems with both do-not-resuscitate orders
and withdrawal of life-sustaining policies in the United States Army).
For an interesting discussion of this issue in the tentatively developing area of law that is
the reciprocal of the "wrongful death" tort, see William C. Knapp & Fred Hamilton, Wrongful
Living. Resuscitation as Tortious Inteference with a Patient's Right to Give Informed Refusal 19 N.
Ky. L. REV., 253, 255-76 (1992).
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without debate on its first reading in the House of Lords,2 27 subsequently
met opposition on several fronts. St.John-Steva 228 launched the "Human
Rights Society" to fight the bill, while the British Medical Association con-
tinued its opposition to euthanasia. 22 9 A rabbi and a bishop similarly ex-
pressed their opposition. 23 0 The Bill was rejected by a vote of sixty-one to
forty on its second reading.
23 '
In 1967, the Euthanasia Society in New York established the Euthana-
sia Education Fund23 2 with the goal of distributing information concern-
ing the dying. Some isolated attempts at promoting legislation were made
by others not affiliated with the New York group.23 3 In Florida, Dr. Walter
Sackett23 4 sought to amend the state constitution to include the concept
of "death with dignity."23 5 The attempt failed.23 6 In 1969, the Health and
Welfare Committee of the Idaho House of Representatives introduced a
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill to legalize voluntary euthanasia "when the pa-
tient is suffering from an irremediable condition."23 7 Although safe-
guards to prevent abuse were included, this Bill also failed.238 Bills similar
to the Florida measure were introduced in several states, including Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 23 9 Nevertheless, no sig-




The subject of death, which underwent a process of repression in the
cultural psyche throughout the advancement of medical technology,
2 41
227. HUMPHRY & WICK=Tr, supra note 2, at 89.
228. A conservative member of Parliament. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. The bishop viewed euthanasia as a violation of the commandment "[t]hou shalt
not kill." Id. The rabbi explained his position as:
We cannot agree to purchasing the relief from pain at the cost of life itself ....
One of the reasons for our position is that we consider human life to have infinite
value and therefore every fraction of human life, even only one hour of it, has pre-
cisely the same infinite value as the whole of life.
Id. See generally IMMANUELJAKoBovrrs,JEwIsH MEDICAL Emuncs 123, 123-25, 276 (1959) (posit-
ing that Jewish law sanctions passive euthanasia while condemning active euthanasia); Ba-
ruch A. Brody, A Historical Introduction tojewish Casuistry on Suicide and Euthanasia, in SUICIDE
AND EuTHANAsIA, supra note 2, at 39-75 (arguing thatJewish law consists of more than a blind
reverence for mere physical existence).
231. HUMPHRY & WicxyrT, supra note 2, at 89.
232. Id. at 87-88. To preserve its tax-exempt status, the fund abstained from further ef-
forts to promote euthanasia legislation. I&
233. Id. at 88.




237. RussELL, supra note 2, at 192.
238. HUMPHRY & WicKE r, supra note 2, at 88.
239. WILSON, supra note 2, at 42.
240. See id. at 43.
241. See HUMPHRY & WIKxrr, supra note 2, at 63-64; RussELL, supra note 2, at 168; Alastair
Maclntyre, The Right to Die Garrulously, in DEATH AND DECiSioN 75, 77-79 (Ernan McMullin
ed., 1978).
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underwent a new period of examination in the 1960s and later.24 2 This
was, simultaneously, a period of rapid advances in medical technology, es-
pecially in the areas of life-saving and life-prolonging techniques.
243 Vari-
ous physicians publicly supported revised legal guidelines for dealing with
critically ill or incurable patients.244 Among them were Dr. Perrin
Long,245 Dr. Arthur Levisohn,2 46 Dr. William Williamson,24 7 Dr. Frank
Ayd, Jr.,248 Dr. Robert Williams,24
9 and Dr. Arthur Schiff.2
50
242. See HumPntv & WtcKmr, supra note 2, at 63-90.
243. See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 15-16, 140.
244. See id. at 140-52.
245. Dr. Long, editor of the Medical Times, published an article in 1960 entitled On the
Quality and Quantity of Life which described numerous examples of human suffering. See id.
at 140-41. Dr. Long asked:
Has not the medical profession missed the point in certain of its endeavors? Are we
not piling up one Pyrrhic victory after another, while gradually losing the war? Are
we not causing... untold anguish to the patient and his friends, insupportable
financial burdens for the family and community, the diversion of resources from
those who could use them more effectively, and a great increase in the cost of hospi-
talization for the average patient, just because we are more interested in increasing
the "quantity" of life no matter at what painful cost to the individual or his
community?
Id. at 142 (alteration in original).
246. Professor of medical jurisprudence at the Chicago Medical School. Id. He viewed
the advancement of medical technology as a possible threat to human dignity, forcing some-
times tortured and hideous deaths, which would be a disgrace to our civilization if no legal
remedy were devised. Id. at 142-43. He cited inadequate public awareness as the result of
relatively uncommon tragic occurrences, but warned that all faced the possibility of a painful
and lingering death. Id. at 143. He criticized the forced circumvention of the law by judges
and juries in cases where "mercy killing" is at issue. Id. He further illustrated the fallacies of
religious arguments against euthanasia: "They would have come to some other very startling
different conclusions had their reasoning preceded their conclusions instead of succeeding
them in order to bolster a conclusion already established." Id. Regarding Pope Pius XII's
1957 statements, Levisohn commented that while euthanasia was condemned in name, "the
most essential contention of the euthanasists is conceded." Id. at 144.
He conducted a poll of 250 internists and surgeons. Of the 156 who responded, sixty-
one percent agreed that doctors did practice euthanasia, by either accelerating death or
omitting life-saving measures. Id. Still, seventy-two percent disapproved of proposed legisla-
tion to legalize euthanasia. Id. In a poll of 146 non-doctors, eighty percent of the 116 respon-
dents would welcome euthanasia if they were incurably ill and were suffering unendurable
pain. HUmPHRY & WiC=Tr, supra note 2, at 71. Seventy-six percent favored legalization of
euthanasia for incurable adult sufferers at their own request. Id. In both instances, affirma-
tive responses were received by seventy-four percent of Protestants, seventy percent ofJewish
respondents, one-hundred percent of those with no religious affiliation, and twenty to
twenty-five percent of the Catholics. Id
247. Professor of surgery at the University of Kansas Medical School. RussEri, supra note
2, at 144. He emphasized a team approach involving consultations among the patient, the
family, and the physicians, to reassure all that the medical profession is deeply concerned
about the welfare of the patient. Id. at 145. While supporting the medical responsibility to
prolong life, he believed there were times for the doctor to ask. "Should [I] lengthen a man's
life a few months at the cost of leaving the man's wife and children penniless?" Id.; cf. infra
part V.C.
248. Catholic psychiatrist who opposed any deliberate hastening of death, but said that a
physician must recognize a person's right to live and die peacefully. RUssELL, supra note 2, at
146. Although he objected to calling it such, he advocated passive euthanasia where the
patient is clearly dying. Id. He further deplored the intrusion of gadgets and medical per-
sonnel, which deprived the family and the patient of the chance to share his last moments.
See id. He surprisingly called for what could be seen as advocating surreptitious administration
of active ("positive") euthanasia:
Also there should be no need or demand for positive euthanasia if physicians un-
hesitatingly administer whatever amount of pain relieving drugs a dying patient
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In opposition, Dr. Laurence Foye 25l insisted that it is the duty of doc-
tors to prolong life as long as possible in every case.25 2 Physicians remain
divided over what appropriate role, if any, euthanasia should play in both
their practices and in society.258 Medical associations have not escaped
the controversy. 254 Interestingly, nurses-especially those who care for
needs. The medical profession has the power to erase any demand for legalized
euthanasia. All doctors have to do is apply their skills prudently as they are morally
and legally [sic] empowered to do.
Id. at 147.
249. Professor of medicine at the University of Washington Medical School. Id. He criti-
cized the law's inability to differentiate between murder and the merciful act of euthanasia.
Id. He commented on the vast sufferings which are forced on many and urged that euthana-
sia was preferable to suicide in dealing with intolerable cases. Id. at 148. He further noted
the irony of a society that refused to permit a suffering, dying person for whom life has no
further value to terminate his life, while simultaneously condoning wars, in which millions
are killed. See id. at 147; cf infra part 1V.C (discussing the inability of the criminal law to
distinguish between active euthanasia and murder).
250. A general practitioner in Florida, Dr. Schiff appealed to doctors and society to face
honestly and realistically the problems associated with euthanasia. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at
148.
251. Formerly associated with the National Cancer Institute and with the Veterans Ad-
ministration at the time of his testimony before the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging
in 1972. Id. at 149.
He defended his position on the grounds that mistakes in prognosis can sometimes be
made and the outcome of any given case can never be known with certainty. Id. He noted
instances where patients had been misdiagnosed, leading to unforeseen recoveries or remis-
sions. I& He also rejected the notion that people were being kept alive needlessly. Id.
"Neither I nor anyone else knows how to decide when being alive becomes useless." Id. He
did not differentiate, however, between those who are still young and want to live, and those
who are aged, truly incapacitated, or already damaged irreparably by their illnesses and who
want to die. Id.
252. Id.
253. A poll conducted by the medical journal New Medica Materia in 1962 indicated that
more than thirty percent of American physicians approved of euthanasia in some cases. Rus-
SELL, supra note 2, at 153. Almost forty percent approved in cases of severely defective in-
fants, while forty-one percent favored legislation to permit euthanasia, with legal safeguards.
Id.
A questionnaire by Dr. Robert Williams, sent to members of the Association of Professors
of Medicine and of the Association of American Physicians, found that eighty percent admit-
ted practicing negative euthanasia and eighteen percent favored positive voluntary euthana-
sia, provided legal safeguards existed. I& Dr. Williams defined negative euthanasia as
planned omission of therapies that would probably prolong life and positive euthanasia as
therapy that is hoped will promote death sooner than otherwise. Id.
A National Opinion Poll taken in 1964 and 1965 of 2000 general practitioners in Eng-
land-selected at random from the Medical Register-found that 48.6 percent reported be-
ing asked by a dying patient to give final relief from suffering, while 53.9 percent saw a
conflict between the request and the law. Id. at 155. 35.8 percent would be willing to admin-
ister voluntary euthanasia if it became legally permissible, while 75.5 percent thought some
doctors already performed such treatments. Id. They were equally divided when asked
whether adequate legal safeguards could be devised. Id.
254. The World Medical Association, meeting in Sydney in 1968, adopted a declaration
stating that it was not their role to be the deliberate agents of euthanasia. RuSSELL, supra
note 2, at 156.
The British Medical Association has remained firmly opposed to euthanasia, and in 1969
passed a resolution condemning it. Id. at 156-57. Many British doctors dissented, however,
pointing out that the influential members who had devised the condemnation were elderly,
and thus overly conservative and out of touch with the misery of dying patients. Id. at 157.
Conversely, they might have been more thoughtful regarding death.
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elderly and dying patients-tend to favor euthanasia.255
The field of bioethics developed rapidly after the invention of a kid-
ney dialysis procedure 256 that proved to be a mixed blessing. In 1960, Dr.
Belding Scribner developed a new shunt which permitted repeated blood
In 1970, the General Council of the Canadian Medical Association approved a change in
the code of ethics: "An ethical physician will allow death to occur with dignity and comfort,
when death of the body appears inevitable." Id. It further stated that unusual or heroic
means to prolong life were unnecessary when clinical death of the mind has occurred. Id.
In 1973, the American Hospital Association made public its new "Bill of Rights" for pa-
tients: "The patient has the right to refuse treatment to the extent permitted by law and to
be informed of the medical consequences of his action." Id.
Also in 1973, the governing board of the Medical Society of the state of New York an-
nounced the following adoption by its Committee on Ethics:
The use of euthanasia is not in the province of the physician. The right to die with
dignity, or the cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong the
life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is inevitable,
is the decision of the patient and/or the immediate family, with the approval of the
family physician.
Id. at 158.
The American Medical Association had not taken an official position on euthanasia,
although the subject has been the source of considerable discussion. See id. at 159. In 1973,
despite suggestions that the AMA develop a euthanasia policy rather than force doctors to
make decisions for themselves, the Association officially condemned mercy killing, although
simultaneously adopting a report advising doctors that they should respect a dying person's
wishes. See HUMPHRY & WIcKrr, supra note 2, at 101.
255. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 165; but ef. Irene P. Loftus, Note, IHave a Conscience, Too:
The Plight of Medical Personnel Confronting the Right to Di 65 NoTRE DAME L. RaV. 699 (1990)
(discussing the medical professional's right to refrain from participating in euthanasia for
ethical reasons); Nurses Question Cruzan Decision, AUSrN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 16, 1990,
at Al3. (noting that the nurses responsible for the care of Nancy Cruzan were attempting to
deal with the anger they felt toward those whose decision prompted the termination of a
feeding tube from Nancy, whom they had come to love). As with most of life's situations, it is
the "person in the trench" who should be heeded when questions with which they are the
most connected arise. Nurses have the greatest contact with patients and should at least be
heard in this debate, if not above the voices of other groups.
Barbara Davis, a geriatric nurse, criticized the role of doctors in the debate, when nurses
are likely to be more closely involved with the patient. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 165. She
further commented that passive euthanasia is unsatisfactory, as it will often increase the pa-
tient's suffering. Id.
Eileen Strauss, a nursing supervisor, protested the distance between doctors and patients
in reality;, doctors often disobey their own orders not to resuscitate if they are on the ward at
the time. Id.
Jennifer MacPherson, a pediatric intensive care nurse, doubts that heroic efforts made
to save severely defective infants are well advised. See iU. at 166. Even parents who ask for
such efforts may not consider the effects decades hence, when they may not be able to care
for the severely disabled adult. See id.
Sharon Curtin related her nursing experiences in her book Nobody Ever Died of Old Age.
She recounts the dread many elderly have, not of dying, but of losing all pretense of indepen-
dence. Id She castigates our society for its deplorable neglect of the elderly and their poten-
tial. See id. She's right, but that's for another article.
At a convention of the Colorado Nurses Association in 1970, an unofficial vote revealed
roughly sixty-one percent favored active euthanasia. Id. at 166-67.
Nurses are further at risk by becoming involved in efforts to covertly end life. See id. at
167. This, however, carries the same moral and legal dilemmas, with none of the possible
safeguards against abuse.
256. Kidney dialysis is needed when the kidneys fail and impurities build up in the blood-
stream. See SPRMNG & LAmsON, supra note 2, at 29.
1993]
DENVER UNIWVES/TY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
dialysis. 25 7 Physicians soon realized that too few machines existed for too
many patients. 25 8 Between 1962 and 1972, hospital selection committees
performed the gruesome task of choosing, in effect, which patients lived
and which died.25 9 Due to the explosive issues involved, Congress ex-
tended Medicare to cover every patient under sixty-five who needed kid-
ney dialysis.
2 60
The dilemma of euthanasia is particularly acute when confronting the
problem of severely deformed infants who are otherwise not in threat of
imminent death. Perhaps one of the greatest medical tragedies in this
regard was the result of the use of thalidomide, a tranquilizer that, if used
during pregnancy, caused serious fetal malformations. 261 The case that
attracted the greatest attention was that of Madame van de Put, of
Belgium.262 On May 22, 1962, her child Corinne was born severely de-
formed as a result of thalidomide use.2 63 The family was shocked and
decided that Corinne should not live. 26 The mother pleaded with both
her gynecologist and midwife to do away with the baby.2 65 Both re-
fused.2 6 6 The nun replied: "It is God who gives life and God who takes life
away."2 67 The family doctor 268 gave to Corinne's grandmother a prescrip-
tion for a dosage of barbiturates sufficient to kill an infant.2 6 9 Madame
257. Previously, direct access to the veins was required, resulting eventually in collapsed
veins. Id. at 30. With no further means to access the blood for cleansing, the patient died.
See id.
258. See id. The expense of treatment was also often an obstacle. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id. As of 1980, the costs have risen to $1.2 billion annually. See id. This effec-
tively avoids the issue by government largess. The underlying problems of valuation of life in
situations of limited resources are so repugnant that virtually any option, regardless of cost, is
accepted. As is increasingly apparent given fiscal constraints, this may no longer be continu-
ously feasible.
Interestingly, only where the lives in question are visible is the dilemma so clear. The
more impersonal the life involved, the easier the choice to terminate, or disfavor, that life. A
commander's choice of battle plans by necessity involves a choice of some lives over others.
Even less dramatic situations require similar choices, as with problems commonly faced by
decision makers, high and low politicians in social programs (although the solution is usually
the same-largess, particularly when politicians become involved, as they invariably do when
controversies arise). This proves only that what is espoused generally is often unsustainable
in practice. A euthanasia policy at either extreme is unlikely to be popular when individual
cases of need or abuse arise.
261. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 175.
262. She was 24, and had taken eleven thalidomide pills prescribed by her family doctor,
Dr. Casters, during her pregnancy with her first child. Id. at 176.
263. Corinne had no arms or shoulder structure and flipper-like embryos of hands pro-
truding from the end of each shoulder. Id Her feet were deformed, her face was disfigured,
and her anal canal emptied into her vagina. Her chances of survival, however, seemed good.
Id. Her family doctor later testified, however, that there would have been no possibility of
fitting her with artificial limbs because there was no shoulder bone structure, only cartilage.
Id. at 177. Other experts gave her a one in ten chance of living. Id.
264. Id. at 176. "The grandmother told the doctor 'Don't condemn the child to live.'" Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. It could be argued, however, that it was not God who was responsible for the
tragically deformed thalidomide babies.
268. Testimony at the trial described him as "'the doctor of the poor' and beloved by his
patients." Id. at 177.
269. Considering the baby's future, Dr. Casters later expressed no regrets. Id. at 176.
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van de Put insisted on performing the euthanasia herself, and alone.270
She rocked Corinne gently, and fed her a bottle of milk, honey, and the
barbiturates. 27 1 She was indicted on a charge of murder, and her hus-
band, mother, sister, and family doctor were arraigned as aiders and abet-
tors.272 At the trial, she stated that she could not put the baby in a home,
as suggested by the gynecologist, because: "[I] t wouldn't have given her her
arms."273 She further stated that Corinne's normal mental state only
made things worse: "If she had grown up to realize the state she was in, she
would never have forgiven me in her whole life for letting her live." 274
The prosecutor demanded a verdict of guilty while indicating that he
would support a recommendation from the jury for a royal pardon.275 He
warned that an acquittal would set a "terrible precedent" and possibly lead
to "great abuse."2 76 The defense attorney broke down and sobbed: "For
this terribly deformed child there was no possible place of happiness on





272. Id. at 176-77.
273. Id. at 177.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. He continued: "You must affirm that the principle of respect for life is sacred.
Thousands of thalidomide mothers who kept their children alive in spite of malformations
have their eyes on your verdict." Id. This illegitimately presumes that because other mothers
chose to raise their children under such circumstances, or could not personally choose other-
wise, Ms. van de Put had a legal obligation to raise Corinne-which was precisely the ques-
tion at issue.
277. Id. at 177. His were not the only tears in the courtroom. Newsweek reported: "Even
the lawyers, reporters, and gendarmes felt tears welling up as the story of the final hours of
Corinne was told .... " Id. at 178. A public opinion poll by Radio Luxembourg showed
popular opinion to be ten to one in the defendants' favor. Id.
278. Id. Dr. St.John-Stevas, a Catholic and strong opponent of euthanasia, described the
reaction:
The verdict was greeted with frenzied joy by the thousand people who had crowded
into the court for the last day of the trial. Their rejoicing was taken up by the
crowds outside the court when the news became known ... Undoubtedly popular
sympathy in Belgium and elsewhere was on the side of the mother and her family
doctor. This is hardly surprising. Both had suffered intensely. They had been five
months in custody, and had experienced the harrowing public ordeal of the trail
[sic]. Whether misguided or not, both had acted from what they imagined to be
unselfish motives, and the element of malice present in ordinary murders was totally
lacking. The mother was a pathetic figure; the doctor, a revered one, regarded as a
saint by the poor of.Liege. No one wanted further punishment inflicted on them.
Id. St.John-Stevas continued in his opposition to euthanasia. In his book TheRight to Life, he
wrote that, "if there is a right to life, Corinne van de Put possessed it as much as anyone else."
Id. Even if this is assumed, however, it does not address the questions of parental discretion
where Corinne is in a situation susceptible to euthanasia, but cannot decide for herself. As
incapacity is not a question here, this would be about as far into the grey as any euthanasia
issue could be. Given that more basic questions of euthanasia remain undecided, the right of
a parent to decide for a malformed but mentally normal child will likely remain an open
question, decided by judges or juries-as is perhaps best.
Not until 1973 did the Distillers Corporation, which manufactured and marketed
thalidomide in England under the trade name Distaval, agree, under public pressure, to
compensate the thalidomide victims. Each child would be paid an average of $126,000. See
id. at 179.
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6. The 1970s to Present
In 1972, an elderly Seattle couple were found side-by-side on their
bed with plastic bags wrapped around their heads,279 reportedly despon-
dent over the fact that one needed to move to a nursing home.28 0 The
following year, a San Francisco couple also insisted on controlling their
own fates,28 ' deciding years earlier that if one became terminally ill they
would go together.2 8 2 They first sent a telegram to their son and then
committed suicide.
28 3
In the summer of 1973, Donald "Dax" Cowart was critically injured in
a freak natural gas explosion.2 84 His wish to discontinue excruciating
burn treatments was ignored despite his constant requests; throughout his
ordeal he maintained his demand to die.28 5 He lives in Henderson,
Texas, where he practices law and continues in his belief that his wish
should have been granted.
28 6
A 1973 Gallup poll reported that public approval of active euthanasia
had increased dramatically since an identical poll was taken in 1950.287 In
1975, eighty-seven percent of Californians surveyed favored passive eutha-
nasia.288 Another majority-sixty-three percent-supported active eutha-





283. Id. Their son, after receiving the telegram, flew to San Francisco, where he found
them in their bedroom, dead from cyanide. He related: "I was relieved and I was proud of
them." Id.
For an interesting examination of double suicides, usually committed by aged couples,
see generally ANN WIcxErr, DOUBLE Exrr. WHEN AGING COUPLEs COMMIT SUICME TOGETHER
(1989). Parenthetically, Ms. Wickett is believed to have committed suicide. Advocate for Sui-
cide Group Found Dead, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 10, 1991, at A8. It is unclear whether breast cancer,
which had been surgically removed, or depression caused her action; her former husband,
Derek Humphry, disavowed her action if caused by the latter. Id.
284. His story is detailed in DAx's CASE: EssAYs IN MEDicAL ETHics AND HUMAN MEANING
(L. Kliever ed., 1989). The explosion, which occurred as he was attempting to start his truck,
killed his father and left him blind, permanently disfigured, and severely maimed. Id. at xi, 3-
4.
285. See id. at 5-9, 15. His attorney, who, as counselor and family friend, represented him
and his mother in their personal injuryactions, not only refused to help Dax obtain a court
order for the termination of treatment, but-in good faith-apparently circumvented Dax's
desires. See id. at 99-101.
286. See id. at xi; see also Gary Taylor, Reluctant Surivor Turns to Law, 10 NAT'L L.J. at 6
(Sept. 21, 1987).
287. See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 198. Fifty-three percent of respondents answered "yes"
to the following question, which had also been used in the 1950 poll: "When a person has a
disease that cannot be cured, doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient's life by
some painless means if the patient and his family request it.L" Id. Safeguards were not men-
tioned in the question.
Men and women held similar views, while Protestants and Catholics were not greatly
dissimilar (fifty-three percent to forty-eight percent, respectively). Id. at 198-99. Educational
level was positively correlated, with support of euthanasia increasing with formal educational
level; six in ten of the college-educated respondents favored active euthanasia. Id. at 199.
The young also were more in favor of active euthanasia, with sixty-seven percent of people
under thirty approving. Id.
288. See HUMPHEY & WicKgarr, supra note 2, at 94. Seventy-seven percent of Catholics
agreed. Id.
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nasia.289 The Euthanasia Society of America2 90 was reactivated in 1974
with the goal of legalizing the Living Will through state legislatures.29 1 By
the end of 1975, bills legalizing the Living Will had been introduced in
fifteen states.292 Only in California did such a measure pass.
293
On the night of April 15, 1975, a pretty, bright twenty-one-year old
was rushed to a NewJersey hospital.2 9 4 Karen Ann Quinlan was in a coma
caused by a combination of drugs and alcohol consumed on an empty
stomach during a birthday party.2 95 She had stopped breathing, and thus
suffered irreparable brain damage, although she was not brain-dead.
296
Three months later her father signed a release to discontinue her use of
the respirator. 297 Her physicians, however, refused to remove the respira-
tor, arguing that to do so would be homicide. 298 The Quinlans, both
Catholics, had been advised by priests about the Catholic Church doctrine
distinguishing between acting to take a life and removing devices that arti-
ficially sustain life in hopeless cases.29 9 Consequently, Joseph Quinlan
filed for appointment as Karen's guardian with the express power to au-
thorize discontinuance of all extraordinary means of sustaining vital
processes.3 00 Noting that she did not meet the Harvard criteria for brain
death,8 0 ' the judge ruled for the hospital.8 0 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed, citing Karen's right to privacy.8 0 3 The respirator was re-
moved but Karen did not die as expected. 0 4 She was transferred to a
nursing home where she remained in a coma until her death in July 1985,
289. Id.
290. After 1975, the name was changed to the Society for the Right to Die. Id. at 100.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 99.
293. HUfPHRY & WicK=rr, supra note 2, at 99. In 1976, Governor Brown signed into law
the Natural Death Act, which recognized the legitimacy of the Living Will. He commented:
"For too long, people have been unwilling to talk about death. This bill gives recognition to
the human right that people have to let their life come to its natural conclusion." Id.
294. Id. at 107.
295. Id.
296. Id. See also supra note 53 and accompanying text. Some movement was recorded on
the electroencephalogram (EEG, which monitors electrical brain activity), she exhibited
some involuntary muscle activity, and responded to pain, light, sound, and smell. HUMPHRY
& Wicxzr, supra note 2, at 107. But cf. infra note 325 (findings of trial courts regarding
Nancy Cruzan's unconsciousness).
297. See HUMPHRY & WICKa, supra note 2, at 107.
298. Id. at 108.
299. Id.
300. Id. Both testified that only weeks before Karen went into a coma, she had told her
sister and mother that she would not want to be kept alive by extraordinary means if she ever
became ill beyond hope. Id.
301. See BLAcK's LAw DiaroNARsY, supra note 53, at 400.
302. See Humpmrw & Wtc=trr, supra note 2, at 108. The judge held: "There is a duty to
continue life-assisting apparatus.... There is no constitutional right that can be asserted by a
parent for his incompetent adult child." Id.
303. The court held:
We think the State's interest... weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.... It is for that
reason that we determine that Karen's right of privacy may be asserted on her be-
half, in this respect, by her guardian and family ....
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ.), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
304. HUMPHRY & Wtcic-rr, supra note 2, at 108.
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ten years later.
30 5
The Quinlan case had a profound effect on both public opinion and
legislative efforts, while also establishing legal precedent8 0 6 As of 1992,
thirty-eight states have recognized Living Wills.
30 7
The Living Will has been devised to enable competent adults to make
their wish known for an end to extraordinary treatment.30 8 The Living
Will has promoted discussion of the various issues surrounding euthana-
305. Id. For a complete discussion of her case, see generally IN THE MATTER OF KARm
QuNLN (2d ed. 1982).
306. Karen's situation led to a series of decisions regarding a patient's right to terminate
life-sustaining measures. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc) (listing 54 state court decisions), cert. granted, 492 U.S. 917 (1989); Lyon, infra note
454, at 1367 n.2.
307. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1975); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210
(Supp. 1992); AR- ConE ANN. §§ 20-17-210 to -217 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 &
Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -580c (Supp. 1993); DEI. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 2501-2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2401 to -2403 (1989); F1A. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101-
.401 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1991 & Supp. 1993); IDAHo CODE
§§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1993); ILu. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/1-35/10 (Smith-Hurd 1992);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A. -.12 (1989 &
Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101-28,109 (1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1-.58.10 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN. HEATH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -614
(1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055
(Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-102 to -206 (1991); Nav. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 449.535-.690 (Michie 1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137H:1-16 (1990 & Supp. 1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1990 &
Supp. 1992); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 3101.1-.6; OR. Ray. STAT. §§ 127.605-.650 (1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1119 (1993
& Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18: §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to
-2992 (1988 & Supp. 1989); WASH. RSV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.920 (West 1992 & Supp.
1993); W.V. CODE 16-30-1 to -13 (1985 & Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West
1989 & Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -208 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Introductoy Letter
from the National Hemlock Society, supra note 65, at 2.
308. See, e.g., Anthony J. Burgalassi, Living Wills-The Right to Die: A Selective Bibliography
with Statutoy Appendix 45, THE RacoRD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE Crry OF N.Y. 816
(1990). See generally Norman L. Cantor, Prospective Autonomy: On the Limits of Shaping One's
Postcompetence Medical Fat4 8J. CoNTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y. 13 (1992). A sample living will:
TO MY FAMILY, PHYSICIAN, MY CLERGYMAN, MY LAWYER-If the time comes
when I can no longer take part in decisions for my own future, let this statement
stand as the testament of my wishes: If there is no reasonable expectation of my
recovery from physical or mental disability, I, , request that I be allowed
to die and not be kept alive by artificial means or heroic measures. Death is as
much a reality as birth, growth, maturity, and old age-it is the one certainty. I do
not fear death as much as I fear the indignity of deterioration, dependence and
hopeless pain. I ask that drugs be mercifully administered to me for terminal suffer-
ing even if they hasten the moment of death. This request is made after careful
consideration. Although this document is not legally binding, you who care for me
will, I hope, feel morally bound to follow its mandate. I recognize that it places a
heavy burden of responsibility on you, and it is with the intention of sharing that




RUssELL, supra note 2, at 296-97 (distributed by the Euthanasia Educational Council, 1972).
The Council reported that, as of 1973, it had distributed a quarter of a million copies of the
Living Will. Id. at 181.
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sia, but may also provide a false confidence to those who believe it carries
the force of law.5 09 Indeed, doctors hesitate in following Living Wills ab-
sent clear legal guidelines.31 Further, the Living Will is a positive action
that must be taken. Many are not unaware of the Living Will or its
problems, but nonetheless do not complete one, or assume nothing tragic
will ever befall them.31 1 Finally, the Living Will provides no guidance for
the treatment of congenitally defective minors or incapacitated
individuals.
3 12
Also available to authorize others to act on one's behalf are Dura-
ble3 1 3 Powers of Attorney.3 14 Originally intended to simplify commercial
transactions for relatives after the death or disability of the principal, they
are now often recognized by state statute, and are valid for health-care
decisions.3 15 A Durable Power of Attorney may be drafted to the specifica-
tions of the principal, within legal limits, granting either broad or narrow
powers in all or specified areas.3 16 One drawback, however, is the possibil-
ity of a change in heart of the designated attorney-in-fact, or a change in
circumstances, without a corresponding change in the Durable Power of
Attorney.
As a converse to the emphasis on the death-inducing consequences of
Living Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, a person can request in ad-
vance that maximum treatment be given in case of disabling illness or in-
jury.3 17 The problem of incompetent persons who have not, for whatever
309. See id. at 182. Moreover, in cases where the provisions of the statute are not followed
properly, the existence of a Living Will statute might be construed as positive evidence of
legislative. intent strongly favoring the preservation of life. See infra part IVA. For an interest-
ing examination of the law concerning living wills, see Craig K Van Ess, Note, Living Wills
and Alternatives to Living Wills: A Proposal-The Supreme Trus4 26 VAL.. U. L Rav. 567 (1992).
310. RussEuL, supra note 2, at 182.
311. See id.Judge Teel, who presided over the controversial case involving Nancy Cruzan
and who recently suffered a heart attack, has not executed a Living Will. See Andrew H.
Malcolm, Paying a Personal Price in a Big Right-to-Die Cas N.Y. Tunas, Nov. 4, 1990, at 14; see
also infra notes 319-38, 438-44. Neither has Mr. McCanse, who is Nancy's court-appointed
guardian: "I suppose I should, though, shouldn't I?" Malcolm, supra, at 14.
312. RussE., supra note 2, at 182.
313. They are "durable" because they remain effective even after the principal becomes
disabled or incompetent, if the document so provides. See BLACK's LAw DixnoNAwR 611 (5th
ed. 1979).
314. As ofJune 1990, thirteen states and the District of Columbia have durable power of
attorney statutes expressly authorizing the appointment of proxies for making health care
decisions. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 290 n.2 (1990)
(O'Connor,J., concurring). All fifty states and the District of Columbia have general durable
power of attorney statutes. Id. at n.3. Missouri has had a particularly public debate in this
arena. See, e.g., CatherineJ. Barrie, Legislative History of Missouri Senate Bill 148, Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. Ray. 453, 454-76 (1992); cf. Michael A.
Refolo, The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990: Health Care's Own Miranda, 8J. CoNrraErm. L.
HE.ALT & PoL'y 455 (1992) (discussing various advance directives concerning a patient's
desire for or against certain types of medical care).
315. See Barrie, supra note 314, at 461.
316. See SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 141.
317. See id, at 141-42. A model form:
LIFE-SUSTAINING PROCEDURES DECLARATION:
I, _ , being at least eighteen (18) years old and of sound mind, will-
fully and voluntarily make known my desire that if at any time I have an incurable
injury, disease, or illness determined to be a terminal condition I request the use of
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reasons, used a Living Will remains, and they become candidates for the
drastic action of life-support withdrawal, with only hearsay as evidence of
their unknowable-indeed, nonexistent-intent.
OnJanuary 11, 1983, Nancy Cruzan lost control of her car as she trav-
elled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri.3 18 She was revived by
paramedics after being found lying face down in a ditch with her car over-
turned.3 19 She was taken unconscious to a hospital, where an attending
neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contu-
sions320 compounded by significant anoxia.321 Nancy's brain had proba-
bly been deprived of oxygen more than twice as long as is necessary for
permanent brain damage to occur.3 22 She remained comatose for ap-
proximately three weeks and then improved somewhat to an unconscious
state in which she could orally ingest some nutrition.3 23 Surgeons im-
planted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube with the consent of her
then husband.3 24 Nancy's condition did not improve, and she lay in a
Missouri state hospital in a persistent vegetative state.3 25 .The State of Mis-
all medical procedures, treatments, and interventions that would extend my life [or
delay my death, without regard to my physical or mental diagnosis, condition, or
prognosis, and without regard to financial cost]. This includes appropriate nutri-
tion and hydration, the administration of medication, and the performance of all
other medical procedures necessary to extend my life, to provide comfort[,] care, or
to alleviate pain.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of life-sus-
taining procedures, it is my intention that this declaration be honored by my family
and physician as the final expression of my legal right to request medical or surgical
treatment and accept the consequences of the request.
I understand the full import of this declaration.
Id. at 169. Indiana has enacted a statute recognizing, with minor alterations, this form. Id. at
168.
This ignores, however, the issue of cost. Even where the incapacitated person is wealthy,
the use of capital to maintain life with no reasonable chance of future benefit to the individ-
ual or to society is economically unjustified and ethically questionable as related to the deple-
tion of resources for surviving relatives. Where the incapacitated person is impecunious (not
an unusual hypothetical in this age of rapidly escalating medical costs), the economic issue is
easy-society should not waste its limited resources. The economic condemnation is even
sharper where the cost must be borne by individual physicians or hospitals. The ethical issue
is reversed: can society deny sustaining treatment, albeit at great cost, with some chance of
patient recovery remaining? Even if no chance of recovery exists, the act of denying medical
treatment involves questions of appropriate state policy, with corresponding questions of the
safeguards available to ensure against abuse and broader issues of a slippery slope of state
valuation of individual life. Cf infra part V.C (discussion of economic considerations of
euthanasia).
318. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990).
319. Id.
320. Internal head injuries. See WEBsTER'S NEw WoRiL DiCaiONARY 229, 304 (1988).




325. A "persistently vegetative state" is a condition in which a person exhibits motor re-
flexes, but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
266. The Supreme Court of Missouri adopted much of the trial court's findings, which de-
scribed Nancy's condition:
(1) [H]er respiration and circulation are not artificially maintained and are within
the normal limits of a thirty-year-old female; (2) she is oblivious to her environment
except for reflexive responses to sound and perhaps to painful stimuli; (3) she suf-
fered anoxia of the brain resulting in a massive enlargement of the ventricles filling
1993] A GENTLE AND EASY DEATH
souri bore the cost of her care.3 26 When the permanence of her condi-
tion became apparent, Nancy's parents requested that her artificial
nutrition and hydration procedures be terminated, which would have
caused her death.3 27 The hospital employees refused in the absence of
court approval,3 28 whereupon her parents sought and received authoriza-
tion from the state trial court. The court found.that Nancy had a funda-
mental right under the state and federal constitutions to refuse or direct
the withdrawal of "death prolonging procedures."3 29 The divided
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, based on either the applicability of
the common-law doctrine of informed consent 3 ° to Nancy's case3 31 or on
the broader questions of a state constitutional -right.3 3 2 It further found
that Nancy's parents did not have the power to order withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment in the absence of a valid Living Will.333 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether or not Nancy
had a right under the Federal Constitution to require the hospital to with-
draw life-sustaining measures.3 3 4 In sharply divided opinions, the Court
affirmed the Supreme Court of Missouri, based on questions of the appro-
priate standard of proof required for Nancy to have evidenced her feelings
regarding life-sustaining treatment,3 3 5 and the interests of the State in pre-
serving life in such cases.
3 3 6
with cerebrospinal fluid in the area where the brain has degenerated and [her] cere-
bral cortical atrophy is irreversible, permanent, progressive, and ongoing; (4) her
highest cognitive brain function is exhibited by her grimacing perhaps in recogni-
tion of ordinarily painful stimuli, indicating the experience of pain and apparent
response to sound; (5) she is a spastic quadriplegic; (6) her four extremities are
contracted with irreversible muscular and tendon damage... (7) she has no cogni-
tive or reflexive ability to swallow food or water to. maintain her daily essential needs
and ... she will never recover her ability to swallow sufficient [sic] to satisfy her
needs.
Id. at 266 n.1. "She is not dead. She is not terminally ill. Medical experts testified that she
could live another thirty years." Id.
Persons in a persistent vegetative state "may react reflexively to sounds, movements, and
normally painful stimuli, but they do not feel any pain or sense anybody or anything. Vegeta-
tive state patients may appear awake but are completely unaware." Id at 301 (Brennan, J.
dissenting). See generally LawrenceJ. Schneiderman, Exile and P1'S, 20 HASTrNGS CENTER REp.,
May-June 1990, at 5 (discussion of ethical issues relating to persons who are in a persistent
vegetative state).
326. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.
327. Id. at 267-68.
328. Id. at 268.
329. See id. The court further found evidence that Nancy had:
[E]xpressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat serious conversation with a
housemate friend that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life
unless she could live at least halfivay normally.., given her present condition she
would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration.
Id.
330. Id. This doctrine was used as a basis for the trial court's decision. See id.
331. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268.
332. See id.
333. See id. See also supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text.
334. See id. For a criticism of the judicial role played in this debate, see generally Ter-
rence A. Kline, Suicide, Liberty, and Our Imperfect Constitution: An Analysis of the Legitimacy of the
Supreme Court's Entanglement in Decisions to Terminate Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 14 CAis-
BELL L. RE,. 69 (1991).
335. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284-87. See also infra notes 438-55 and accompanying text.
336. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284-86. See also infra notes 446-49 and accompanying text.
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"Do carrots cry?"
3 3 7
On March 4, 1985, Roswell Gilbert shot his wife of 51 years, who suf-
fered from Alzheimer's disease3 3 8 and osteoporosis.
3 3 9 The retired elec-
trical engineer was convicted and sent to prison with a life term that
carried a minimum twenty-five-year sentence. 3 4 0 On August 2, 1990, Flor-
ida Governor Bob Martinez pardoned Mr. Gilbert, who was then eighty-
one and in failing health,3 4 ' after previously opposing clemency.
3 4 2 After
being freed, a frail Gilbert admitted that he was wrong to commit a "mercy
killing" of his wife: "I tried to help her as much as I could. The best word
to use is desperation. It was a state of desperation, in my mind."
3 43
In 1987, Janet Adkins began to notice slips in her memory; she be-
came frustrated when she lost her concentration while playing the piano,
one of her great loves in life.3 4 4 In 1989, she was diagnosed as having
Alzheimer's disease, and immediately began planning her death.
3 4 5 She
had always led an unusually active life and continued to do so up to the
time she committed suicide.3 4 6 She contacted Dr. Jack Kevorkian,
3 4 7 who
337. Nurses Question Cruzan Decision, Ausrm AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 16, 1990, at A13
(comment of a nurse concerning the persistent vegetative state of Nancy Crnzan).
338. See Freed Man Says He Regrets "Mercy Killing" of His Wfe AusrrN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Aug. 3, 1990. Alzheimer's is a degenerative disease with no known cure or treatment. See
generally RONALD C. HAMY ET ATL, ALZHErMER'S DISEASE: A HANDBOOK FOR CAREGIVERS
(1990); LENoa S. PowE.L & KATIE CouRTcE, ALZsF.umt's DISEASE: A GUIDE FOR FAMIIES
(1983).
339. See Man Who Shot Wife Is Granted Clemency, N.Y. TMrms, Aug. 2, 1990, at A9.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See Man Freed After Five Years in Jail for Mercy Killing, AUSTIN AMEmCAN-STASMAN,
Aug. 2, 1990, at A4.
343. See Freed Man Says He Regrets "Mercy Killing" of His Wife supra note 338.
344. See Whose Right to Die?, AusTIN AMERrCAN-STATESMAN, June 10, 1990, at Dl.
345. See id. She had previously been a member of the Hemlock Society. See id.
346. See id. She remained an avid mountain climber had recently climbed Mount Hood
and hiked in the Himalayas. See id.
347. A 62-year-old semi-retired pathologist, Dr. Kevorkian considers himself on the
frontlines of a movement to legalize and legitimatize assisted suicide. See id. at D4. Indeed,
he is now considered by others, for good or evil, to be on the frontline. As of March 1993,
Dr. Kevorkian has helped 15 terminally ill people commit suicide. See, e.g., Tom Morganthau
et al., Dr. Kevokian's Death Wish: The 'Suicide Doctor' Plans to Cany On, Despite a Murder Investi-
gation and a Law Aimed to Stop Him, NEwswEEK, Mar. 8, 1993, at 46-48. He has been charged
with committing three murders, in 1990 and 1991, but each time the cases were thrown out
for the simple reason that Dr. Kevorkian had been careful not to do the deed himself. Id. at
46. Until 1992, Michigan had no law making assisted suicide a crime. Id. In December of
that year and in clear response to Kevorkian's actions and public comments, Michigan en-
acted such a law. Again in response to Kevorkian, Michigan moved the effective date from
March 30 to February 26 of 1993 to combat the quickened pace of assisted suicides; six took
place in February 1993. Id. at 46-47.
Nevertheless, Kevorkian has vowed to continue to aid in the suicide of the terminally ill.
Id. at 46. Indeed, having since lost his license to practice medicine, Dr. Kevorkian defied a
Michigan law that proscribed assisted suicide. Isabel Wilkerson, Suicide Doctor Tests Law, Stays
with Man Who Dies, N.Y. Timss, May 17, 1993, at Al. Kevorkian was arrested after allegedly
assisting in the suicide of Ron Mansur, a 54-year-old man who suffered from both bone and
lung cancers. Id. The extent of Kevorkian's involvement was unclear, and prosecution
against him under the law which makes assisted suicide a felony punishable by four years in
prison and a two-thousand-dollar fine was equally uncertain, according to the prosecutor's
office. Id.
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assisted her by connecting her to a device of his invention, which induced
death in three stages.3 4 8 Their actions produced much public
commentary.
3 49
On July 26, 1990, Maxim Menendez, a twenty-five-year-old pet-store
worker, lapsed into a coma after drinking a cocaine-laced soft drink that
was accidentally missorted by a cocaine smuggler.3 50 He is brain-dead and
is kept alive by machine.
3 51
In a rare public admission, Dr. Timothy E. Quill disclosed that in
1990 he had prescribed barbiturates sufficient for one of his long-time
patients, suffering from acute myelomonocytic leukemia, to commit sui-
cide.3 52 The fact he knew his patient well distinguishes his case from cases
involving Dr. Kevorkian and the anonymous resident who did not.3 5 3 The
prosecutor decided against bringing charges against Dr. Quill because of a
lack of evidence.
3 54
IV. THE CuRRENT DEBATE
A. Arguments Against Euthanasia
Two primary arguments are made in opposition to euthanasia.3 55
The first, rooted in Judeo-Christian heritage, concerns an intrinsic immo-
rality of "premature" death.356 The second relates to the unacceptable
consequences which, it is believed, inevitably follow any loosening of legal
proscriptions or social mores.3 57 Additional arguments contest the scope
of the problem, question the effect on the medical community and soci-
ety, and reject the psychological consequences faced by potential euthana-
sia candidates and their families under any legalized active euthanasia
scheme.
35 8
Kevorkian's actions remain highly controversial. See generally, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, Rxfor
Death, TrmE, May 31, 1993, at 35-39 (comprising the lead and cover article for the issue).
348. See Whose Right to Die?, AusTrN AmErcAN-STATEsmN, June 10, 1990, at Dl.
349. A poll conducted by the Times Mirror Center of 1213 adults showed that fifty-nine
percent would want to terminate life-sustaining treatment if they suffered from a painful,
terminal disease. See id. Religion was a strong factor, and a distinction was made between
withholding treatment from adults and from severely disabled children. See id. Interestingly,
one-third could imagine assisting in the suicide of a loved one suffering from a terminal
illness. See id. Eight in ten polled approve of state laws allowing the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment where the terminally ill patientes wishes are known. See id. at D4. Fifty-five
percent support active euthanasia, compared with only forty-one percent in 1975. See id.
Fundamentalist Christians are generally strongly opposed to active euthanasia, but, paradoxi-
cally, a majority of "born-again" Christians and the very religious support mercy killings by
spouses in some instances. See id.
350. See Sydney P. Freedburg, AUsTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 16, 1990, at A23.
351. Id.
352. Lawrence K. Altman, Doctor Says He Agonized, But Gave Drug for Suicide, N.Y. TIMm,
Mar. 7, 1991, at Al.
353. See infra text accompanying note 514.
354. See Doctor Won't Be Charged in Suicide Case, AurN. AMERICAN-STATESMAN, April 13,
1991, at A23.




358. See infra parts IIA.3-5.
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1. Theological Objections
"His Death concerns the gods, not those men, no!"
3 5 9
"Thou shalt not kill."360 From no less an authority than God, the
proscription against any form of killing seems clear.3 61
There are two fundamental theological premises for the conclusion
that all active forms of euthanasia are forbidden: the sanctity of human life,
and the merits of human suffering.3 6 2 The concept of the inviolability of
human life3 63 is derived from divine revelation and natural law. Through
the Bible, God's will is expressed in numerous commands against the tak-
ing of life. 36 According to natural law, God has sovereign dominion over
all life3 65 and thus man has no right to usurp God's domain.366 To dis-
359. SOPHOCLES, AjAX 970, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS para. 6 at
513 (3d ed. 1979).
360. Exodus 20:13. Some biblical scholars believe the proper interpretation is: "Thou
shalt not murder." See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 217-18.
361. This may pose interesting questions regarding the religious justifications for war, but
that is a topic for another millennium.
362. SeeWIlsoN, supra note 2, at 82. Many religions do not see passive euthanasia, or the
withholding of medical care, as euthanasia at all; indeed, many refuse the nomenclature. See
supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. Passive euthanasia can be considered, however,
either the withholding of all medical care, or of only extraordinay medical efforts. The differ-
ence can be crucial to approval or condemnation in practice. See supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text. See generally Joseph V. Sullivan, The Immorality of Euthanasia, in BENEFICENT
EuTIANAsrA 12 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1975); SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 96 (discussing the
euthanasia debate among theologians).
363. One argument not raised by proponents of euthanasia, but a general presupposition
nonetheless, involves the definition of"human." A religious view assumes that all persons are
human, see generally supra note 214, and accompanying text (Pope Pius XII discussing eutha-
nasia); supra part II.B. (life is per sevaluable, regardless of circumstances), but this is arguable
where a person is in a persistent vegetative state. The lack of cognitive capacity can at least be
considered the absence of an essential element of being human, leading to the unanswerable
question of whether the body, without sentience,. is sufficient to be "human."
This should not be confused with the Nazi assumptions of sub-humanity; Gypsies, Jewish
people, and persons with physical disabilities do not, as groups, suffer from persistently vege-
tative states. In Nazi Germany the defining characteristics were wholly unrelated to the qual-
ity, if possible, of being less than fully "human." See generaly supra notes 176-89 and
accompanying text discussing Nazi Germany.
According to a religious perspective, it might not be incompatible to distinguish physical
existence from being "human"; the concept of the soul as a separate entity is common to
religions, and it is there that salvation will occur, if at all. The issue would then be one of
deciding whether a soul inhabits a person in a persistently vegetative state. Presumably it
does, but the question has not been posed so specifically; previously no need for such edifica-
tion existed.
364. See, e.g., Exodus 23:7; Darrel W. Amundsen, Suicide and Early Christian Values: The
Nature of the Problem and the Scope of this Essay, in SUICIDE AND EuTmHANsLA, supra note 2, at 81-
96; BAILw, supra note 2, at 22-23.
365. See BAIL.E, supra note 2, at 20-22. But cf. id. at 113 (suggestion by theologian Daniel
Maguire that humans have underestimated their dominion over life and death with regard to
difficult medical situations). See generally SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 122-25 (explain-
ing God's sovereign power over all creation).
366. See WILsON, supra note 2, at 83. It is further argued that any action to take life goes
against a basic instinct in humans of self-preservation and is thus inherently unnatural See
Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 98-99; William F. May, The Right to Die and the Obligation to Care:
Allowing to Die, Killing for Mercy, and Suicide, in DEATH AND DECISION 111, 111 (Ernan
McMullin ed., 1978). This presupposes that such an instinct, while generally accurate, can-
not in certain instances be overwhelmed by suffering, or overridden by conscious decision.
Even given the instinct of survival, its existence is not itsjustification; its origins are (presuma-
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obey this divine order is to reject God's will and suffer the consequences;
obedience to God takes primacy over considerations of human suffering.
Such considerations can be irrelevant in any event as Christian dogma
places a spiritual significance on suffering. 86 7
2. The Slippery Slope Objection
Even assuming that moral obstacles are not controlling, the possibility
of mistake or malevolent abuse presents the common slippery slope objec-
tion. s68 Even where euthanasia is seen as beneficial in certain circum-
stances, the potential for misdiagnoses and the threat of non-mercy
killings are seen as too great to justify any exceptions to an absolute bar
against euthanasia. 86 9 Further, counterbalancing the needs of a particular
individual are the considerations for society as a whole. The slippery slope
objection is. particularly relevant here because euthanasia involves such a
serious and complicated subject and because we have an example of a
contemporary, similar society, run amok.
Anti-euthanasia forces often point to the Nazi atrocities as an example
of the dangerousness of euthanasia.3 70 This argument is flawed for several
bly) biological and cannot be juxtaposed against the complex ethical questions surrounding
the value and meaning of life filled with suffering. Indeed, in nature, no such creature that
suffered to the extent normally envisaged in the euthanasia debate would long survive.
367. See HumPHRY & Wcxir-r, supra note 2, at 165; WENNBERG, supra note 2, at 82-88;
SAcRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DoCrRINE OF THE FArmi, DECLARATION ON EuTHANAsIA III
(May 5, 1980) (reprinted.in Lim ETfucs CENTRE, supra note 216; full text in L'Ossermatore Ro-
mano, June 30, 1980). Monsignor Middleton, while condemning the proposed New York
euthanasia bill, see supra note 193 and accompanying text, "extolled 'the mystical beauty of
pain.'" Huni'mR & Wicscarr, supra note 2, at 38. See generally SPRING & LARsON, supra note 2,
at 130-31. Suffering is seen as providing an opportunity to draw closer to, and become more
dependent on, Jesus Christ. Id. at 131. Further, some view as repugnant any attempt by
moralists to decide how much suffering is too much. Id.; see also id. at 56 (rejection of the
belief that man should be free to control his own life and death). A pastoral letter from
Dutch Catholic Bishops refuted the "secular philosophy that equates good health with the
'value' of a person's life," stating that personalities can grow despite deteriorating bodies. Id.
Original-sin beliefs notwithstanding, Dr. James Walsh's argument extolling suffering as
virtuous disregards the possibility of innocent suffering, as with infant AIDS sufferers today.
See supra note 163.
368. For an interesting discussion on 'slippery slope arguments, see generally Frederick
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HA.v. L. REv. 361 (1985) (explaining that slippery slope argu-
ments focus on the possibility of future damages).
369. Additionally, opponents fear that a "right to die" would rapidly deteriorate into a
"duty to die," as those who are burdens would feel pressure to succumb to euthanasia. See
SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 49; see also infra note 540 (former Governor of Colorado
stating that the elderly have a "duty to die"). This, coupled with the demographically aging
U.S. population, is seen as a serious genocidal possibility. See SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2,
at 22. Some see efforts by euthanasia proponents as a thinly veiled attempt to, step by step,
"establish the death penalty for those whose lives they consider unworthy to be lived." Rita
Marker, Don't Let Doctors Turn into Killers, USA TODAY, Apr. 6, 1989, at 8A (photocopy distrib-
uted by the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force) (emphasis added).
370. See RussEu., supra note 2; at 90. Anti-euthanasia forces, which tend as well to corre-
late positively with those who hold strongly religious beliefs, have little answer to the criticism
that the Holocaust occurred through deafening Church silence in an overwhelmingly Chris-
tian coiintry (a 1940 census indicated that ninety-five percent of Germans were affiliated with
a church). See Husmpma, & Wixc r, supra note 2, at 29. Further, many who were directly
responsible for the heinous acts were church oriented and continued to think of themselves
as such, despite their actions. Id. Franz Stangi, commandant of the Treblinka concentration
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reasons. The motives behind the Nazi programs are at the opposite end of
the moral spectrum from legislation with the goal of meeting the desires
of the suffering individual.37 1 The Nazi emphasis was not on the suffering
individua but rather on the sociey's right to exterminate unwanted indi-
viduals regardless of the individual's feelings on the matter.3 7 2 Killing for
the convenience of the State has never been a goal of mainstream eutha-
nasia proponents.37 3 Further, the Nazi euthanasia program was directed
secretly and in an extra-legal manner.374 If anything, this argument might
support openly discussed and legislated policies in order to lessen the like-
lihood of a possible reoccurrence of the Nazi debacle.
camp, where 700,000 people died, was a devout Roman Catholic. I& Indeed, he found it
difficult to sign a statement that he was a Gottglaubiger (a believer in God without a religious
affiliation); Germans were loyal to their churches and church rituals. Id. Hermann Goering,
at the Nuremberg court, proclaimed: "[I] always considered I belonged to the church." Id.
He further noted that the party represented a "'positive Christianity... [fighting] the spirit of
Jewish materialism.'" Id.
Historian William Allen argues essentially that itwould have been futile for the churches
to oppose the Nazi regime. Id. He further explains that a lack of focus on moral fundamen-
talism and concern for the church's survival, even in the face of blatant violations of religious
dogma, in effect supported the Nazi regime, except where government policies were directly
opposed to church self-interest. Id.
371. One wonders how many Charles Proteus Steinmetzs were slaughtered for the mor-
ally obscene and intellectually idiotic "euthanistic" justifications of the National Socialists.
Then again we do know, give or take a few hundred thousand, how many ordinaryJohn and
Jane Q. Europeans were exterminated. After all, one need not be a genius to validate exist-
ence. The question that follows is not, however, what does one need to validate one's exist-
ence; that presupposes that the State has the right to terminate existence based on
intelligence or physiological (or other, state-defined) factors. See supra notes 176-89 and ac-
companying text. Rather, the question is more appropriately: when does one have the right
to legitimately conclude that his own life no longer desires existence? The difference in
emphasis is critical. No remotely mainstream advocates propose active involuntary euthana-
sia in any form even approaching what occurred in Nazi Germany; to do so would be anti-
thetical to the foundations of our culture and legal system. See also supra notes 186-88
(outlining the Nazi's secret and involuntary euthanistic programs).
The U.S. Supreme Court grappled with an analogous issue concerning the execution of
retarded defendants convicted of capital crimes. See, e.g., Al Kamen, Executing the Insane For-
bidden: High Court Rules Punishment Unconstitutionally Cruel and Unusual, WASH. Posr, June 27,
1986, at A4.
372. Or the feelings of the individual's family, where the individual was incapacitated. An
article by Michael Straight published in the New Republic detailed German practices:
In September, October, and November, 1940, 85,000 blind, incurably ill or aged
Germans were put to death by the Gestapo. They were put to death as casually as
the SPCA chloroforms old and helpless dogs. They were not killed for mercy. They
were killed because they could no longer manufacture guns in return for the food
which they consumed; because the German hospitals were needed for wounded
soldiers; because their death was the ultimate logic of the national socialist doctrine
of racial superiority and the survival of the physically fit.
RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 91.
373. Further, according to Marvin Kohl:
There is simply no evidence that killing per se is contagious, but there is overwhelm-
ing evidence to show that it is not. It is true that people who believe that it is right
to kill Gypsies, Jews, or anyone else, provided their deaths may profit the state, will
probably continue to kill if they have the power to do so. But this is not evidence of
the seductiveness of killing. Rather it is evidence that when men have almost unlim-
ited power their actions will be consistent with their beliefs, and if their beliefs en-
tail needless cruelty, so will their actions.
Kohl, supra note 180, at 137.
374. According to generally accepted Western legal principles. See supra notes 186-89 and
accompanying text.
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3. Objections as to the True Extent of the Problem
Some writers opposed to euthanasia stress that the need for euthana-
sia is often exaggerated with extreme examples of patient suffering.
37 5
This is a specious argument, implying that because euthanasia is truly
needed so rarely it is thus wrong. That a single person must endure ex-
treme and/or hopeless suffering validates the arguments both for and
against euthanasia.
4. The Effect on the Medical Community
I swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, Hygeia, and Pan-
acea, and I take to witness all the gods, all the goddesses, to keep accord-
ing to my ability and my judgment the following Oath:
To consider dear to me as my parents him who taught me this art; to
live in common with him and if necessary to share my goods with him; to
look upon his children as my own brothers, to teach them this art if they so
desire without fee or written promise; to impart to my sons and the sons of
the master who taught me and the disciples who have enrolled themselves
and have agreed to the rules of the profession, but to these alone, the
precepts and the instruction. I will prescribe regimen for the good of my
patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to
anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice
which may cause his death. Nor will I give a woman a pessary to procure
abortion. But I will preserve the purity of my life and my art. I will not
cut for stone, even for patients in whom the disease is manifest; I will
leave this operation to be performed by practitioners (specialists in this
art). In every house where I come I will enter only for the good of my
patients, keeping myselffar from all intentional ill-doing and all seduc-
tion, and especially from the pleasures of love with women or with men, be
they free or slaves. All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of
my profession or outside of my profession or in daily commerce with men,
which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never
reveal. If I keep this oath faithfully, may I enjoy my life and practice my
art, respected by all men and in all time; but f I swerve from it or violate
it, may the reverse be my lot.
376
Euthanasia stands against all that modern medicine stands for; "to
kill" is, after all, antonymic of "to cure." Blurring the lines of the function
of medicine would arguably harm an essential element of trust among pa-
375. See, e.g., MAR.x, supra note 33, at 25.
376. The Hippocratic Oath, reprinted in DoRL.AN's ILLUSrRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 767-
68 (27th ed. 1988). Although the Hippocratic Oath has for generations been a revered tradi-
tion at medical school graduation ceremonies, it has undergone changes, sometimes severe.
See BARNARD, supra note 31, at 29. Some schools have made word changes, while others have
abandoned it altogether, or substituted the Declaration of Geneva, which was adopted in
1914 by the World Medical Association. Id. at 28. Few Canadian schools use the Hippocratic
Oath. Id.
In fairness to Hippocrates, he could not have foreseen the progress of two thousand
years of medical advancements. Indeed, he avoided the use of drugs even in his own time; he
preferred instead a homeopathic healing process. See DoRu.LAN's IsusrraTED MEDICAL Dic-
TioNAR, supra, at 767. In addition, Ms. Russell proposed that, if man can promulgate such
an oath, he can also revise it. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 221.
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tients, physicians, nurses, and society.377 In addition to a fundamental
moral unacceptability, many are concerned that if active euthanasia be-
comes a prevalent practice, a stigma would be attached to those doctors
willing to perform euthanasia.37 8 Others point to the demoralizing effect
of a condoned and systematic "abandonment" of scores of patients.
3 79
Another argument against euthanasia involves the progress that medi-
cal technology makes against diseases. Euthanizing patients might deprive
them of potential cures developed after it is too late, but before they
would otherwise have died. °8 0 This might occasionally prove true, but is
also a function of the time before "natural" death when euthanasia would
be allowed.3 8 ' It is doubtful a breakthrough would be made and be avail-
able to the dying patient in a matter of a few months or even years. Re-
strictions on medical experimentation might significantly restrict the
benefits of new discoveries to any who suffered from the affliction too near
to the time of the discovery. Even if a discovery is made and is available,
the issue then requires a proper balancing of the demands of the pa-
tient38 2 with the probabilities of an effective, available cure.388 Also of
concern is the possibility of misdiagnoses which might result in euthaniz-
ing non-terminal patients.3 8 4 These remain valid concerns, but the risks
377. See Willard Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill in EUTrN.Asw THE MoRAL IssuEs,
supra note 31, at 25, 27; see also THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 2, at 14649. See generally
HELGA KUHSE, THE SANCTr-OF-LrFE DoCrgrNE IN MEDicmN: A CRITIQUE (1987).
378. RussELL, supra note 2, at 79. Dr. Abraham Wolbarst, a distinguished New York physi-
cian, argued that-analogous to the situation of abortion operations-legalization would re-
move the stigma attached to what has been a criminal act. Id. Many opposed to euthanasia
see the issues of abortion and euthanasia as inextricably related, both involving a question of
the right to life. See, e.g., MARx, supra note 33, at 17; SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 47-48.
379. See Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100-01 (arguing that the practice of euthanasia
would eventually affect the attitudes of all health professionals, diminishing the quality of
medical care for everyone).
380. See WErss, supra note 53, at 87.
381. "Natural" is now a difficult concept, as life can often be extended "artificially" via
extraordinary medical care. Moreover, our life spans are historically much longer now than
previously, due to both better nutrition and living conditions, and improvements in medical
care. Distinctions of when "natural" ends and "artificial" begins become an academic argu-
ment, with little basis in medical realities. See generally MEDICAL INNOVATION AND BAD OUT-
COMES: LEGAL, SoCL.L, AND ETHiCAL REsPONSES (Mark Siegler et al. eds., 1987).
382. At the time euthanasia is considered.
383. Quantifying probabilities may not be as difficult as it first appears. Most medical
progress now occurs as the result of organized, even bureaucratic, experimentation. Knowl-
edge of programs in development, with educated guesses as to rates of progress, would give a
nearly complete picture of new cures "in the pipeline." These considerations should, how-
ever, be a part of the physician's analysis of the patient's condition and recommended treat-
ments as a matter of course.
384. Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100.
Best while you have it use your breath,
There is no drinking after death.
JOHN FLETCHER, THE BLooDY BROTHER, rprinted in THE OxFoRD DICrIONARY oF QUOTATIONS
para. 7 at 215 (3d ed. 1979).
Death, for all its presumed beneficence against suffering, is final. Any mistake, whether
honest or otherwise, cannot be reversed. Even honest mistakes can take several forms: im-
proper medical diagnosis by either incompetence or the state of medical knowledge, or the
unpredictability of the progression of an illness. The finality of euthanasia requires at the
very least a high degree of certainty that only those persons who meet the requisite criteria of
x amount of human suffering and Yamount of hopelessness will be given the option of
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can be reduced in accordance with intelligent practice in any case by "get-
ting a second opinion." In a terminal case where euthanasia is under con-
sideration, third or fourth opinions would be well warranted.
Many who oppose euthanasia reject the implication that it is the only
option available to a dying person. They propose instead alternatives such
as hospice care.3 8 5 Others emphasize the Christian responsibility to minis-
ter to the needs of those who might otherwise consider euthanasia.3 8 6
While these are legitimate criticisms and honorable suggestions, 387 they
do not avoid the underlying question of the right of an individual to
choose death, even with the option of alternative health care, in the face
of continuing pain.
Yet another objection relates tor the ability of physicians to alleviate
most pain with drugs, obviating the need for euthanasia.38 8 This again
does not address the underlying question of the patient's right, or lack
thereof, to choose death, and further disregards the question posed by
those favoring euthanasia: "What will be the resulting quality of life?"
3 89
While drugs certainly do much to alleviate pain, at some point, the quan-
tity and type of drugs needed increases to the point that this question
becomes particularly relevant.
5. Effect on Society
Mary Senander, of the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force,
presents an interesting argument. She reverses a standard refrain by those
favoring euthanasia of a legislated morality imposed by those in
opposition:
If you want to commit suicide, you can do that. It's not illegal. If
you want to hang yourself with a velvet cord from the rafters of
your garage-I'm not recommending it and I wish you
wouldn't-you can do that. If you want to blow your brains out
euthanasia. Where the risks are so lopsided, it seems reasonable to err on the side of caution
and thus against euthanasia.
Even if we could be certain as to the honor of those who might euthanize improperly,
more fundamental questions remain. Who decides what those circumstances are and
whether the patient meets them? Further, what controls are needed to ensure faithful com-
pliance with a presumption against euthanasia? And what of the instances where the patient
is unable to make known his or her wishes? These questions bode ill for the very real
problems facing any implementation of a euthanasia policy.
385. See, e.g., RobertJ. Miller, Hospice Care as an Alternative to Euthanasia, 20 LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 127 (1992); MARx, supra note 33, at 81. Hospitals, it is noted, are oriented
toward the treatment of those who can be treated, while nursing homes are oriented toward
non-terminal elderly, neither are designed for the needs of the dying. See id.; see also THOM-
AsMA & GRABER, supra note 2, at 113-15; DAvID CUNDIF', M.D., EUTHANAsA Is NOT THE AN-
swsR: A HospicE PsssiciAN's VIEw (1992).
386. See generally SPING & LARsoN, supra note 2, at 17-75 (discussing the rationale be-
hind hospice care).
387. See generally ELzABETH CALLiu, A GENTLE DEATm: PERSONAL CAREGIVING TO THE TER-
sumiALLV ILL (1986) (registered nurse's advice on coping with and caring for a terminally ill
loved one).
388. See SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 176-77.
389. A patient, bed-ridden and racked with drug-masked pain, may well ask- "Is this life?"
- a question that, sadly, begs to not be answered.
1993]
DENVER UNIVERS1TY LAW REVIEW
with a diamond-studded pistol-I hope you won't, for your sake
and for your famfy's-you can do that. If you want to save up
pills and poison yourself-I'd try to talk you out of it-but you
could do it. But what you're asking for-what proponents of eu-
thanasia are demanding,[sic]-is my approval and acceptance of
your actions. What's more, you expect-and proponents of "aid
in dying" demand-someone else to help.39 0
She continues:
When you ask for social and legal approval of killing, you're ask-
ing ME to participate in YOUR death, to share a communal re-
sponsibility and burden. And guilt. And blame. And I won't do
it! Now you're meddling with MY choices and MY conscience.
Don't expect me to be silent when these issues of public policy
are debated; I have MY rights too.39 1
This presents a unique perspective of two opposing forces, each saying: by
your actions and beliefs, you are forcing me to do or to countenance
something that is reprehensible to me. Who's rights are being infringed
by whom's? It is further notable that this position posits a moral objection
that is not necessarily religious, thus distinguishing theological from
strictly moral objections.
Here, Ms. Senander relies on the premise that assistance of suicide
(not euthanasia per se)3 92 violates a right of all citizens to be free from
immoral infringements (according to the complaining individual's sense
of moral correctness). This is, at once, both a powerful emotional argu-
ment and a difficult one to refute on any but a strictly logical basis. The
fallacy here is that Ms. Senander's use of the term "participate" is suscepti-
ble to different meanings in different contexts. Her "participation" is lim-
ited to her existence in a society that may condone a practice that is
reprehensible to her. Her argument, however, should not be so simply
dismissed. She validly exposes a base objection to the effect on non-par-
ticipants of the difficult decisions that must be faced by those considering
euthanasia. To those who feel strongly about the importance of maintain-
ing a bar on any takings of life, euthanasia is an affront to humanity and a
diminution of society's claim to civilization. This does, however, disregard
the fact that the argument is disassociated from the situation of any partic-
ular individual. This leaves the argument in the untenable position of re-
quiring compliance to the moral dogma of society-an impossible task in
this society and probably an undesirable goal even if feasible. In effect,
this would necessarily lead to a lowest common denominator of moral
jurisprudence.
Should society condone euthanasia, there is recourse available to
those who object to the practice. As a member of society, each person has
the right to participate in the process of legislating both morals and public
policies, via whatever reasonable means is available-in our case via demo-
390. MARY C. SENANDnE, INThRATIONAL ANnI-EurHANAsIA TASK FORCE, DEATH ON DE-
MAND: "DON'T COUNT ME INI" (1988).
391. Id.
392. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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cratic governance. Whether the victor will be able to gather the greatest
political power to force the issue remains an open and troubling question
with such a basic issue at stake; neither side can live easily, if at all, with the
other's demands.3 93
Another objection, closely related to the slippery slope objection,3 94 is
the change in attitudes toward the terminally ill and others who are medi-
cally vulnerable, which is viewed as necessarily leading to an eroded value
of life in general.3 95 After it becomes possible to think of some as deserv-
ing death, it will consequently become less improbable that the general
revulsion against killing will decline.
3 96
6. An Admission of Defeat: Creating an Atmosphere of Despair
I do not want to die-no; I neither want to die nor do I want to
want to die;
I want to live for ever and ever and ever. I want this "I" to live-
this poor "I"
that I am and that Ifeel myself to be here and now, and therefore the
problem of the duration of my sou4 of my own sou4 tortures me.
39 7
The option of euthanasia might be seen by patients as a shortcut, per-
haps leading many to give up too easily.3 98 The very possibility of euthana-
sia might keep some from surviving when they otherwise might.399
Medical recoveries can occur based not on medical care, but rather on a
simple yet powerful desire to live.4 0 To give up the fight40 1 is to close off
the incentive to live, thus resulting for some in a needless death.
40 2
Furthermore, some might choose euthanasia out of concern for their
393. This raises interesting philosophical questions of democracy in that a presumption
of consent to the process is required of any minority;, in losing, the loser must accede to the
legitimacy of the contest. This is less certain in areas where some believe strongly that issues
beyond mere governance are involved. The power of any citizen or group of citizens to veto
a practice based on its discontinuity with their sense of morality is itself both undefined and
worthy of further exploration.
394. See supra part III.A.2.
395. See, e.g., C. Everett Koop & Edward R. Grant, The "Small Beginnings" of Euthanasia:
Examining the Erosion in Legal Prohibitions Against Mercy Killing, reprinted in STtDIs IN L MED.
& Soc'y 19 (1986) (published by Americans United for Life, which opposes euthanasia).
396. See id. at 42-43.
397. MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO, THE TRAGic SENSE oF LrF IN MEN AND IN PEOPLES 45 (J.E.
Crawford Flitch trans. 1926).
398. Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100; see also David C. Clark, "'Rational' Suicide and
People with Terminal Conditions or Disabilities, 8 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 147 (1992); Harry M.
Hoberman, The Impact of Sanctioned Assisted Suicide on Adolescents, 4 IsSUES IN L. & MED. 191
(1988).
399. Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100.
400. See, e.g., BAmARD, supra note 31, at 79-82 (relating a personal experience while on a
"farm call").
401. See supra note 367 (discussing human instinct to survive).
402. This argument may have merit in cases where the diagnosis is uncertain, but in cases
of terminal or incurable illnesses, the value of "willing the illness away" is unproved and not a
legitimate argument against euthanasia generally, particularly considering the restrictions
that would accompany any acceptable euthanasia policy.
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families or others, rather than from a true desire to die.40 3 This is a strong
argument for anti-euthanasia forces in that it combines elements of (non-
religious) moral and slippery slope objections. The argument is further
strengthened by the inability to guarantee that any decision favoring eu-
thanasia will be based strictly on the needs and desires of the individual
who will die and not on the influence of others who may be affected, but
who will not themselves suffer the consequences. This is particularly
troublesome considering that any influence will likely come not from any
conscious encouragement, but from a sense of obligation on the part of
the euthanasia candidate to cease or prevent being a burden on loved
ones.
These concerns are not easily assuaged by an emphasis on the judicial
safeguards present to prevent undue influence. First, whether any influ-
ence can be due is not certain; the "correctness" of an individual's decision
to die to prevent emotional or financial burdens on loved ones is asjustifi-
able on grounds that it is within a person's autonomy to sacrifice for love
as it is condemnable on grounds of its terrible import. Second, assuming
such influence is condemnable, few cases of serious medical decisionmak-
ing would survive such an influenceless standard-life decisions are not
made in an emotional vacuum. Finally, the courts might indeed be the
best available arena to ensure that any influence is not undue.
"No life that breathes with human breath
Has ever truly long'd for death. -404
B. Arguments for Euthanasia
1. A Need
Darkling I listen; and, for many a time
I have been half in love with easeful Death,
Call'd him soft names in many a mused rhyme,
To take into the air my quiet breath;
Now more than ever seems it rich to die,
To cease upon the midnight with
no pain. .... 405
Compassion. In a word, compassion embodies all that insists on the
practice of euthanasia. 40 6 To effectively understand arguments favoring
403. Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100: see alsoJoseph Richman, Sanctioned Assisted Sui-
cide: Impact on Family Relations, 3 IssuEs iN L. & MEo. 53, 54-62 (1987). Even more objectiona-
ble is the possibility of subtle or not-so-subtle pressure to force elderly patients to commit
euthanasia. David G. Bjornstrom, Elderly Will Be Pressured to Die Early, 105 LA. DAILYJ., Oct.
28, 1992, at 6.
404. Lord Alfred Tennyson, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DiarioNARt OF QUOTATIONS para. 20
at 543 (3d ed. 1979).
405. John Keats, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS para. 22 at 291 (3d
ed. 1979).
406. See William A. Squires, A Call for Compassion: Removing Obstacles from the Right to Die,
19 BARuISTER Winter 1993 at 3; see also Paul Kurtz, The Case for Euthanasia: A Humanistic
Perspective 8 IssUEs IN L. & MED. 309, 309-16 (1992). Euthanasia has evolved into so many
forms, particularly due to the ever-expanding capabilities of medical professionals, it would
be simplistic to attempt to advocate all in blanket arguments. Compassion, though, does
describe the motive behind beneficent forms under serious consideration.
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euthanasia, it is necessary to distinguish the various forms; different argu-
ments, on either side, apply differentlydepending on the nature of the
action or non-action to end life, the state of the suffering individual, and
his or her say in the matter.
"Death is perhaps nothing, dying eveiything. ,1
7
The primary argument for euthanasia is not so much for euthanasia-
no one408 enjoys the contemplation of misery-as it is against the arguably
absurd propositions that deny a remedy for that which exists-insufferable
and unending pain. Assuming that needless suffering is to be neither tol-
erated nor glorified, we either act or do nothing, to relieve such pain.
"Naught broken save this body, lost but breath;
Nothing to shake the laughing heart's long peace there
But only agony, and that has ending,"
And the worst friend and enemy
is but Death. "109
Some of the early commentators on euthanasia based their ideas on a
religious theme. In one of the first articles on euthanasia to appear in a
Protestant Church periodical, E.N. Jackson cited the infinite regard of
Jesus for every distressed human soul. 410 He continued by proposing that,
based on the Christian concept of soul, what a physician might do to the
physical body would not injure the soul itself.4 11 He further believed that
adequate safeguards could exist to prevent unwise or unscrupulous ac-
tions. 41 2 In an address in 1954, Dr. Claude E. Forkner 413 proclaimed: "It
is not death that people fear ... it is ceaseless pain, endless suffering,
excessive use of the family financial resources, lifelong incompetence,
hopeless dependency."41 4 Euthanasia, he continued, embodies one of the
strongest Commandments of the Bible: "Do unto others as thou wouldst
have them do unto you." 4 1 5 Eighty-four-year-old Dr. Heinrich Wolfe
4 16
deplored the zeal of many doctors in prolonging life cruelly and futilely,
407. E. du Perron, in 19 HAsTNas CENrER REi'. 31 (Special Supp. Jan.-Feb. 1989).
Another of many horror stories involved a 94-year-old woman who entered a hospital
after experiencing severe internal bleeding. A large, malignant tumor was found in her co-
lon. With reservations about the wisdom of surgery, the tumor was removed. Resuscitation
was expressly rejected, in writing, before the surgery. After the operation, a respirator was
placed in her mouth and would remain there until her death, weeks later. Sedation was
minimal so as to not interfere with diagnoses. Her hands swelled to three times their normal
size and were tied to the bed to prevent her from removing the irritating tubes. The onset of
pneumonia was treated with antibiotics, and was revealed only inadvertently to family mem-
bers two days hence. Her kidney malfunction worsened. Her face was swollen beyond recog-
nition. Her lips were raw from the respirator. Finally, she died. See Fred M. Hechinger, They
Tortured My Mother, N.Y. Tms, Jan. 24, 1991, at A14.
408. Sadists and masochists notwithstanding.
409. Rupert Brooke, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DICrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS para. 28 at 94
(3d ed. 1979).
410. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 113.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Professor of Clinical Medicine at Cornell Medical College. Id. at 112.
414. Id. See also HUMPHRY & WICgarT, supra note 2, at 65 (noting that, according to stud-
ies, prolonged dying was most feared).
415. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 112.
416. A consultant at Mount Sinai Hospital. Id.
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eager to demonstrate technical skills at the expense of their dying
patients.
41 7
Dr. Harry E. Fosdick 418 countered the basic religious contention that
only God has the right to determine when life should end by pointing out
that man had been responsible for increasing the average lifespan from
approximately 30 years during early colonial days to well over 70 years
today.41 9 In so doing, man may inadvertently have increased suffering for
those who otherwise would not have survived, leading to the dilemma soci-
ety now faces in dealing with euthanasia.
4 20
"It is silliness to live when to live is torment; and then have we a prescrip-
tion to die when death is our physician. "4 21
The situation where the patient is incapable of requesting euthanasia
raises a more difficult question.422 Where a Living Will, Durable Power of
Attorney, or other extant evidence provides a clue as to the person's prior
wishes, physicians and the courts are not faced with the problems of invol-
untary423 euthanasia. Where a person faces continued existence in a form
quite different from cognitive human existence, however, the capacity of
family or relatives to make the decision to end life is far more ethically and
legally attenuated.
"To live a life half dead, a living death. "424
2. Questions Concerning the Meaning of Life
"Please ... kill me. "425
A difficult question that is rarely raised concerns the reasons for want-
ing to die. After all, even for those who are unhappy or in ill health, life is
"good."426 It is not enough to say merely that death provides a release
from suffering. If this were so, any love-spurned soul would provide a suf-
ficient rationale for death. For death to be appealing, its alternative, life,
must be far worse. People view "life," however, as either sacrosanct, in
which case any infinitesimally minute portion always has positive value, or
as relative, in which case life can become negative at some variable point
in the future, the only question being when. Ordinarily, death makes the
417. Id.
418. Then minister of the Riverside Church in New York. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. WILLAM SHAKaSPEARE, OTHEL.O, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3.
422. See, e.g., THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 2, at 43-46.
423. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
424. John Milton, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DICfIONARY OF QUOTATIONS para. 17 at 350
(3d ed. 1979).
425. Plea of a female planet colonist, immobilized in a fibrous cocoon, who begs rescuing
Marines to kill her before an alien, which was implanted via alien embryo carrier through the
colonist's mouth to her abdomen, is about to hatch. AuaENs (Twentieth Century/Fox 1986).
426. See Foot, supra note 38, at 87. Here, "good" probably is best defined in the context
of an expectation of better or improving health. The fundamental issue underlying euthana-
sia is the inevitability of death faced continuously, rather than abstractly as is usual until
serious illness strikes or old age creeps up. See alSOJOHN HARIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE 1-110,
192-213, 238-42 (1985).
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determination for us. In cases of terminal illness, the central issue be-
comes: Which death is preferable? Either way, the person will die. Will the
preferred death be (1) painful, according to verified diagnoses, or (2)
controlled? No one would ordinarily choose controlled death,42 7 but
where pain becomes unbearable, a controlled death is no longer unthink-
able. The equation, therefore, is the relationship between what will hap-
pen in the absence of death versus death.4 28 Where only pain or
incapacitation awaits, the question then enters the standard euthanasia
realm of whether or not the person has a right to choose a controlled
death.
Apocryphal dinner-party guest to female acquaintance: "Would you
have sex with me for one million dollars?" The woman replies, after con-
sideration: "Yes, I think I would." "Well then, would you have sex with
me for one hundred dollars?" To which she exclaims in disgust: "What
do you think I am-a prostitute?" "We have already established that,
madam; we are now merely haggling.,
429
Opponents' assertions of sacrosanct life are seriously challenged by
prima facie valuations of life made continuously in the criminal law. For
instance, persons convicted of murdering police officers face more severe
punishments.4 30 Whether those increased punishments are desirable is
not at issue; that police officers as a group are afforded stricter enforce-
ment of differentiated laws is a value judgement that society has made-
determined not by the act, or even the actor, but rather by the person who
dies. Conversely, the life of someone who attempts to commit a felony but
is killed by the victim as a matter of self-defense is per se less "valuable" in
427. Much less a painful death.
428. A fundamental chasm exists between opposing and favoring forces, which can be
reduced to a mathematical construct. Those opposing generally espouse a view of life as
sacrosanct. As such, logically there can be no such thing as a life with a negative value. The
whole reason for euthanasia is a belief that life sometimes does indeed have a negative value;
suffering with no reasonable possibility for relief is negative.
The question underlying all discussions of euthanasia is: Is life, per se, always good?
Following theological doctrines, and normal experience, the answer is: Yes. But "always" is
such an absolute beast, so easily defeated in logic and on exams. To disprove the hypothesis.
we simply have to find one example where life is not good. Assuming a reasonable interpre-
tation of "good," examples both hypothetical and real abound.
Suppose a person were to be executed-let's say a notorious spy to liven the Article-
and had a choice of being shot directly through the cerebral cortex, with the monotonously
predicable outcome of death, or of first being tortured over a generous time by various lov-
ingly cared for medieval instruments. The first question is whether the torture preceding
and including death is worse than death sans agony. The next question is whether our spy
has the right to decide (which might, of course, depend on the honor of the captors). For an
interesting discussion of this dilemma, see also SUICIDE AND EU'rHMAsiA, supra note 2, at 251-
76 (concluding that a coercive state force should not be available to prevent suicide or
euthanasia).
Nancy Cruzan's pseudo-ghost will attest to the experience that the above debate is any-
thing but fictitious. Accordingly, is her experience sufficient to qualify as "negative?" Or
perhaps: "neutral?" If neutral, the arguments for euthanasia are even muddier.
429. Source blessedly forgotten; a preemptory apology for the implied sexism.
430. See, e-g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(1) (West 1974). Firemen are also covered;
the homicide must occur when the officer or fireman is acting in the lawful discharge of an
official duty. Id.
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the eyes of the law; no punishment is meted.43 1 Valuations are made re-
garding human life. It is for civilization to justify those distinctions.
Whose Life Is It Anywayn
32
Some people object to the effect of intensive medical care on the pro-
cess of dying. Although the goal may be admirable, the effect is one of
degradation of the patient to the status of a research specimen. 43 3 The
patient sometimes becomes little more than an experimental mass, sub-
jected to treatment after treatment in the hopeless quest for a continued
heartbeat.
43 4
Death (to a woman in pain, about to die): Do not fear me, my child.
Come, climb into my arms, and I shall take away all your pain.4 35
V. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL IssuEs
A. Euthanasia and the Courts
I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty, or
give me death!
43 6
As if to mimic society's uncertainty regarding euthanasia, a deeply di-
vided 43 7 U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision affecting Nancy Cruzan,438 up-
held the right of the State of Missouri to maintain Nancy's artificial
nutrition and hydration. 439 The Court's opinion focused on technical
431. See, e.g., id. at § 9.32.
432. WHosp LFE Is IT ANYWAY? (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1981).
433. See, e.g., COLEN, supra note 53, at 229-42; Huswymw & Wicsxrr, supra note 2, at 96
(describing the experience of a cancer patient).
434. See, e.g., HUMPHR & WicK-rr, supra note 2, at 96; THOMASMA & GmBER, supra note 2,
at 158-64; supra note 16.
435. Franz Schubert, Der Tod und das Madchen (1821).
436. Patrick Henry, reprinted in Ti OxsoRD DicrIoNARY oF QUOTATIONS 245-46 (3d ed.
1979). The question at hand appears to be: can we demand both?
437. Five opinions were written for a 5-4 majority. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 269 (1990); infra note 440.
438. See supra notes 319-38 and accompanying text.
439. See Cruan, 497 U.S. at 265.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion focused on narrow legal issues. See infra text accompanying
notes 442-45.
Justice O'Connor emphasized personal interests in refusing medical treatment. See id. at
287; infra note 442.
Justice Scalia, rejecting any federal judicial role in the debate, commented on the
Court's divisions:
The various opinions in this case portray quite clearly the difficult, indeed agoniz-
ing, questions that are presented by the constantly increasing power of science to
keep the human body alive for longer than any reasonable person would want to
inhabit it.
Id. at 292 (Scalia, J., concurring). He argues that any decision regarding appropriate public
policy is the sole domain of the legislature of the separate States; to rule otherwise violates
our original principle of federalism. See id at 293. He further rejects Nancy's petition on
three points: (1) the relevance of Nancy's suffering, (2) the passive/active distinction, and
(3) prevention of withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration violates her bodily integ-
rity. See id at 295. He does not seem to accept the legal distinction between suicide and
euthanasia. See id. at 296.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissenting, reject as procedural obstacles the
evidentiary standard of Missouri, which they argue impermissibly burden Nancy's right to
terminate artificial nutrition and hydration. See id. at 302.
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points, concluding that Missouri had a sufficient interest, and a right, to
impose a clear and convincing standard of proof, in the evidence re-
quired, to show that Nancy would have chosen withdrawal of her artificial
food and water.440 Further, the Court ruled that the Missouri Supreme
Court did not err constitutionally in overturning" 1 the trial court, which
had found that the evidence "suggested" Nancy would not have wanted
the continuation of life-preserving measures in her situation.4 42 Finally,
the Court concluded that Missouri was not required to accept the "substi-
tuted judgment" of Nancy's close family. 43
Justice Stevens, dissenting separately, objects to the primacy of general State interests
when in conflict with Nancy's personal interests, and criticizes the majority for its decision in
the face of principles guaranteeing Nancy the fulfillment of her interests. See id. at 331. He
does not dispute the importance of a clear and convincing standard of proof, but disagrees
that the facts proved here should be controlling. See id. at 344-45. He further criticizes judi-
cial interpretations that set Nancy's life and liberty interests in opposition, and decides her
fate for her-the ultimate denial of her interests. See id. at 347.
440. See id. at 281. Because of the necessarily invasive nature of artificial nutrition and
hydration, it is considered medical treatment. In 1989, the Supreme Court of Illinois
adopted the "consensus opinion [that] treats artificial nutrition and hydration as a medical
treatment." In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ill. 1989):
Feeding a patient by means of a nasogastric tube requires a physician to pass a long
flexible tube through the patient's nose, throat and esophagus and into the stom-
ach. Because of the discomfort such a tube causes, "[mlany patients need to be
restrained forcibly and their hands put into large mittens to prevent them from
removing the tube.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Alternately, ajejunostomy tube must
be surgically implanted into the stomach or small intestine. Id.
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to emphasize the invasive nature of artificial nutrition
and hydration, and to stress the due process protection of an individual's "deeply personal
decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water." See
id. at 289. She further emphasized that the Court did not decide whether a State must give
effect to the decisions of a surrogate who has been chosen by the individual undergoing
treatment; it ruled only on an evidentiary standard of one State. See id. at 289. She warned
that, because evidence of the patient's intent is often not conclusive, current evidentiary
standards might often result in actions inconsistent with the patient's wishes. See it. at 289-
90. She recommends State recognition of Durable Powers of Attorney to effectuate the indi-
vidual's intent. See id at 290.
441. By a divided vote. See id. at 263-64.
442. See id. at 285. The independent guardian ad litem appeared to have only reluctantly
appealed the trial court's decision to the Missouri Supreme Court as a matter of duty, he
advised the court in the appeal that he did not disagree with the trial court's decision. See id.
at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, he cited the undisputed finding that: "it was in
Nancy Crnzan's best interests to have the tube feeding discontinued." See id. Further, the
trial court had found no adverse impact on third parties and no economic motivations. See
id. at 333.
443. See id at 334. The Court has upheld the constitutionality of favored legal treatment
of traditional family relationships, but refused to turn into a constitutional requirement that
the states recognize family decisionmaking in cases such as this. See id at 275. The Court
emphasized that the Cruzans were worthy of such a substituted judgment standard, but the
criteria were a function of state, but not federal due process, powers. See id. at 281; see also
Michele Yuen, LettingDaddy Die: Adopting New Standards for Surrogate Decisionmaking 39 UCLA
.L. REv. 581 (1992).
Nancy's parents, emotionally exhausted from their legal battles, continued in their strug-
gle to end her life, such as it was, citing new evidence of her desire to not live under such
circumstances. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Case Testing Right to Die "Aged Us All," N.Y. TMEs,
Nov. 4, 1990, at L24.
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Ensuring that a person in Nancy's position"" benefits from the full
protection of the law poses another dilemma. The State has the right, if
not the obligation, to demand solid evidence of the incapacitated person's
beliefs and intentions, as if they were not incapacitated.4"5 Parol evidence"
6
is normally forbidden in transactions not involving life-or-death questions;
why then should it be allowed where the consequences are all the more
important?44 7 Essentially, no other option exists. In order to fulfill the
State's presupposed duty to preserve life, some standard of evidence must
be maintained, with the State acting automatically as adversary, even
where the guardian ad litem has a good faith belief that the best interest of
the patient is to terminate artificial support. 4" 8
The Court has never' considered whether a State evidentiary standard
higher or lower than "clear and convincing" would be constitutionally ac-
ceptable. The Court has relied on balancing tests to weigh the compelling
State interests in preserving life against the wishes and rights of the indi-
vidual and the family. 4 9 A lower standard might run the risk of unconsti-
tutionality by failing to properly safeguard the interests of the patient, and
a higher standard might sway some of the Justices against a deferent view
444. "Nancy will never interact meaningfully with her environment again. She will re-
main in a persistent vegetative state until her death." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988)).
445. This assumes, moreover, that the State has the authority to recognize the authority
of an individual to terminate life-supporting measures.
446. Which, in the absence of a Living Will or Durable Power of Attorney, is the only
available indication of the incapacitated person's view on life and death. The Court specifi-
cally did not address the question of what result would have followed if a Durable Power of
Attorney had been made. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 n.12.
447. See id. at 284.
448. See id. at 281 n.9; see also Carl Hernandez III, Note, Legitimate Exercise ofParens Patriae
Doctrine: State Power to Determine an Incompetent Individual's "Right to Die" After Cruzan ex rel.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 167 (1992); Dr. G.
Steven Neeley, Patient Autonomy and State Intervention: Re-examining the State's Purported lnteres
19 N. Ky. L. Rav. 235 (1992).
Of increasing importance in the debate over constitutional protections for euthanasia
decisions is the emergence of state constitutional reliance. See generally Thomas C. Marks, Jr.
& Rebecca C. Morgan, The Right of the Dying to Refuse Life Prolonging Medical Procedures: The
Evolving Importance of State Constitutions, 18 OHfo N.U. L. REv. 467 (1992) (suggesting that the
explicit privacy provisions in state constitutions represent the best guarantees against the
artificial prolongation of life against one's wishes).
449. SeeYoungberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). "[W] hether respondent's consti-
tutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests
against the relevant state interests." Id.; In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ.), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (the NewJersey Supreme Court noted that the State's interest weakens and the indi-
vidual's right to privacy correspondingly grows as the prognosis dims and the degree of bod-
ily invasion increases). See generally Glenn W. Peterson, Comment, Balancing the Right to Die
with Competing Interests: A Socio-Legal Enigma, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 109 (1985) (highlighting the
difficulty in formulating adequate balancing equations and suggesting an overhaul of the
laws governing the right to refuse medical treatment). But cf. In reWestchester County Medi-
cal Center, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) (the Court of Appeals of New York, over objections of
her family, granted an order for artificial feeding of a 77-year-old woman who was incompe-
tent as a result of several strokes). "[N]o person or court should substitute its judgment as to
... the life [of] another." Id. at 613.
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of the State's duties and powers.450 It remains an open question to what
extent Cruzan will act to continue the formation of a common-law consen-
sus regarding passive euthanasia;451 the number and content of the opin-
ions give little comfort to those looking for solid answers.452
Implicit in the Cruzan opinion is the fact that, had Nancy completed a
Living Will, 45- the case would not have arisen because Missouri presuma-
bly would have had clear and convincing evidence of her intentions. Nev-
ertheless, a Living Will remains in most instances merely evidence of a
person's views; it does not have the force of law and may prove ineffective
unless recognized by the State.4
54
The Cruzan decision is remarkable in that it neither accepts nor re-
jects either the sanctity of life or the "right to die." The majority opinion
is narrowly technical, purposefully ignoring broader issues, while the con-
curring and dissenting opinions illustrate the dependence of the "answer"
on one's own perspectives of life-an arguably nonjudicial function.
B. A Constitutional Right to Euthanasia?
The presupposition that government has plenary authority over the
ending of life is pervasive in both judicial decisions and general literature.
This presupposition has been made, however, with little reference to un-
derlying concepts of personal autonomy or extenuating mortal
circumstances.
One possible means of asserting a legal "right" to euthanasia rests on
the principle of personal autonomy via a right of privacy.455 Because the
right to privacy is itself increasingly controversial and belies an uneven,
450. Compare Justice Scalia's concurrence, 497 U.S. at 292 (arguing impliedly that a
State can set any evidentiary standard), with Justice Brennan's dissent, id. at 301 (arguing
that any evidentiary standard must be designed to effectuate the intent of the individual, and
any contrary effect is illegitimate; the clear and convincing standard, coupled with Missouri's
exclusionary rules, are thus nearly prima facie illegitimate). See generally David F. Forte, The
Role of the Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof in Right to Die Cases, 8 IssuEs IN L. & MEn. 183
(1992).
451. Active euthanasia was not at issue in Cruzan.
452. See supra note 441; see also Holly C. Gieszl & Peggy A. Velasco, Comment, The Cruzan
Legacy: Legislative and Judicial Responses and Insights for the Future, 24 Aluz. ST. LJ. 719 (1992);
Philip G. Peters, Jr. et al., Physician Willingness to Withhold Tube FeedingAfterCruzan: An Empiri-
cal Study, 57 Mo. L. Rav. 831, 833-48 (1992).
453. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
455. See infra notes 478-82 and accompanying text. A California appellate court regarded
a right to terminate one's life as probably the "ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy[.]"
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (1986); see also
Martin B. Berman, Whose Rite Is It Anyway? The Search for a Constitutional Permit to Dis 22 Sw.
U. L Rxv. 105 (1992) (proposing that in those cases which involve a persistently vegetative
patient, courts adopt a presumption that, absent evidence to the contrary, the patient
chooses to have his or her life terminated). But cf Edward A. Lyon, Comment, The Right to
Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 58 U.
CIN. L. Rxv. 1367 (1990). Lyon criticizes extensions of constitutional protections beyond
marriage, procreation, and family for reasons similar to the slippery slope objection (part
IIIA.2, supra), and on grounds of appropriate judicial authority. Lyon discusses the legal
foundation for refusal of life-sustaining measures only, and is thus more limited in scope
than this Article; unfortunately, informed consent is not helpful in cases of incapacitated
persons. Further, the bases for a right to privacy are not mutually exclusive; reliance on
1993]
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poorly expressed development, 456 an investigation of alternative grounds
for supporting such a right-particularly as it relates to euthanasia-is
warranted.
The legal principle of a right to privacy developed relatively recently
in common law, having often been appended as a parasite to property,
tort, and contract law.457 This development contrasts sharply with that of
other legal systems, which often have long histories of protected privacy
rights.458 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in their watershed 1890 ar-
ticle, argued that the common law had developed a right of privacy, which
nevertheless went unnoticed because of mislabeling as a "property" or
"contract" right or "breach of trust."4 59 They advocated instead a protec-
tion based on the law of tort.460 Although the two did not consider the
issue of government intrusion into the "inviolate personality" of the indi-
vidual, they helped establish the notion in American jurisprudence of a
cognizable legal interest in privacy.
46 1
Griswold v. Connecticut,462 which laid the foundation for modem con-
stitutional privacy protections, was decided on arguably irrelevant
grounds.4 63 An ill-defined "right to privacy," along with the Fourteenth
informed consent does not preclude the applicability of a constitutional right of privacy, or
vice versa.
456. This implies that a well-defined right to privacy is possible, built on common core
values of bodily integrity. This may be unrealistic or even undesirable given our constitu-
tional framework and uniquely vague concepts of socially appropriate mores. Cf. Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privaty, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989) (arguing that traditional consti-
tutional privacy analysis, which looks to the prima facie effect of the law, misses the point;
instead, we should look to the affirmative powers of the law in question).
457. See SAMUEL H. HoFsTADTER & GEORGE HoRowrrz, THE RIosHr OF PRIVACy 1, 5, 11-24
(1964). Blackstone records no recognition of an enforceable right of privacy. The writings
of renowned political philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Paine, Rousseau,
and Spencer, which preceded the Industrial Revolution, concerned only interference with
life and property, not with the less tangible aspects of invasions of privacy. See id. at 11. But
cf. 1 WimLAM BLtcroSTON, CoMETAm~m 125-26 (discussion of natural liberties as "the
power of acting as one sees fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature"
and "inherent in us by birth," restrained only by "human laws (and no farther) as is necessary
and expedient for the general advantage of the public"-thus defining civil liberties).
The right of privacy is still not recognized in British common law. See PETER CANE, TORT
LAW AND ECONOIC INTERESrs 15, 87 (1991); RAYMOND WACS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: Pm-
VACY AND THE LAw 39-40 (1989).
458. See Hofstadter & Horowitz, supra note 457, at 1. The earliest record of a right to
privacy is contained in the Mishnah, a compilation of ancient Israeli Oral Law collected circa
200 A.D., which constitutes the core of the Talmudi See id. at 9. In Roman law any "willful
disregard of another's personality" was injuria, and Greek law similarly recognized Contume-
lia, or "every infringement of the personality of another." See id. French, Swiss, and German
laws, which have been influential throughout Europe, followed the Roman and Greek exam-
ple in recognizing actionable rights against invasions of privacy. See id. at 10-11.
459. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Pivacy, 4 HARv. L. Rev. 193,
200-12 (1890).
460. See id. at 219-20.
461. Interestingly, but not too surprisingly, Warren and Brandeis addressed only non-gov-
ernmental intrusions. Id.
462. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
463. The Court was deeply split. Three concurring opinions were written, with Justices
Black and Stewart dissenting seperately. Central to Justice Douglas' opinion, disregarding
the questionable treatment of standing, was the importance of the marriage relationship in
the right to use contraceptives. See id. at 480, 486; see also id. at 502-07 (WhiteJ, concurring).
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Amendment, formed the basis for a right of bodily autonomy,4 64 from
which a right of procreation emerged.465 A right of marriage was estab-
lished in Loving v. irginia,46 6 which held unconstitutional a statute that
made interracial marriage a punishable offense.4 6 7 Further expansion of
the right to privacy occurred in Stanley v. Georgia,468 where the Court re-
lied on the First Amendment to strike a Georgia statute that made illegal
This is hardly arguable with a straight face given today's radically different (if perhaps more
honest) treatment of sexual mores; the right to use contraceptives more likely inheres, if at
all, in individual freedom-not in marital units. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). In fairness to justice Douglas, he likely felt constrained to justify his decision with
specific textual references to avoid broader questions of the role of the Court. SeeJoHN E.
NowAK Er Al., CoNStrruroNAL LAw 686-87 (3d ed. 1986). The right to use contraceptives is
analogous to the issues of euthanasia because both depend on who or what has authority
over the physical being of the individual.
Justice White presumed that "the State's policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit
sexual relationships, be they premarital or extramarital, [is] concededly a permissible and
legitimate legislative goal." 381 U.S. at 505 (White,J., concurring). This begs the question: is
it permissible for the State to impose, by force of law, its demands into private consensual
adult relationships? To enforce the majority concept of "proper" sexual mores is to violate
one of the purposes of our system of government: the protection of (non-destructive) minor-
ity interests. To further assume that socially undesirable sexual liaisons are inherently de-
structive may be proper, but the justification of the statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives requires a quantum leap in faith. The statute was indeed an "uncommonly
silly law" because it illegitimately presupposed that banning contraceptive use would neces-
sarily decrease the incidence of socially undesirable sexual relationships. Id. at 527 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). This is a patently spurious argument; such illicit contacts would most likely
continue with roughly the same frequency regardless of official sanction. Even if they do
become less frequent, far more damage will be caused by the non-use of contraception. Addi-
tionally, the burden of this statute falls biologically on only fifty percent of the sexual partici-
pants-women-creating a prima facie equal protection violation. The poor effectiveness of
child support laws negate any counterarguments of equality of legal effect.
The Court demonstrated its uneasiness with its decision based on what was essentially a
value judgment of the control over one's sexual actions as an individual. The issue as it
relates to euthanasia is even sharper, where the exercise of control, if at all, is final.
The Court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, extended the right of privacy to single persons as
related to procreation and contraception on equal protection grounds. See 405 U.S. at 446-
56. The Court suggested that the freedom to decide to have children is so fundamental it is
protected by a right to privacy. See id. at 453. This circular precedent thus based the right to
use contraceptives on a right between married persons, extended to those unmarried via the
fourteenth amendment.
464. See Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacj, 12 Hav. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 233, 266 (1977).
465. The Supreme Court first recognized procreative rights in Skinner v. Oklahoma. See
316 U.S. 535, 536-43 (1942). Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the right to
procreate is "one of the basic civil rights of man[,]" because "[m ] arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541. Are not thought and
the power to control our destinies similarly important> Would we regard mere existence with
the same philosophical respect as we afford the assumptions of free will? These debates have
burdened philosophers throughout history, we must merely acknowledge them as casting
doubt on any dogmatic position.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held the right to privacy to extend to the decision to not have
children, subject to the state's interest in the protections of fetal life. See 410 U.S. 113, 153-
56, 163-65 (1973). This doctrine is currently the focus of intense societal andjurisprudential
debate-113 files are produced by the phrase "Roe v. Wade" on Nexis; 513 for "abortion."
466. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
467. The Court later poorly expressed this right to marriage and the standard ofjudicial
review in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
468. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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the possession of pornography in any individual's home.
4 69
In Bowers v. Hardwick,470 the Court severely curtailed the right to bod-
ily autonomy in deciding that state sodomy laws do not interfere with an
individual's right to privacy.47 1 Given the dependence of previous find-
ings of a right to privacy on a right to marriage and procreation, no prece-
469. See id at 558-68. Georgia argued that forbidding the possession of pornography,
even within the confines of one's home, was necessary for the protection of the moral health
of the community. See id. at 559-60, 565. The Court disagreed, finding little evidence to
indicate that possession of pornography incited illegal action. See id. at 566-67. The correla-
tion between viewing (non-violent) pornography and criminal sexual behavior remains un-
certain, at best, and very possibly is negative, counter to the assumptions of many who are
vocal in that debate. Compare EDWARD DoNNEesra r AL., THE QUESION OF PoNOGR"PH.
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLCY IMPLICATIONS (1987) and PoRNocRAPH" AND SFXUAL AGRRES-
SION (Neil M. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds., 1984) and WnLu H. MAsmTs Er AL., MAS-
TERS AND JOHNSON ON SEX AND HuMAN LOVING 301 (3d ed. 1986) with U.S. DEPARTMEW OF
Jus'ncE, ArroRNE GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY (Final ReportJuly 1986). Care
must be taken to distinguish the effects of violent pornography from pornography per se;
many studies confuse these distinctions within pornography. The Court found finally that
the restriction was a form of thought control "wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the
First Amendment." 394 U.S. at 566.
This issue is similar to euthanasia in that it raises the question of public authority over
consensual actions outside of the public domain. This is raised in cases of voluntary euthana-
sia, where the public interest is expressed only tangentially by an assumed desire to live; any
damage to society in the form of decreased productive capacity has already occurred. The
slippery slope objection to euthanasia similarly relates to the moral decline of the commu-
nity. While the right of the state to regulate behavior in public spheres is well established,
the opposite is true of activity within the home. The adage that a person's home is his castle
did not develop lightly- serious implications regarding the state's authority of intervention
are involved. See, e.g, U.S. CONST. amend. III. This alone casts serious doubt as to the propri-
ety of Georgia's assertion of authority.
470. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
471. The Court reasoned that the right to privacy protects only those rights "implicit in
the ordered concept of liberty" or "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition." Id. at
191-92, 194. This contradicts one of the primary purposes of the Constitution itself: to pro-
tect minority interests against potential tyranny of the majority. Because popular majorities
are transient, an essential function of the Constitution must be effective structural frustra-
tions against present majorities that attempt to prevent the formation of future majorities.
We are each members of numerous minorities. If constitutional protections were valid only
to the extent that they were "implicit in the ordered concept of liberty" or "deeply rooted in
this nation's history and traditions," our Constitution would have little meaning indeed. The
Court assumes that acts of sodomy-not limited to acts between persons of the same sex or
unmarried heterosexuals-somehow violate an ordered sense of liberty, with little reasoning
to support such a claim. The Court further relies on history to mandate social mores. Given
the repressed and culturally heterogeneous traditions of our ancestors, this seems both logi-
cally unsubstantiated and a slavish dependence on a history not nearly as clear as the Court
would have us believe.
In a statement to law students on October 18, 1990, formerJustice Powell, whose swing
vote decided the case, admitted that "[wihen I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a
few months later, I thought the dissent had the better of the arguments." Anand Agneshwar,
Ex-Justike Says He May Have Been Wrong: Powell on Sodomy, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3. Powell
considered Bowers v. Hardwick "of little or no importance" because no one had been prose-
cuted for sodomy. Aaron Epstein, Ex-Justice Admits 'Mistake' in Gay Ruling; AusTN-AMERiAN
STATESMAN, Oct. 26, 1990, at A2. The case remains the law of the land, however, and thus
carries precedential effect in both judicial and legislative arenas. It has been cited regularly,
for example, to deny to gay persons the choice of becoming foster parents, custody of their
own children, and service in the military. See id.
Twenty-five states outlaw sodomy. See 38 Playboy 46 (Jan. 1991). Five of these only out-
law homosexual sodomy. See id. Several individuals have been indicted or sentenced for
violations involving oral sex performed by married or unmarried heterosexual couples. See
id.
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dent was available to support a right to private anal sex. 472 This raises the
question whether a right to sexual privacy is or should be based on a right
of procreation, or an inherent authority over one's own person. Human
rights, which are so often self-proclaimed by the United States as yardsticks
forjudging other societies, presuppose governmental respect for individu-
als' authority to make choices relating to their own lives where their behav-
ior is not destructive to others or to society.4 73
The right to privacy, even if somewhat strained in construction,474 is
far too important to destroy.475 The contemporary interpretation that in-
fers broad privacy protections in the penumbrae of specific constitutional
guarantees has been important, but it is increasingly subject to attack, and
deflects legal analysis from the true source of the right of privacy and all
that follows. The right of privacy can be logically supplemented and sub-
stantiated regardless of the Griswoldian constructs by drawing on the most
basic of legal precepts.
What is ignored in discussions of a right to privacy is the possibility
that the Constitution did not create a right of privacy, but instead reflected
an assumption in the New World of then-unknown personal autonomy-
what would now be labeled a right of privacy. A right of privacy is not
enumerated because it is a precondition to the Constitution itsef.47 6 "We the
472. Bowers v. Hardwick should not be read in an exclusively homosexual context; heter-
osexuals, whether married or not, were equally subject to criminal sanction. See 478 U.S. at
187; see also id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see id. at 188 n.2. Even if criminal
prosecutions are less likely-or nonexistent-for heterosexual couples, the objections re-
main valid; laws cannot be justified on the grounds of non-enforcement against particular
groups. Indeed, such non-enforcement, selective or otherwise, brings into question the legit-
imacy of a statute, particularly if it deals with issues of morality.
473. The question is then legitimately posed whether or not sodomy is per se destructive
to society. Judicial balancing is often relied on in difficult value issues, and the degree of
destruction is thus logically relevant in determining the legitimacy of the government's ac-
tions. For example, treason is expressly provided for in the Constitution and is perhaps the
best example of a true threat to the continued operation of the People's government. Were
government to assert itself in. all areas of potential damage, the concept of limited govern-
ment would be empty. Even if repulsive to many, the damage private sodomy poses to the
continued functioning of society is uncertain and cannot reasonably be said to be severe
enough for the positive intrusion required for enforcement against it. It must be conceded
that the true nature of the Georgia statute is a desire to control the sexual behaviors of its
citizens. This drains any remaining legitimacy to the causal argument of sodomy's destruc-
tive societal effect.
474. SeeJoHN E. NowAx Er A., supra note 463, at §§ 11.5-11.7, 14.26-14.30.
475. Indeed, any attempts to emasculate it severely (i.e., so as to affect personally a large
enough contingent of citizens) would likely be averted by whatever other judicial grounds
were available to avoid nearly inevitable popular confrontations. Alternatively, legislative ac-
tion would likely reassert many of these underlying rights of privacy.
476. Ours is not the first generation to debate the constitutional sources of liberty inter-
ests. In 1875 ChiefJustice Waite noted:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long
before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, it is, and
always has been, one of the attributes of citizenship under a free government. It
"derives its source," to use the language of Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 211, "from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by civilized
man throughout the world." It is found wherever civilization exists. It was not,
therefore, a right granted to the people by the Constitution. The government of
the United States when established found it in existence, with the obligation on the
part of the States to afford it protection.
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People" cannot legitimately form a more perfect Union unless we first
have dominion over ourselves. 477 Given that We the People created a lim-
ited government to protect our survival against the real evils of external
threats and internal economic protectionism, the value of privacy lights
intrinsic to the individual appears clear.478 This leads, however, to an ad-
ditional question that asks where this self-authorized power originates.
The building block of the Constitution is: People. The smallest indi-
visible unit of People is: Person. It is mathematically intuitive to attach
some significance to the importance of the Person in this constitutional
equation, quite apart from our strong cultural bias of individuality. Still,
asserting a basis for individual authority demands further investigation.
The right to privacy should be based fundamentally in property law.
Indeed, dominion over one's own physical and mental personalty is argua-
bly the purest example of a property interest.4 79 Any defense of property
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875).
477. The then-radical notion of non-monarchial government was probably best at-
tempted in the unique environment of the New World, where ancient interdependencies
and close autocratic supervision were attenuated to the extent that the citizenry felt less and
less beholden to the European powers. Additionally, the sparse populations and relative
isolation even among colonies added to the sense of social and cultural isolation. This, cou-
pled with the generally negative experiences with colonial powers, led to a general distrust of
governmental authority. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. ScHLESiNoE, THE BIRTH OF THE NATION 3-16,
33-54, 113-27 (1968).
478. This analysis is strengthened by the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federal-
ists preceding constitutional ratification, which centered around the need for a bill of rights
in the Constitution. The Federalists, avidly pro-Constitution, argued against a bill of rights.
See ROBERT A. RuTrLN, THE BIrTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 118-19, 132-33 (1955). The Anti-
Federalists, who were against the proposed Constitution, insisted on a bill of rights to protect
the States and people. See id. at 117-25. Alexander Hamilton's reply to the Anti-Federalists,
in a famous Federalist opinion, viewed with alarm the concept of a bill of rights, because such
enumeration of rights would imply that the federal government had residuary power, where
it supposedly had none. See THE FEDERALIsr No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). A bill of rights
would thus be not only superfluous, but would dangerously limit rights to only those in the
bill. With hindsight we can commend or criticize these views, but their existence does illus-
trate unique assumptions of autonomy that render present commentary about the source of
a contemporary right of privacy as proof of the Federalists' fears of implied governmental
powers, and Anti-Federalists' demands for constitutional protections. See generally ANrI-Fa-
ERALISTs VERsus FEDERAsrs: SELEcaED Docuhmars (John D. Lewis ed., 1967).
479. The standard justifications for property interests remain weak; they are often justi-
fied by power and primacy. See, e.g., SHELDON F. KURTz & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, AmERICAN
PROPERTv LAw 1-29, 45, 62-63, 84, 101, 116 (1987); Michelle B. Bray, Note, Personalizing Per-
sonalty: Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. Rav. 209, 211 (1990); see also
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERIcAN CoNSTrTUTIoNAL LAW 21
(1928) (citing von Gierke: "Property had its roots.., in Law which flowed out of the pure
Law of Nature..."). Locke early recognized the connection between personal existence and
ownership, beginning with the premise that "every Man has a Property in his own Person."
JOHN LocKE, Two TEArISEs OF GovWRNMENT § 27, at 305 (Peter Laslett 2d ed., student ed.
1967) (3d ed. 1698); Bray, supra, at 212.
Defining the body as property is not only not foreign to legal property constructs, but
strongly analogous to common property laws. The general rule relating to the enjoyment of
property assumes a right of use, with government limitations only with cause. Further, the
government has a duty, and stake, in ensuring the peaceful use of property. Thus, tort law
has been applied early to property interests. SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEaTON
ON TORTS § 13 (5th ed. 1984). See generaly RussELL ScoTr, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981)
(discussion of developing medical technologies and resultant social and legal problems).
The California Supreme Court recently decided a case involving the use of a patient's
spleen, for commercial purposes, without the patient's consent or knowledge. Despite facts
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rights beyond the human being-what property law now encompasses-in
reality requires a legal structure that merely defines proximate relation-
ships to individuals. 480 Neither common property nor tort law was suffi-
ciently developed to fully incorporate the impact of a right of privacy.
Given nearly a century of legal introspection, however, the contemporary
concept of property rights is sufficiently expanded and flexible to accom-
pany complex new legal challenges. It is more than sufficient to encom-
pass the basic question presented: defining the ownership of personalty
for purposes of defining a privacy interest.
Do we own ourselves? 481 The answer is far from historically certain.
Slavery was constitutionally justified.4 82 So too was the virtual ownership
quite unfavorable to the defendants, the court decided finally that the patient did not have a
cause of action for conversion of the spleen. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793
P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). This opinion has been a source for much legal debate. See, e.g.,Jen-
nifer Lavoie, Note, Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, 75 VA. L. Rav. 1363 (1989); Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, Biotechnology and
the Commercial Use of Human Cells: Toward an Organic View ofLife and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA
Compumit & HIGH TECH. UJ. 211 (1989); Catherine A Tallerico, Comment, The Autonomy of
the Human Body in the Age of Biotechnology, 61 U. COLd. L. Ray. 659 (1990); see also Bray, supra
(discussion of property rights applied to personalty).
The suggestion of body-as-property is neither logically unsound nor immoral. We each
depend strongly on others for identity, and consider others to be strongly connected to us.
Referring to "my child" or "my mother" is not insignificant; the possessive grammatical form
necessarily connotes-possession. Each descriptive term invariably involves a deep sense of
emotional bonding and belonging. This does not imply any sense of fee simple ownership,
but it does illustrate analogous privacy concepts. Privacy extends spherically not only beyond
individuals, but also pairs and groups of individuals who are bonded by family or other rela-
tionships. In this sense, any uninvited intrusion into a sphere is a violation of an interest in
the sphere's integrity. For a discussion of personhood as a basis for defining property, see
generally MargaretJ. Radin, Propery and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. Rv. 957 (1982). The ques-
tion for the law remains to define how far an interest extends beyond physical being.
A natural resistance to the concept of body-as-property is reinforced by the history of
slavery. See infra notes 484, 486-87 and accompanying text. Societies that accept slavery pro-
mulgate codes to regulate it. See Scorr, supra, at 27. The Law has no virgin slate from which
to castigate ownership of human beings, however, historical ownership of humans merely
strengthens the analogy. What was (viewed contemporaneously) morally despicable was the
ownership of others-not the concept of ownership itself; slavery is antithetical to the concept
of self-ownership. It is for society to recognize the illegitimate basis for human ownership
beyond one's own person. This inalienability is crucial to recognition of self-ownership, and
is explored in depth in Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REa. 1849
(1987).
For an excellent discussion of property rights applied to personalty, see generally Bray,
supra.
480. See 1 AmimcANI LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.7 (1952). Business organizations are the legal
equivalent of fictional (human) beings, enabling economic prosperity via the most basic de-
mand of capitalism: private ownership. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (discussion by Chief Justice Marshall of the nature of a
corporation as a being); A.AN iR BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 3C
(1968); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 80 (1983).
481. An individual who is fundamentally religious (if within the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion) will answer this negatively. There, the religious entity is the owner, with the resident
human merely enjoying (or not, as the case may be) usufructory rights. Notwithstanding the
religious perspective, if we do not own ourselves, who does? This rhetorically poses no legiti-
mate alternative, leading to the assumed answer that each individual "owns" himself.
482. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); DANIELJ. FLANIGAN, THE
CINAL LAw OF SLAvERY Am FREEDOM 1800-1868, at 191-92 (1987).
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of women, whose legal identities merged into that of their husbands4 8 3-
what is ownership if not legal recognition of identity? In addition to their
status as property of others, slaves were denied legal recognition as individ-
uals.48 4 The law proved logically inconsistent, however, in the treatment
of their personalty when they were either the perpetrators or victims of
crime.
485
In sharp contrast with the dearth of common law on a right of pri-
vacy,486 the common law early recognized a presumption of bodily integ-
rity, drawing on John Stuart Mill's oft-cited assertion that a state may not
exercise power over members of a civilized community except to prevent
harm to others.48 7 Interestingly, recent decisions have emphasized com-
mon law principles at the expense of constitutional doctrines, suggesting
that courts are approaching the limits of a privacy-protected right to
die.
48 8
Raising self-ownership to a constitutionally protected right is difficult,
if not impossible, given the continuing debate over proper textual inter-
pretation. Recognizing this more intellectually honest basis for a right to
privacy does, however, change the relative positions of the interested par-
ties in the euthanasia debate. Proceeding from the assumption of per-
483. See 1 AmERIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 5.50-5.52 (1952). Interestingly, the term "wo-
man" (much to feminists' dismay, no doubt) is derived from the German "wifmann" (vari-
ously spelled), meaning essentially "property of a man." VII OxFoRD ENGLiSH DICrIoNARv,
supra note 35, at 325, 484; OxFoRD DIaONARI OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 523, 1011 (C.T. On-
ions ed., 1969) (cf. also leman-mistress of man).
484. The Constitution, in providing for a census, considered slaves as three-fifths of a
person. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
485. The status of slaves as people was uncertain at best. While they are obliquely re-
ferred to twice in the Constitution, courts had difficulty reconcilingJustice Taney's decision
(one of eight) in Dred Scott which declared that slaves were not persons under the Constitu-
tion. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). CompareU.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 andart. LIV, § 2, cl. 3
with 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-26. Slaves, however, could not logically be prosecuted for
criminal violations; could a criminal statute apply to a non-person? Moreover, even if slaves
were persons for purposes of prosecution under criminal statutes, to incarcerate or capitally
punish them would deprive their owners of property in violation of the Constitution.
In United States v. Amy, Chief Justice Taney considered a point reserved at trial that
contested the application of a federal criminal statute to Amy-a slave and thus a non-per-
son. 24 F. Cas. 792 (C.C.D. Va. 1859). The statute forbade "any person" to steal a letter from
the United States mail. See id at 793-809. The motion for a new trial was overruled, with little
legal reasoning. See id. at 809-11. Justice Taney could have cited THE FEDEPALIST No. 54
(James Madison), which argued that slaves were both property and persons in differing
respects.
In the final analysis, slaves were most equal-most human-under the law when they
committed crimes; the logical inconsistencies of the law were better left unchallenged. For
an excellent discussion of this issue, see generally DANIELJ. FLAsNcAN, THE CRiMINAL LAW OF
SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 1800-1868 (1987). Where a slave was the victim and the perpetrator
was white, prosecution was unlikely, and serious punishment rare. See id. at 145-50, 414.
Where, however, a black even remotely threatened a white, the punishment tended to be
capital. See id. at 26.
Interestingly, Dred Scott was the only decision other than Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), to hold a federal statute unconstitutional prior to the Civil War. See
NowAK et al., supra note 463, at § 3.1, n.11.
486. See supra note 459 and accompanying text.
487. J.S. MiLt, On Liberty, in 43 GREAT BooKS OF THE WEsrST.N WORLD 267, 271 (Robert
Hutchens ed., 1952); Lyon, supra note 455, at 1384 n.111.
488. See LAureNcE H. TRiBE, AmER AN CONsTrrrTIoNAL Aw 1370 (2d ed. 1988).
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sonal autonomy, the question for the government is: Under what
circumstances may an individual's right to determine the nature and time
of his death be overridden by state and societal interests? This does not
provide an easy answer to the euthanasia dilemma-that would be neither
possible nor desirable. Rather, the debate is placed in a different context.
The issue is essentially one of who must bear the burden of approving or
prohibiting euthanasia. The "right" of the individual to a peaceful death
should be balanced with the government's duty to ensure that that individ-
ual's death is indeed peaceful. The burden should not be on the individ-
ual; rather, the government should show cause for invading a property
interest in a person's autonomy and reasonable extensions thereof.
C. Active Euthanasia and Legal Prosciptions Against Taking Life
Passive euthanasia has posed difficult issues forjudicial resolution, re-
sulting slowly in a compromise of legal recognition of some personal au-
thority to decide for oneself to terminate one's own health care in severe
health care situations. This presents two problems. First, the distinction
between active and passive euthanasia is becoming an increasingly aca-
demic exercise. 48 9 Advances in medicine afford increasingly sophisticated
life-saving and -prolonging options previously unavailable. 490 This blurs
the bright line that divides the previously clear legal and ethical distinc-
tions of euthanasia actions. Second, even with clearly passive euthanasia,
such as the withholding of food and water, the reality is that even "non-
action" is torment to those who are necessarily involved. The process of
starvation 491 is hardly compatible with a civilized ethos. It entails, by de-
sign, progressive deterioration in the functioning of the body, increasing
levels of pain,492 and complication of other medical conditions.493 This,
in any other context, we would label torture.
To justify any actions beyond passive euthanasia requires a quantum
leap in both faith and precedent; the criminal law is generally incapable of
distinguishing active euthanasia from murder.49 4 Given this, why is one
even possibly acceptable when the other is an assumed evil? To attempt
escape from this dilemma's horns, we must first know: Why is murder
wrong?
As a matter of human history, murder has been condemned because
it presents a destructive force in civilized society. Further, murder violates
a person's interest in continuing to live. When applied to the situation
where active euthanasia is being considered, the reasons behind the pro-
scription against homicide are absent. Any disruption for society has al-
489. See Fletcher, supra note 47.
490. See, e.g., supra notes 247, 420 and accompanying text.
491. See infra notes 534-35 and accompanying text.
492. Big Mac attacks are the closest most will ever come to the physiological distress of
food deprivation.
493. See infra notes 533-35. One need only look to instances of famine to verify the physi-
ologically violent nature of starvation.
494. See WLSON, supra note 2, at 143; see also Donald G. Casswell, Rejecting Criminal Liabil-
ity for Life-Shortening Palliative Car 6J. Cowras. HEm L. & Pot.N 127, 128-40 (1990).
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ready occurred, via the loss of the productive capabilities of the
individual.495 Indeed, disruption on a smaller scale-for family and
friends-would continue after the individual becomes a candidate for eu-
thanasia, but would diminish after a euthanic death. Violating a person's
interest to live is, by definition, absent as an objection where active volun-
tary euthanasia is concerned.
4 96
Active euthanasia involves some action causing death.4 9 7 Although
this definition could also be used for murder,498 three crucial differences
serve to distinguish the two. Homicide is not defined by the motives of the
person who kills, by the circumstances and motives of the person who dies,
or by the circumstances of his death, but such distinctions are unofficially
relevant in prosecutorial discretion, grand jury indictments, jury verdicts,
and sentencing.49 9 These distinctions have been the only means to differ-
entiate "real" murderers from "good"-or at least sympathetic-ones. Re-
liance on the graces of individual prosecutors, jurors, and judges is
anathema to the rule of law, however, and counter to advocates' interests
in answering the criticism of those opposed to euthanasia, who rightly
point to the threat of unchecked abuses. These three considerations are
thus crucial in reliably distinguishing euthanasia from murder.
First, humanitarian motives are not recognized as legitimate justifica-
tions for homicide.50 0 Positive motives could legitimately be incorpo-
rated, under very limited circumstances,5 0 1 into the legal definition of
homicide, where humanitarian considerations were present, withoutjeop-
495. An opponent of euthanasia could point to the slippery slope argument as a disrup-
tive factor in itself. See supra part IIIA.2.
496. Active involuntary euthanasia presents a more difficult question, as it remains an
open question whether such an interest can be transferred via "substituted judgment" to
relatives. See supra notes 445-50 and accompanying text. It is presumed that the state has a
legitimate interest in advocating on behalf of the incapacitated and assuming in the individ-
ual's stead a desire to live. See supra notes 450-52.
497. See supra note 45.
498. See, e.g., Tzx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.01-19.05, 19.07 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993).
Indeed, active euthanasia fits the definition of pre-meditated murder perhaps perfectly-
often better than prosecutors could normally hope for. What is normally contested defini-
tionally is the meaning of malice aforethought. See WAYNE R. LAXAVE & AuSTIN W. ScOTr,
CRiMiNAL LAW § 7.1 (2d ed. 1986). In common law and statutory definitions of felonious
homicide, "malice" is equivalent to "intent," serving to distinguish intentional homicide from
manslaughter. Id. This is problematic for proponents of active euthanasia, as a person who
assists another in suicide, for whatever noble purposes, does intend his actions.
499. This poses a related risk. Euthanasia as currently practiced occurs with virtual igno-
rance of the law. Coroners might falsify reports, prosecutors might decline to prosecute,
grand juries might decline to indict, juries might acquit, and judges might compensate in
sentencing. The one consistent thread is uncertainty. This, if not breeding disrespect for the
law, brings into question the legitimacy of legal sanctions on an issue as central to civilized
government-and as legally amorphous-as euthanasia. Even the Cruzan opinions either
avoided the issue or framed it in one-sided contexts.
A recent opinion concerning capital punishment poses an interesting tangential argu-
ment, in that consideration of subjective factors may arguably violate equal protection guar-
antees, and subject minorities to disfavorable results (or majorities to unfairly favorable
leniency). See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 912-15 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
500. See WILsON, supra note 2, at 143.
501. Verification of humanitarian motives would necessarily be a question of fact for the
state and courts.
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ardizing the integrity of the criminal justice system.5 0 2 Second, the cir-
cumstances and motives of the person who dies are, according to criminal
law precepts, irrelevant to the guilt of the person who kills. 50 3 Yet a clear
medical tragedy, coupled with a sincere desire to die, properly substanti-
ated, clearly distinguishes the act of euthanasia from homicide. Third, the
circumstances of the death provide substantial evidence regarding the au-
thenticity of both the motives behind the killing and the reasons for want-
ing to die.
Looking officially to humanitarian motives of the person who kills,
the circumstances of the death, and the circumstances of the person who
dies provides a clear means to distinguish euthanasia from homicide. Crit-
ics of euthanasia will likely point to the importance of an absolute criminal
proscription against assisting suicide to prevent the possibility of true mur-
der under the guise of a requested death. This, however, is a question of
fact. The criminal law could be as specific as the most ardent euthanasia
supporter would accept in demanding evidence of the authentic need for
death to safeguard against such possible abuse. Rather than skirting the
issues, with a result worse for everyone, the criminal law could distinguish
euthanistic from homicidal death, and make allowances accordingly.
VI. PoucY CONSIDERATIONS
It is dangerous to go out into this hellish world but it is still more danger-
ous to hide in the bushes.
504
Complex moral, medical, and social considerations enter into any dis-
cussion of when, if ever, euthanasia should be condoned or regulated.
Moral objections are present on two levels: a rejection of the philosophy
which sees the possibility of life having negative value, and objections to
the effects of purposeful taking of life.50 5 The medical community re-
mains divided, while further advances in medical technology increase the
likelihood of situations arising where euthanasia might be considered.50 6
Social considerations interweave with religious and moral values,-as well as
more dispassionate economic and political consequences.50 7 Still, objec-
tions to euthanasia fall into two major categories: concern for the sanctity
of life and of the consequences of non-sacrosanct life, which some fear
would result in an inexorable slide into barbarism.
A. Moral Implications
For many, the topic of euthanasia touches chords that cannot be re-
tuned by logic.5 08 Judeo-Christian presuppositions reject human self-de-
502. See infra part VI.C.
503. Although the status of the person who dies can-inconsistently with sanctity-of-life
views-affect the level of punishment. See supra notes 431-31 and accompanying text.
504. Yevtushenko, in Kohl, supra note 180 at 140.
505. See infra part VI.A.
506. See infra part VI.B.
507. See infra part VI.C.
508. An opponent of euthanasia comments:
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termination with regard to ending suffering by ending life.50 9 Against
these faiths, no logic can prevail. Yet we, as a society, are faced with con-
flicts and painful choices that cannot, and must not, be resolved by refer-
ence to any one system of beliefs.5 10 This, unfortunately, disrespects a
view of life as sacrosanct.
5 11
There is little room to argue logically against (or for) theological ar-
guments.5 12 One either accepts divine revelation-and all that follows-
on faith, or one does not. Similarly, strictly moral arguments are con-
strained by their necessary reference to contested bases of analysis. Where
the state is involved, however, the question becomes more difficult.
Whether to form public policy based, at least in part, on assumptions of
the inviolability of life necessarily affects the direction of the debate, and




The call came in the middle of the night. As a gynecology resident
rotating through a large, private hospital, I had come to detest telephone
calls, because invariably I would be up for several hours and would not
feel good the next day. However, duty called, so I answered the phone. A
nurse informed me that a patient was having difficulty getting rest, could
I please see her. She was on 3 North. That was the gynecologic-oncology
unit, not my usual duty station. As I trudged along, bumping sleepily
against walls and corners and not believing I was up again, I tried to
imagine what I might find at the end of my walk. Maybe an elderly
woman with an anxiety reaction, or perhaps something particularly
horrible.
I grabbed the chart from the nurses [sic] station on my way to the
patient's room, and the nurse gave me some hurried details: a 20-year-old
It is very illogical of us to make this distinction between active and passive. Well, so
it is. Logically there is little or no difference. But our gut instinct tells us that there
is. And, like it or not, we are not going to be browbeaten into changing our minds
by mere logic; nor even by the remarkable fact that, whereas in the case of human
beings passive euthanasia is widely regarded as a civilized and humane compromise,
in the case of animals the same thing is considered an inexcusable cruelty.
Thurston Brewin, Voluntay Euthanasia, 1986 LA CEr 1085, reprinted in Robert Campbell &
Diane Collinson, Passive and Active Euthanasia Are Not Equally Acceptabke, in EuHIANAstA: OP-
POSING VIEWPoITrs, supra note 31, at 52.
In the final analysis, one's views of the euthanasia debate are inextricably dependent
upon one's perspective of other ethical issues. This is unfortunate in attempts to deal with
the problem, because logic, by itself, is all but powerless to alter prejudices; dispassionate
logic is unwelcome in arenas of morality.
509. See, e.g., SPitIN & LAmsON, supra note 2, at 124.
510. Interestingly, nearly all books on euthanasia, of either persuasion, give an accurate
and reasonable account of opposing beliefs. This unfortunately reinforces the appearance
that a fundamental chasm of values between the opposing forces renders the development of
any mutually acceptable social policy improbable.
511. Few would argue with the proposition that human life is, ordinarily, worthy of such
absolute protections. But, as with most absolutes, reality rears its Hydraic heads, forcing qual-
ifications where they are not wanted.
512. See supra part III.A.1. Western religions are, by definition, self-referential. They are
justified internally, premised on the assumptions of faith.
513. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
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girl named Debbie was dying of ovarian cancer. She was having unre-
lenting vomiting apparently as the result of an alcohol drip administered
for sedation. Hmmm, I thought. Very sad. As I approached the room I
could hear loud, labored breathing. I entered and saw an emaciated,
dark-haired woman who appeared much older than 20. She was receiv-
ing nasal oxygen, had an IV, and was sitting in bed suffering from what
was obviously severe air hunger. The chart noted her weight at 80
pounds. A second woman, also dark-haired but of middle age, stood at
her right, holding her hand. Both looked up as I entered. The room seem
filled with the patient's desperate effort to survive. Her eyes were hollow,
and she had suprasternal and intercostal retractions with her rapid inspi-
rations. She had not eaten or slept in two days. She had not responded to
chemotherapy and was being given supportive care only. It was a gallows
scene, a cruel mockery of her youth and unfulfilled potential. Her only
words to me were, "Let's get this over with."
I retreated with my thoughts to the nurses [sic] station. The patient
was tired and needed rest. I could not give her health, but I could give
her rest. I asked the nurse to draw 20 mg. of morphine sulfate into a
syringe. Enough, I thought, to do the job. I took the syringe into the room
and told the two women I was going to give Debbie something that would
let her rest and to say good-bye. Debbie looked at the syringe, then laid her
head on the pillow with her eyes open, watching what was left of the
world. I injected the morphine intravenously and watched to see if my
calculations on its effects would be correct. Within seconds her breathing
slowed to a normal rate, her eyes closed, and her features softened as she
seemed restful at last. The older woman stroked the hair of the now-sleep-
ing patient. I waited for the inevitable next effect of depressing the respir-
atory drive. With clocklike certainty, within four minutes the breathing
rate slowed even more, then became irregular, then ceased. The dark-




This letter touched off a firestorm of criticism, both within the medi-
cal community and without. Some medical professionals called for a
strengthening of fundamental moral principles of medicine.51 5 Others ar-
gued for a reassessment of medicine's role.5 16 The resident's actions
should, however, be distinguished from the purpose behind them. Few
would commend the unplanned and unsupervised euthanization by a
bone-tired resident outside his normal duty rounds, but the underlying
dilemma remains: should Debbie have had her wish 51 7 of death fulfilled?
Assuming the laws of that state recognized her choice, she could have cho-
514. It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988).
515. See Willard Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill in EuTHANAsrA: THE MORAL ISSUES,
supra note 31, at 25, 27. In addition to objecting to the resident's methods, they-condemned
any doctor who would kill a patient, and further insisted on disciplinary actions against any
physician who kills. Id. at 28.
516. See e.g., Kenneth L. Vaux, Debbie's Dying: Mery Killing and the Good Death,in EtrHANA-
stA: THE MORAL IssUEs, supra note 31, at 29.
517. Assuming that was clearly what she meant by- "Let's get this over with."
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sen to refuse medical treatment5 18 and would have died eventually via pas-
sive euthanasia. The medical staff would have had no choice but to watch.
The question of whether she would have been better off refusing medical
treatment, 519 rather than dying from an injection of morphine, leads to a
basic problem with the medical community's approach.
The words of one of my teachers flashed through my mind: "If no cure is
available, the doctor is required to alleviate pain and suffering as much
as possible." For the supreme relief of supreme suffering, there is only one
answer.
5 20
I am a doctor. I cannot kill. I must let live.
52 '
2. The Medical Community's Schizophrenia
The primary function of medicine has never been defined.5 22 Is it to
preserve life, or to reduce suffering?5 23 Based primarily on this conflict,
the medical community has had a difficult time dealing with the issue of
euthanasia.52 4 The American Medical Association supports the patient's
518. It could well be argued that the problem with what happened to Debbie was not that
she wanted euthanasia (how can anyone not sympathize), or that she got it. Rather, the
method of her death was, at least, grossly inappropriate. Particularly objectionable was the
resident's complete lack of familiarity with the patient, her family, her situation beyond the
chart, and his failure to consult with any medical professional-least of all Debbie's personal
physician or anyone else who may have provided some safeguards for a person in Debbie's
position.
519. Assuming she had the willpower.
520. BARNARD, supra note 31, at 71 (thoughts before preparing a morphine solution for
Maria, who had terminal cervical cancer, and was in great pain). He didn't inject her, how-
ever, and she later went into temporary remission. He criticizes not his initial decision, as
her later temporary remission was a medical exception, but the lack of any professional direc-
tion for a physician resident. Id. at 73.
521. RUssELL, supra note 2, at 177 (gynecologist for Madame van de Put).
522. It has, rather, been assumed. Previously, medicine was busy learning the methods of
fighting disease and other agents of misery, with few negative side effects. Thus, preserving
life and reducing suffering were synonymous-until the technologies advanced to the point
of, arguably, forcing some to outlive their own deaths. See ScULLY & ScuLLv, supra note 42, at
16; see also THomAsmA & GRABrER, supra note 2, at 118-20, 193-97 (discussing the goal of
medicine and the obligations to relieve pain and suffering).
523. Alternatively: "curing" patients, or "improving" their lives (and deaths). Either way,
the underlying dilemma remains the same.
524. See, e.g., Dennis Brodeur, Assisted Suicide: The Limits of Personal Choice in a Social Soci-
ety, 11 ST. Louis U. Ptm. L. Rsv. 439 (1992) (Right to Life/Right to Die Symposium issue);
Stephanie B. Goldberg, Assisted Suicide Resolution Defeated: Opponents Say Measure Crosses Line
Between Suicide and Passive Euthanasia, 78 A.B.A.J. 107 (April 1992); Sanford H. Kadish, Let-
ting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CA1. L. REv. 857, 860-86 (1992); Aida A. Koury,
Physician-Assisted Suicide for the Terminally Ill: The Ultimate Cure?, 33 Amz. L REv. 677 (1991);
Juliana Reno, A Little Help from My Friends: The Legal Status of Assisted Suicide, 25 CmaiGrroN L
PEv. 1151 (1992); Thomas Rivosecchi, Comment, Medical Self-Determination: A Call for Uni-
formity, 31 DuQ. L REv. 87 (1992); George P. Smith II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a
Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv.
275 (1989); Lynn D. Wardle, Sanctioned Assisted Suicide: "Separate but Equal" Treatment for the
"New Illegitimates, "3 Issuas iN L. & MED. 245 (1987); Robert F. Weir, The.Morality of Physician-
Assisted Suicide 20 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 116 (1992); Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and
the Right to Die with Assistance 105 HARv. L REv. 2021 (1992).
The issue is hardly academic: an estimated 10,000 patients are being maintained in
persistent vegetative states in the United States alone. The number is expected to increase
significantly. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 328 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). A fifth of all adults surviving to age 80 will likely suffer from a progres-
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right to choose the withholding or withdrawal of treatment, while firmly
condemning active euthanasia.5 25 The dilemma is the refusal to face real-
ity-somewhat like the child who cannot fathom the reason for the
euthanizing of its beloved pet.5 26 Debbie's death, when it came, would
have been far worse than by morphine. The fact that it came somewhat
sooner, and by the hand of a doctor,5 27 is a further question of ethics that
has not been well addressed. 528 The dilemma will likely become worse,
especially with respect to the acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome
epidemic.
5 29
For I was hungy and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and
you gave me something to drink.
530
Similarly, physicians are deeply troubled by the implications of with-
holding food and water from patients. The physiological effects of with-
drawal of nutrition and hydration, which are considered medical
treatment,531 provide a harrowing lesson in dying.53 2 Witnessing death
sive, demential disorder prior to death. Id. at 329. The eighty percent of Americans who die
in hospitals are likely to die in sedated or comatose, and certainly manipulated, states. Id.
The issue of legal liability for physicians who assist in euthanasia is another dimension to
the medical community's dilemma. See; e.g., Hilary H. Young, Assisted Suicide and Physician
Liability, 11 Ray. Lrrm. 623, 641-50 (1992).
525. SeeAaRmcAN MEDICAL Ass'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL ANDJUDICIAL ASAIRs, REPORT 12:
EurAsrA 3 (June 1988).
526. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association
sees the withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging treatment as acceptable, with the in-
tention not to kill the patient but rather to relieve the patient of the burden of treatment or
suffering. Id. at 4. This ignores, however, the reality that withdrawal of life-prolonging meas-
ures, such as oxygen, food, water, will increase, not relieve, suffering-at least until death.
527. Cf supra notes 348-50 and accompanying text (description of Dr. Kevorkian and his
invention to assist suicide).
528. Compare Rachels, supra note 31, at 43 (arguing that there is no difference between
letting die and killing) and Howard Caplan, Doctors Should Support Euthanasia Decisions in Eu-
*rssqA = OPPosnqG VWoIn rrs, supra note 31, at 49 (recounting of a patient's miserable
death, and the court order needed for withdrawal of nutrition and hydration), with Robert
Campbell & Diane Collinson, Passive and Active Euthanasia Are Not Equally Acceptabl id. at 51
(arguing a prima facie difference exists). The best defense of the position against active
euthanasia appears to be Thurston Brewin's comment. See supra note 508 (pointing out that
passive euthanasia is considered "inexcusable cruelty" in the case of animals.
Compounding the problem is the relative secrecy of the instances where passive eutha-
nasia occurs; most are well hidden even within the hospitals that are already isolated from
society.
529. See SPRENG & LARSON, supra note 2, at 31.
530. Matthew 25:35 (Revised American).
531. See supra note 440.
532. Progressive effects of withholding food and water.
a. The mouth dries out and becomes caked or coated with thick material.
b. The lips become parched and cracked or fissured.
c. The tongue becomes swollen and might crack.
d. The eyes sink back into their orbits.
e. The cheeks become hollow.
f. The lining of the nose might crack and bleed.
g. The skin hangs loosely on the body and becomes scaly.
h. The urine becomes highly concentrated, burning the bladder.
i. The lining of the stomach dries out, causing dry heaves and vomiting.
j. Hyperthermia develops.
k. The brain cells begin drying out, causing convulsions.
I. The respiratory tract dries out, causing very thick secretions which can plug
the lungs and cause death.
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via starvation and thirst is against both functions of medicine; health care
professionals are forced to watch as they fail to either preserve life or re-
duce suffering.5 3 Passive euthanasia is thus arguably more against the
traditions of medicine than either active euthanasia or organized palliative
care. Even more problematic for the medical profession is the dilemma
posed by children who are born with, or develop, serious deformities or
mental incapacities.53 4 As legal incompetents, they must rely on the deci-
sions of their parents or guardians, which can sometimes present confused
conflicts as the parents face terrible options in situations where objective
decisionmaking is difficult, at best, and heart-rending always.535 This
presents an additional burden for the physician, and the courts, in balanc-
ing the needs of the child with the intentions of the parents.53 6 After all,
children must rely on others for everything, including wisdom.
C. Economic Considerations
People talk about the right to die as if they have the right to refuse to
die.
537
Persons who are dying often worry about the effect of their illness on
their family's financial situation. 538 The increasing reliance on hospitals
m. Eventually, the major organs fail, resulting in death.
See Rita Marker, Euthanasia Part HI Starvation and Dehydration as Treatment, STEUB r.VlLE REG-
isrm, Nov. 13, 1987, at 12 (description by Judge David H. Kopelman of Massachusetts). Com-
pare Fred Rosner, Food and Water Must Always Be Provided, in EuTHANASLU OPPOSINo
VxEwPoirs, supra note 31, at 77, with Dan W. Brock, Food and Water Must Not Always Be Pro-
vided, id. at 83.
One recent book that has caused considerable controversy discussed alternative methods
of euthanasia, criticized the effects of many such methods, and provided advice for recom-
mended methods. SeeDEREK HumPHRy, FNAL Exrr: THE PRAcrcAx S OF SELP-DELVERENcE
AN AssisTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991).
533. Withholding of food and water provides an interesting contrast to the withholding
or withdrawal of other, less basic medical treatments. Similar to the kidney dialysis story (see
supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text), starvation is something that physicians and
nurses can (easily) do something about. Resources are not a problem (indeed, even if they
were, congressional reaction would probably be the same as with kidney dialysis: since we
don't like the problem of a pie cut unevenly, let's legislate a bigger pie), yet a vegetative or
terminal life cannot be fixed, whatever the commitment.
534. Some children have congenital defects that will result inevitably in their deaths, nor-
mally after much suffering. Others, such as Down's syndrome children, are in no immediate
threat of death, and can live their lives in reasonably normal ways, remaining as children and
capable of emotional relationships and simple tasks. See Foot, supra note 38, at 106. See also
THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 2, at 37-40 (discussing euthanasia when the patient is not
terminal).
535. Cf. supra notes 262-78 and accompanying text (story of Corinne van de Put). Of
course Corinne was not consulted; infants must rely on others for everything, including wis-
dom. The pertinent question is: Does she have a right to a peaceful death? If so, does that
right outweigh reliance on an assumed desire of a right to live?
536. "If we say we are unable to look after children with handicaps we are no more telling
the truth than was the S.S. man who said that the Jews could not be fed." Foot, supra note 38,
at 106-07 (emphasis in original).
537. Richard Lamm, Euthanasia Should Be Based on Economic Factors, in EuTNAs,: Oppos-
ING ViEWPOINrs, supra note 31, at 135.
538. See HARRY VAN BOMMEL, CHoicEs: FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE A TERMINAL ILLNESS, THEIR
FANIEs, AND THEIR CAREGIVERS 118 (1987); see also M. Rose Gasner, Financial Penalties for
Failing to Honor Patient Wshes to Refuse Treatment, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L REV. 499, 499-520
(1992).
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and medical professionals has greatly increased the cost of dying in the
United States.539 According to basic societal values, personal financial
considerations must not be controlling, but, realistically, cannot be consid-
ered illegitimate, either.
The macroeconomic impact of euthanasia, or its prohibition, is an
increasingly troublesome issue, particularly since it disrespects the moral
and social implications of its findings.540 Nevertheless, health care costs
continue to escalate, and many who need health care are forced to survive,
or not, without adequate care. The wisdom of allocating larger portions of
our already insufficient health care resources on the maintenance of ter-
minally ill, or persistently vegetative, patients is not clear.54 1 This element
of the euthanasia debate is generally ignored, and will likely continue to
be so, as a decision based on economic considerations would be seen as
perilously close to the illegitimate considerations of the Nazi Germans.5 42
VII. COMPARATIVE LEGAL ScHEMEs
Perhaps the Netherlands provide the best example of officially ac-
539. Cf. VAN BomMEL, supra note 538, at 118.
540. With some macroeconomic qualifiers, ours is substantially a "zero-sum" society (par-
ticularly with respect to the short- and medium-term allocations); where we allocate resources
(money) on one thing, we have roughly that same amount- less for whatever else we want or
need. See, e.g., ABRAHAM L. GrrLow, ECONOMICS 7-12 (1962).
Further, the demographic aging of our society will eventually force these issues more
into focus; by the year 2040, the elderly will likely constitute twenty-one percent of the popu-
lation and consume forty-five percent of all health care resources. Daniel Callahan, Euthana-
sia Should Be Based on Age, in EuTHANAsw OPPOSING VImWPOIHrS, supra note 31, at 120. But ef.
Roy A. Fox, Euthanasia Should Not Be Based on Age, id. at 126 (supporting medical decisions
based solely on individual cases and rejecting economic considerations as contrary to public
policy). A particularly troubling aspect of this debate is discussed in Robert L. Risky, Volun-
taty Active Euthanasia: The Next Frontier. Impact on the Indigent, 8 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 361
(1992).
An estimated eighty percent of the average American's medical costs are spent in the last
year of life. VAN BoMMErs, supra note 538, at 118.
541. Richard Lamm, who served as governor of Colorado from 1974 to 1986, caused an
uproar when he declared that the elderly had a "duty to die," rather than waste precious
medical resources in the last months of life. See Lamm, supra note 537, at 132. He further
lambastes public policy which favors treatment of the terminally ill while ignoring education,
prenatal care, and our infrastructure. See id. at 133, 137. He asserts that we, as a nation, are
not wealthy enough to base our health care on the assumption that we can provide every-
thing medically possible to everyone who needs it. He thus supports rationing, and points
out that medical rationing already exists. See id. at 134. He also disapproves of the favoritism
bestowed on his (older) generation. See id. at 136; see also Margaret P. Battin, Age Rationing
and the Just Distribution of Health Care: Is There a Duty to Die?, 97 ETmcs 317, 319-40 (1987);
Subrata N. Chakravarty & Katherine Weisman, Consuming Our Children?, FoRBES Nov. 14,
1988, at 222, 222-32 (cover story title: Cry Baby: The Intergenerational Transfer of Wealth).
But cf. Dana E. Johnson, Euthanasia Should Not Be Based on Economic Factors, in EuT Astw
OPpOSING Vawpomrrs, supra note 31, at 139 (arguing that the medical relationship should
not be disturbed by economic interference); THOmASMA & GiR"a, supra note 2, at 190-91
(noting the potential danger of "technofix" medical solutions).
Not considered relevant by the drafters of the Life-Sustaining Procedures Declaration,
supra note 317, is the tremendous cost associated with continued vegetative care that often
cannot be covered by family resources. Also, should the family not wish impoverishment, the
ability to abandon the patient poses a difficult problem, if not a cruel dilemma, for the
family.
542. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
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knowledged euthanasia.5 43 Although active euthanasia remains illegal in
the Netherlands, as many as several thousand are still performed annu-
ally.5 44 Dutch opinions have changed dramatically over the past two de-
cades, and a solid majority now favor active euthanasia. 545 The action to
543. See, e.g., Pieter V. Admiraal, Justifiable Euthanasia, 3 Issuzs IN L. & MED. 361 (1988);
Margaret Battin, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Risks of Abuse: Can We Learn Anything from the
Netherlands?, 20 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 133 (1992); Catharina I. Dessaur & Chris J.C.
Rutenfrans, The Present Day Practice of Euthanasia, 3 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 399 (1988); Dana E.
Hirsch, Comment, Euthanasia: Is It Murder or Mercy Killing? A Comparison of the Criminal Laws
in the United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, 12 LOY. LA. INT'L & COMe. L.. 821, 835-
38(1990); Henk Jochemsen, Life-Prolonging and Life-Terminating Treatment of Severely Handi-
capped Newborn Babies: A Discussion of the Report of the Royal Dutch Society of Medicine on "Life-
Terminating Actions with Incompetent Patients: Part I, Severely Handicapped Newborns", 8 IssuEs IN
L. & MED. 167 (1992);John Keown, The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 108
LAw Q. REv. 51 (1992); M.T. Meulders-Klein, The Right Over One's Own Body: Its Scope and
Limits in Comparative Law, 6 B.C. INr'L & COMP. L REv. 29 (1983);J.H. Segers, Elderly Persons
on the Subject of Euthanasia, 3 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 407 (1988); Helen Silving, Euthanasia: A
Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. Ray. 350 (1954); Peter Zisser, Euthanasia and
the Right to Die: Holland and the United States Face the Dilemma, 9 N.Y.L ScH.J. INT'L & COMP. L
361 (1988).
In February of 1993, "[ t ] he Dutch parliament adopted the most liberal euthanasia guide-
lines in Europe after years of keeping the widely accepted practice in legal limbo." WALL ST.
J., Feb. 10, 1993, at Al. The measuve stopped short of legalization, but guarantees physicians
immunity from prosecution provided they follow strict rules. Euthanasia remains punishable
by up to 12 years in prison, however. Id.
Other societies are slowly, if begrudgingly, becoming exposed to this dilemma. InJapan,
where life expectancies are among the highest anywhere, the high rate of suicide has pushed
euthanasia into the headlines. See Catharine Rosair, Long-Living Japanese Debate Right to Die
with Dignity, HONOLULU ST.R-Buu-mN, Nov. 4, 1992, at A-28. The circumstances surround-
ing Emperor Hirohito's death, in which he received more than ten times his blood capacity
in transfusions after being diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, brought euthanasia issues to
the forefront. His weight dwindled to a mere 66 pounds. During his agonizing illness,
neither he nor the Japanese people were told the truth about his condition. Id.
For discussions of legal policy in Canada, see Daryl-Lynn Carlson, Euthanasia: The Contro-
versy of Mercy, 16 CAN. LAw. 26 (Dec.-Jan. 1992-93); Fran Carnerie, Euthanasia and Self-Deter-
minism: Is There a Charter Right in Canada?, 32 McGiuL L.J. 299 (1987). For a discussion of
euthanasia policy in England, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Right to Die, 141 Nv LJ. 1637
(1991).
For an interesting corollary in a non-Western social context, see Isam Ghanem, The Re-
sponse of lslamic Jurisprudence to Ectopic Pregnancies, Frozen Embryo Implantation, and Euthanasia,
27 MED., ScL. & L 187 (1987).
544. See Pieter V. Admiraal, Justifiable Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, in EurHANAsrA
THE MORAL IssuEs, supra note 31, at 125; Marlise Simons, Dutch Survey Sheds Light on Euthana-
sia, Suicide AUsTIN AMERiCAN-STATESMtAN, Sept. 22, 1991, at C2. Every doctor who performs
active euthanasia is technically liable to prosecution, but so long as certain clearly circum-
scribed guidelines are followed, prosecutions have not been pursued. See Admiraal, supra.
Under these guidelines, (1) the patient must have been informed of his situation, (2) he
must have requested euthanasia freely and after careful consideration, (3) the doctor must
believe that death is justified and no alternatives are available, (4) an independent physician
must have been consulted, and (5) a report must be filed. After the death, the case must be
reported to the coroner, and the police must investigate and report to the prosecutor, who,
in consultation with the Attorney General, will decide whether to prosecute. Id. at 125-26.
On December 11, 1987, a bill was introduced, after considerable debate, into the Dutch
legislature to legalize active euthanasia. See HJJ. Leenen; Euthanasia in the Netherlands, in
MEDicINE, MEDICAL ETmcS AND THE VALUE OF LIFE 1 (Peter Byrne ed., 1990).
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end life must be voluntary, thus excluding incompetent persons.5 46 Many
opposed to active euthanasia in the United States accuse the medical pro-
fession of atrocities in the Netherlands, 547 although no independent evi-
dence has verified this.
548
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Euthanasia is controversial because it can be viewed from either the
eyes of God or the hearts of humans. Alternatively, opponents object from
a position disassociated with individuals who must face euthanasia directly,
while those individuals must go against the accumulated wisdom of their
society to meet life as it meets them. Fundamental moral values are pitted
against the exigencies of suffering patients who demand-and deserve-
relief. Active euthanasia has been practiced sporadically throughout his-
tory, but is contrary to the sanctity of life, a tenet of Christian belief. The
frequency of persons who suffer with no reasonable possibility of recovery
continues to increase, further intensifying the debate.
In addition to violating the sanctity of life, euthanasia can be seen as
the first step down a road of self-destructive barbarism. Moreover, the
medical community, and patients themselves, are apprehensive about tak-
ing their own life before Death does. On the other side of the debate is
essentially one argument with two dimensions: we must allow euthanasia
because we must not allow needless suffering. Beyond that-even ac-
cepting the arguments of euthanasia opponents-to continue as we do
now is to ignore reality and insist on forcing euthanasia underground,
where no legal safeguards are available. The answer, if one exists, will
deny one side its fundamental beliefs.
Euthanasia can be either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary eutha-
nasia is the least problematic ethically, since the person suffering can jus-
tify his decision intelligently. Involuntary euthanasia has not been further
categorized, but should be. It can be either beneficent or malevolent. Be-
neficent involuntary euthanasia is accomplished on behalf, and in the best
interests, of an incapacitated person, and is currently the topic of much
legal action, as Cruzan illustrated.5 49 Provided adequate legal safeguards
Id.; see also VAN BOMMEL, supra note 538, at 124.
546. Unless they have expressly so provided previously. See Leenen, supra note 544, at 3.
547. The International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force is particularly critical:
Eight Dutch hospitals are performing involuntary euthanasia. Families of pa-
tients who will die by euthanasia need not be consulted.
Some Dutch doctors have been advised to kill their elderly patients rather than
admit them to hospitals, and elderly people report they fear being "assisted to die"
because they are burdensome to others.
And the Royal Dutch Medical Association has endorsed euthanasia for children
without parental consent.
Mary Senander, Medical Murder Is Given a Forum, MrmmAoLrs STAi Tam, June 8, 1989, at
27A.
548. We can reasonably assume that atrocities d la Nazi Germany would be well reported.
549. In the process of molding a new common law, many have suffered beyond their
already pitiful situations, yet that remains the price of our system ofjustice. See, e.g., supra
part ILC.
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are in place, the use of Durable Powers of Attorney or Living Wills in an
evidentiary capacity militates against extended litigation, while absence of
evidence of the incapacitated person's intent forms the core of the current
legal debate. Malevolent involuntary euthanasia, as occurred in Nazi Ger-
many, is not euthanasia at all-it is murder. In any event, it is neither
espoused nor seriously considered as appropriate public policy.
Euthanasia can be either active or passive. Active euthanasia involves
some positive action causing death and is thus equated with murder. Pas-
sive euthanasia is increasingly a poorly defined area extending from sim-
ple withholding to active withdrawal of medical treatment, including food
and water, until death occurs. The effort to distinguish these forms cre-
ates a false dichotomy given current medical technology, because active
and passive are no longer distinct categories. Rather, they form a spec-
trum of possibilities that blend into each other. This makes many argu-
ments against active euthanasia less persuasive when presented with the
medical realities of (barely) live patients.
Assuming we, as a society, recognize situations where euthanasia is
acceptable, then our current attitudes toward death and its ways are worse
than dilemmic; they are hypocritical. Passive euthanasia can be not only
worse than active euthanasia, it is often barbaric. The process of starvation
cannot reasonably be said to be preferable to death itself; there is no logi-
cal answer to the question of how starving a comatose person is better than
a lethal narcotic injection. Denying positive relief, while condoning the
systematic, if hidden, near-torture of those near-in time or physiology-
death is the height of ethical hypocrisy. Hippocrates may indeed have
opposed the Greek tradition of suicide, but he could not have imagined
the advances medical technology would provide. Such advances have
proved a double-edged sword, however. All the physicians we can produce
cannot change this reality. In prolonging life, medicine sometimes pro-
longs suffering. There is no escape from the horns of this dilemma-as
with war, it will be with us for a very long time indeed. The medical com-
munity is singularly unable to cope with this dilemma, and needs guidance
from the law, which must in turn honestly appraise the issues involved.
We insist more fervently on humane treatment for animals than for
those who are dying and need all the compassion we can find in ourselves
to give them.550 Sometimes that means, in the real world, doing that
which we don't want to do, but must. What is wrong is not that we must
aid in their deaths, but the tragedy-of whatever making-that they must
die so ignominiously.
We as a species are probably not yet mature enough to deal with the
explosive issues surrounding euthanasia, yet we have little choice. Not
dealing with the issues directly has brought unnecessary misery into the
lives of many. Society too must learn better to deal with death. Death is
certainly not ajoyful occasion, but it needn't be so maudlin. In our efforts
550. Humane is not insignificantly derived from Latin humanus, or human. See VII Ox-
FoRD ENGLISH DiCTIONARY 473-74 (2d ed. 1989).
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to outmaneuver Death, we have stopped accepting it when it calls and
have often been our own worst enemy in denying it its due. Death is not
always the enemy to be feared and fought to the last.
Mechanisms for killing are, to put it mildly, problematic. Opponents
of active euthanasia are rightly concerned about the potential for social
disaster. We can either proscribe all active euthanasia, with the resultant
misery, or confront the problem and provide for adequate, even obsessive,
legal safeguards. The common slippery slope objection is specious. Life is
a slippery slope. So too, now, is Death. We have no choice but to deal
with these issues in a reasoned, balanced way. We must stop fighting
against the slope and instead define acceptable and unacceptable policies.
To attempt to define precisely the distinctions of euthanasia is to dichoto-
mize falsely what are in reality categories that blend into each other. At
some point passive is no longer so passive, and guidelines to ensure the
patient's rights are needed to ensure civilization's continued presence.
This is not to suggest that judicial standards should be loose-quite the
opposite. But the courts must acknowledge the reality of the diverse cir-
cumstances possible in this arena, and, with polished safeguards in their
sheaths, do justice.55 1 Legal safeguards are particularly important when
concerning incapacitated patients, but, as Cruzan has shown, our legal sys-
tem is capable of handling such delicate issues. That is, after all, its
function.
To accept the religious perspective is to wholly accept the assump-
tions underlying the beliefs of some, but not all, which is as directly op-
posed to the Constitution and our special social leniencies as is likely to be
found. The law cannot accept on faith-to assume that which cannot be
proved-a basic assumption of religious belief. With most issues, religious
beliefs do form a common background for public policy, but with eutha-
nasia, the answer is binary. We must accept either all or nothing-there is
no middle ground to the sanctity of human life. Yet reality indicates
otherwise. So long as some are forced to live, and suffer through, that
reality, it is arrogant, at least, for some to insist on the meaning of life to
those already half in hell.
Society cannot avoid the complex controversies surrounding euthana-
sia and must at least attempt to provide for adequate guidelines and legal
safeguards for those who tragically must face such a decision. Passive eu-
thanasia is rarely painless. Active euthanasia is not only painless, but if
properly administered it should be a positive experience. Drugs that pro-
duce pleasurable sensations given before a fatal injection, coupled with a
dignified ceremony, are far preferable to an ignominious starvation as an
end to life. This is not maniacal; the horror of suffering exists-it is for
society to be honorable in aiding those who would otherwise needlessly
suffer by providing a legally safeguarded exit.
551. Notwithstanding Justice Holmes' admonition that ajudge's duty is to apply the law,
and not to "dojustice." IRvwNG DU.LARD, THE SPRTrr oF LIBERTY 306-07 (3d ed. 1960) (quoting
Judge Learned Hand), repinted in EUGENE C. GERHART, QuoTE IT! MEMORABLE LEGAL Quo-
TATIONS 314 (1969).
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A right to privacy-possibly the ultimate refuge for a right to die-is
more legitimately based in a person's property interest in his own being.
This redefinition does not resolve the debate surrounding euthanasia. It
does, however, frame it differently, placing the burden more squarely on
society to show cause for interrupting a person's actions to end his own
life. Such a showing is not onerous where the individual's demands are
unsubstantiated. Reliance on a constitutional right to privacy is worri-
some, however, because it defies what the law craves-ready definition and
concrete rules.55 2 Recognizing this more intellectually honest basis for a
right to privacy changes the relative positions of the interested parties in
the euthanasia debate. Proceeding from the assumption of personal au-
tonomy, the question for the government is under what circumstances an
individual's right to determine the nature and time of his death can be
overridden by state and societal interests. This does not provide an easy
answer to the euthanasia dilemma-that would be neither possible nor
desirable. Rather, the debate is placed in a more appropriate context.
The legal system must bear the burden in balancing the "right" of the
individual to a peaceful death with the government's duty to ensure that
that individual's death is indeed peaceful. The burden should not rest on
the individual; government must show cause for invading a property inter-
est in a person's reasoned desire for death.
The criminal law must come to terms with the issues surrounding eu-
thanasia. Three means of distinguishing active euthanasia from murder
are available: the humanitarian motives of the person who kills, the cir-
cumstances and motives of the person who dies, and the circumstances
surrounding the death. In so distinguishing, two badly needed functions
are served. First, safeguards against abuse are available to all parties in-
volved. Second, criminal sanctions against actions not in keeping with the
benefit of the suffering individual are legitimized. The criminal justice
system, however, is not solely to blame; the criminal law is merely a reflec-
tion of societal values.
Society as well must face the issue and develop consistent rules.
Where the person is legally competent and suffers from a terminal illness
with no reasonable expectation of recovery or remission, euthanasia must
be voluntary-evidenced by persistent, conscious, and free requests.
Where the person is a minor, the parent's wishes must be balanced by the
medical profession and the courts against any possible abuse. Where the
adult person is incapacitated and has not completed a societally en-
couraged document stating his wishes, the family members should be
given limited discretion, again under court supervision, to authorize active
euthanasia. Any reports of abuse must be investigated thoroughly, and, if
substantiated, punishment to the full extent the law allows must be meted.
552. This illustrates the difficulty in defining too closely an issue-privacy-so basic we
assume its general authenticity. Attempts to make discrete that which is inherently vague
inevitably result in poor articulation of created fictions, which then run the risk of eventual
exposure as the superstructure of stare decisis overwhelms the fluid foundation. It is far
better to recognize a public policy as existing broadly while resisting efforts to define it pre-
cisely, insisting instead on flexible, equitable decisions with structural safeguards.
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With authorized means available, no excuse would exist for unsupervised
or inappropriate euthanasia. Regardless of the course the courts or soci-
ety takes, euthanasia will remain a controversial issue. We must recognize
this and accept the need for balancing the contradictory interests, and get
on with our deaths.
The debate should not center around a "right to life"; does anyone
question that? Rather, it involves a right to non-life; a right, legitimately
circumscribed, to abstain from that which is needlessly painful. As Ham-
let's soliloquy attests, the debate is intensely personal. Yet we cannot deny
to those who are suffering beyond our comprehension the alternative of a
gentle and easy death.
I've never heard of anyone dying from laughing. Wouldn't that be
nice?
5 53
553. DAD (Universal 1990) (spoken by Jake Tremont (actor Jack Lemmon) to his wife,
Bette, after his near-fatal hospitalization, following which he rebounds with uncharacteristic
joie de vhm).
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